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A bstract

This dissertation explores Nietzsche's political theory through an
analysis of his major work, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It is demonstrated that
the narrative structure of Zarathustra follows from a politically-grounded
critique of collective human existence. Nietzsche critiques the state and
mass society as inherently repressive. He critiques the concept of the
community and friendship as producing ressentiment and bad conscience.
One of the central metaphors in Zarathustra proves to be that of nausea,
arising from contempt for the mediocre masses of humanity and the
realization of the chaotic and contingent nature of existence. Through
nausea, the individual necessarily becomes separated from the masses and
is able to begin the process of constructing an individually-actuated
selfhood. Nietzsche then discusses the possibility of self-creation, spurred
by the confrontation with individual finitude. This project of self
overcoming proceeds thorough an aesthetic ethics of resistance to repression
and acts of protean creation. Nietzsche's theory of transmuted selfhood is
one that embraces multiplicity and contradiction within the consciousness.
It is ultimately shown that the model of selfhood presented in Zarathustra
depends upon resistance and solitude, thus precluding the possibility of
constructive political theory in the traditional statist sense. Rather,
Nietzsche's relevance for politics is the imperative to seek new permutations
of personal existence.
iv
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C h apter I
N ietzsche a n d Political T h o u g h t

Nietzsche has received a great deal of attention in recent years and
has had a profound influence over contemporary scholarship. However,
there has been less attention paid to Nietzsche in political theory than in
other areas of the humanities. Despite the dearth of literature addressed to
Nietzsche's political thought, there is surprisingly little consensus as to its
content Interpretations range from the assertion that Nietzsche was a
deeply political thinker concerned with the institutional arrangements of the
state to the rival interpretation that Nietzsche had little political interest
outside of the internal struggle within die individual soul. Certainly textual
support can be found for both of these assertions, with a broad intermediate
ground lying in between. The lack of unanimity concerning Nietzsche's
political thought is troubling as Nietzsche had a profound impact upon
most contemporary political thinkers and has helped to shape postmodern
thought
This project is designed to remedy a serious omission in the political
literature on Nietzsche. The ambiguity regarding Nietzsche's political
thought is largely an artifact of the strategies and presuppositions of the
interpreters of his texts rattier than an accurate representation of Nietzsche's
political reflections. This project will demonstrate that Nietzsche's political
thought is not as fragmented and contradictory as the literature suggests.
1
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Rather, Nietzsche's political and social thought is relatively coherent and
follows from his epistemological and ontological project The
misunderstanding of Nietzsche's political thought is largely due to the
stubborn neglect by political theorists of Nietzsche's major work, Thus
Spoke Zarathustra.
This project will demonstrate that Zarathustra is Nietzsche's most
important contribution to political thought and provides the key for
interpretation of Nietzsche's thought as a whole. It is only in Zarathustra
that Nietzsche, freed from the constraint of conventional philosophical
discourse, is able to discuss his own very unconventional theories of
philosophical anthropology and the creation of the individual self. It will be
shown that Zarathustra bridges Nietzsche's early praise of Homeric
societies and the mediating force of tragedy with his later discussions of the
transmuted self and the ethic of resistance to societal norms and institutions.
Without referring to Zarathustra, it is ultimately impossible to understand
Nietzsche in any but a fragmented and superficial fashion.
Furthermore, by concentrating on Zarathustra, it is possible to
examine Nietzsche at his own self-proclaimed best As the culmination of
his mature philosophy, Zarathustra represents the opportunity to study
Nietzsche's political theory most accurately. As such, studying Nietzsche
through an interpretation of his narrative most closely resembles die
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interpretive exercise Nietzsche called for in his philosophy. Therefore, this
dissertation represents an attempt to meet Nietzsche on his own terms.
It will be shown that Nietzsche constructed Zarathustra as a
deliberate critique of traditional political institutions and practices. Indeed,
it will be demonstrated that Nietzsche chose the narrative format in order to
avoid the linguistic and stylistic constraints of conventional philosophical
discourse. As such, Zarathustra represents a unique challenge: it is
Nietzsche at his finest both philosophically and rhetorically. However, it is
also Nietzsche at his most problematic and evasive.
L
Not surprisingly, the question of Nietzsche's political theory has
engendered a formidable scholarly debate. It is necessary to penetrate the
debate and determine the main currents of thought underlying the most
influential interpretations of Nietzsche's political theory. This review will
demonstrate that the literature on Nietzsche's political thought does indeed
suffer from inattention to Zarathustra; and will detail the interpretations
that will be criticized and elaborated upon by the substantive discussion of
Zarathustra.
There has been a great amount of work on Nietzsche, but most have
been only marginally successful or wrongheaded. This is primarily because
they have not sought to understand Nietzsche in his own terms, but try to
make Nietzsche conform to traditional models and terminology of
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4
traditional political theory. In attempting to pigeonhole Nietzsche's political
reflections into the categories familiar to conventional state-centered
political theory, the radical elements of his political message are
simultaneously distorted and emphasized. This phenomenon is illuminated
by the tendency of political interpreters of Nietzsche to cluster around two
fundamental themes.
Paradoxically, these fall into two antithetical categories, statist and
apolitical. Statist interpretations, including Strong and Ansell-Pearson, try
to find a positive political theory of the state in Nietzsche's philosophy.1
Generally, these interpretations identify new institutions, new social norms,
and tend to stress Nietzsche's affinity with the ancient Greek heroic state. In
these interpretations Nietzsche is acknowledged as a critic of the modem
nation-state, but they emphasize that Nietzsche envisions a new model of
society to replace the flawed political system of modernity. Interestingly,
these interpretations tend to stress the early works of Nietzsche and neglect
the aphoristic works.
Apolitical interpretations, including Thiele, Heidegger, and
Klossowski, argue that Nietzsche does not present a comprehensive political

1Tracy Strong, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o f Transfiguration (Berkley: University
of California Press, 1974), Keith Ansell-Pearson, A n Introduction to N ietzsche as a Political
Thinker The PerfectN ihilist(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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theory.2 Rather, Nietzsche presents a critique of politics and political theory
that is so scathing and complete that it is impossible to rejuvenate politics.
Generally, these interpreters argue that Nietzsche envisions all human
interaction as essentially repressive and given to creating self-replicating
mechanisms of oppression. These interpretations stress the destructive
aspects of force, the specter of Nihilism, and imply that Nietzsche's
philosophy is either completely inimical to politics or a form of aristocratic
individualism. These interpretations rely upon the aphoristic and later
works to support their conclusions.
In order to set the stage for the analysis of Zarathustra, it is necessary
to explore these interpretations to discern the important controversies that
may be answered by this analysis of Zarathustra. In keeping with the
central theme of this dissertation, Nietzsche's theories on the constitution
and origin of the concrete self, this literature review will primarily
concentrate on this theme as it has been explored in the political literature
on Nietzsche. This often takes form of discussion of the enigmatic concept
of the Vbermensch?

2Leslie Paul Thiele, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o fthe Soul. A Study o fHeroic
Individualism (Princeton University Press, 1990), Martin Heidegger "Who is Nietzsche's
Zarathustra?" in ed. David Allison The N ew N ietzsche (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985),
Martin Heidegger, N ietzsche, 4 vob. trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper,
1979), Pierre fdossowski, N ietzsche and the Vicious Circle, trans. Daniel W. Smith
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
3 Nietzsche's prose is elegant and readily translates. However, it is simply impossible to
translate the vicissitudes of the German language, especially the loaded terms common to
philosophical discourse. Indeed, mistranslation of Nietzsche's key terms has led to
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Tracy Strong elaborated one of the first interpretations specifically
devoted to Nietzsche's political theory. Strong attributes to Nietzsche a
"politics of transfiguration/' which has as its goal "the development of
beings who do not simply live as human-all-too-human." 4 This striking
transfiguration requires "a change in the very stuff of humanity."5 Strong's
argument is based upon an interpretation of Nietzsche's project for
humanity that argues for the production of a successor species for man.
Man is not only overcome, he is replaced.
Strong contends Nietzsche envisioned that this transfiguration would
occur within a political system. He acknowledges Nietzsche's attacks on the
state, but contends that "to assert. . . that Nietzsche attacks politics is to
miss the key point This is not a specifically anti-political doctrine "6 Strong
contends that Nietzsche is reacting specifically to the modem nation-state,

common misconceptions of his philosophy. Accordingly, I have endeavored to leave
untranslated those terms which can not be clearly rendered into English. These include
such words as Obermensch or words whose English equivalents have a different
connotation, such as Dekadenz Words with multiple English equivalents, such as Geist,
have been dealt with as accurately as possible, considering the complexity of the text
Except where I quote directly from sources, I render W ille zur Macht hyphenated as "willto-power," following the practice of Bemd Magnus, in order to emphasize the essential
unity of phrase which does not come across otherwise. However carefully it is attempted,
translation is always an interpretive exercise and fraught with danger. No amount of
linguistic knowledge or skill can replace or accurately simulate the raw force of A lso Sprach
Zarathustra in German.
4Strong, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Polities o f Transfiguration. 13.
5 Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Polities o f Transfiguration, 260.
6Tracy Strong, "Nietzsche and Politics" in N ietzsche: A Collection o f CriticalEssays, ed.
Robert Solomon (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 283.
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which is a "concretization of only slave morality."7 Rather, Nietzsche
envisions a state similar to the ancient Greek p o liso t Homeric heroic
societies, which lauded the triumph of the exceptional individual. Although
these two models are drastically different from one another, they both have
a common element
For Nietzsche, the development of society which is not its own
rationale and therefore does not permit of a nihilistic selfconsciousness must come from or at least be co-equal with the
appearance of men who do not share the ontological problems of the
present men and their society.8
For Strong, Nietzsche's politics starts with the individual, but must
necessarily end with the social. Indeed, these individuals might not arise at
all without the presence of the state. This interpretation relies heavily upon
Nietzsche's early essay "The Greek State," in which Nietzsche praises heroic
society. Such themes can also be detected in The Birth o f Tragedy.
However, Nietzsche's later works, including Zarathustra, do not seem as
optimistic regarding the general theme of the state, much less the creation of
an "ideal society."
The most disturbing element of Strong's interpretation, however, is
the insistence on the actual transfiguration of humankind. The thesis of this
argument might be called into doubt through the reading of some of
Nietzsche's later works, specifically The Antichrist
7Strong, "Nietzsche and Politics," 283.
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The problem I thus pose is not what shall succeed mankind in the
sequence of living beings (man as an end), but what type of man shall
be bred, shall be willed, for being higher in value, worthier of life,
more certain of a future. Even in the past this higher type has
appeared often—but as a fortunate accident, as an exception, never as
something willed?
Through analysis of Zarathustra, a work largely ignored by Strong, it
will become clear that Nietzsche is arguing that the concept of the
Obermensch is to be used as a guide for willing the exceptional human, not
for replacing the species in a concrete, eugenic sense. The exceptional
human must arise from self-mastery and self-overcoming. It remains a
dubious assertion, or at least unclear, that Nietzsche had a biological or
evolutionary model in mind for the production of this individual. Most
prominent Nietzsche scholars differ with Strong's interpretation.
Danto's examination of the concept of the Obermensch is at odds
with Strong's. "The Obermensch. . . is not the blond giant dominating his
lesser fellows. He is merely a joyous, guiltless, free human being, in
possession of instinctual drives which do not overpower him.10 Beyond
these traits, Nietzsche gives little specific information. Danto concludes that
Nietzsche left the idea of the Obermensch "as a variable and not a constant,

8Strong, "Nietzsche and Politics," 290.
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The A ntichrist trans. Walter Kaufmann, in The Portable N ietzsche
(New York Viking, 1962), »3.
10Danto, N ietzsche as Philosopher, (New York Columbia University Press, 1965), 199.
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to be given a value by those of us who are to achieve it"11 However, Danto
acknowledges that this ambiguity has left the concept open to be interpreted
as one advocating "brute exercise of strength," especially considering some
of the illustrations that Nietzsche employs, such as Cesare Borgia.
Dannhauser describes the Obermensch as Nietzsche's project for the
future development of humanity. The Obermensch is both the fulfillment
and the transcendence of previously conceived ideals of man. However, he
asserts that the concept of the Obermensch is "necessarily vague and
ambiguous . . . the superman cannot be fully described because he will be
above all a true self. Every superman will be unique.12 Dannhauser
concludes that Nietzsche does not give a political solution to achieve the
realization of the Obermensch. Nietzsche instead offers an apolitical road to
achieving the Obermensch, which Dannhauser refers to as "radical
individualism." This is evident in Nietzsche calling for the potential
Obermensch to become "true selves. . . to seek solitude, to flee from public
life, to reject established modes of conduct and thought"13
Keith Ansell-Pearson contends that Nietzsche advocates the "great
politics" of aristocratic radicalism in the face of the "petty7' politics of

11 Danto, N ietzsche as Philosopher, 200.
12Werner J. Dannhauser, "Friedrich Nietzsche," in H istory o fPoliticalPhilosophy, ed. Leo
Strauss andJoseph Cropsey(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 847.
13Dannhauser, "Friedrich Nietzsche," 847.
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European nationalism. Ansell-Pearson stresses that the individualism
advocated by Nietzsche is an aristocratic, not a liberal, notion. "As he
himself tells us, his philosophy 'aims at an ordering of rank, not an
individualistic morality/"14 Individuals can only attain value by "placing
themselves in the service of the culture (which for him means the cultivation
of great human beings), and by representing. . . the ascending forces of
'life'"15 Like Strong, Ansell-Pearson looks to "The Greek State" and The
Birth o f Tragedy for an articulation of Nietzsche's political theory. "In it we
find a clear expression of Nietzsche's political theory, with its emphasis on
political life as a means to the production of great human beings and
culture."16
Ansell-Pearson ultimately argues that Nietzsche's political theory is
designed to produce individuals capable of producing new philosophical
legislation to bring the masses into line, a postmodern Philosopher King:
Nietzsche's thinking on politics. . . is best seen as an attempt to
understand how the conditions can be cultivated for man to undergo
further development and advancement in the epoch of the death of
God and the advent of nihilism. His preoccupation with politics is
thus neither accidental nor peripheral to his concerns, but can be seen
to arise in a very fundamental sense from his teaching on redemption
and from his reflections on the destiny of the soul. An important
aspect of the attempt to think through the problem of nihilism is the
need to develop an understanding of how new values can be created
14 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to N ietzsche as a Political Thinker, 11.
15 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to N ietzsche as a Political Thinker, 11.
16 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to N ietzsche as a Political Thinker, 63.
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and fashioned through the conjunction of philosophical legislation
and political power.17
Importantly, Ansell-Pearson argues that this exceptional individual is
not a eugenic notion, but an individual accomplishment, citing passages in
Ecce Homo to this effect "The Obermensch is not in any way to be
conceived along Darwinian lines or as representing a transcendental ideal..
. posited in terms of an infinite future beyond the reach of mere mortals."18
However, Ansell-Pearson consistently argues that Nietzsche asserts the
Obermensch can only arise within a societal context
Bruce Detwiler argues that Nietzsche's political significance rests in
"aristocratic radicalism." The death of God offered an opportunity to the
Dionysian artist-philosopher to emerge and take his rightful place at the
forefront of the creation of a new culture.19 Detwiler argues that one of
Nietzsche's fundamental points is that philosophy is an inherently artistic
endeavor, a contention that has profound societal implications. Nietzsche
argues that the worth of a philosopher is not found in discovering new
truths, but in the creation of new values. This artist philosopher is impelled
by the will-to-power to set for himself the artistic goal of a higher humanity.
17 Ansell-Pearson, N ietzsche contra Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 201.
18Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to N ietzsche as a Political Thinker, 106. Danto
makes a similar point, N ietzsche as Philosopher, 200.
19Bruce Detwiler, N ietzsche and the Politics o fAristocratic Radicalism (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1990), 99.
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This search involves a "philosophy of becoming and self-overcoming" and
involves "periodically discarding one's intellectual commitments."20
Detwiler concludes that the political implication of Nietzsche's thought
involves an aristocratic political order governed by a ruling caste of artistphilosophers.
Mark Warren employs an interesting, albeit questionable, distinction
in the analysis of Nietzsche and the political. Rather than discussing
Nietzsche's political thought as a whole, he makes a sharp distinction
between Nietzsche's political philosophy and his "philosophy of power."21
Warren asserts that Nietzsche's political philosophy does not warrant
serious consideration, as it is encompassed within Nietzsche's "philosophy
of agency" and his larger critique of Western culture. Nevertheless, Warren
ultimately characterizes Nietzsche's politics as "neoaristocratic
conservatism."22 Warren undertakes a thorough discussion of various
permutations of the will-to-power, and the political ramifications of each.
Warren ultimately finds that Nietzsche's philosophy of power leads to a
valid and useful "framework for a critically postmodern political

20 Detwiler, N ietzsche and the Politics o fAristocratic Radicalism, 170.
21 Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 1-8,207223.
22Warren, N ietzsche and Political Thought 211.
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philosophy."23 Warren's conclusion is somewhat paradoxical, given his
bifurcated analysis of Nietzsche's political philosophy. As such, his analysis
is rather confusing and overly concretized.
The apolitical interpretations of Nietzsche are exemplified by Leslie
Paul Thiele, who offers one of the most perceptive studies of Nietzsche.
Thiele focuses upon Nietzsche's "politics of the soul." Thiele contends that
Nietzsche viewed the individual self as a multiplicity, composed of an
unique composition of drives. This internal regime forms the stage for the
politics of the soul. "The individual is a law unto himself, unpredictable
and unmanageable."24 As such, a true individual can never be part of a
society, which requires "members" conditioned to conform to societal
norms.
"The purpose of the state, according to Nietzsche, ought to be the
cultivation of individuals, but this is never the case."25 The state and society
seek to make the individual conform, by their very nature they can not do
otherwise. Such would be inimical to their existence:
Ultimately, the strong individual is a product of the struggle with his
own isolation. Political affairs are at best a distraction from this task,
and at worst its greatest inhibitor. To be antipolitical, as Nietzsche
considered himself, is the mark of individuality. For the worthiest

23Warren, N ietzsche and Political Thought, 207.
24Thiele, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul, 38.
25Thiele, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul 417.
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struggle is not waged within the public realm. True heroism,
according to Nietzsche, stakes its agonal thirst within the soul.26
Haar questions whether the Obermensch should be seen as "some
sort of highest type of man, the perfect embodiment of the essence of man,
or as a species higher than man. . . as some living being other than man."27
Haar concludes that the Obermensch is "an attempt at something which is
no longer man," yet he is not a myth; he is an "economical exigence of the
Will to Power." As such, the Obermensch is as different from man as man is
from the animals. The Obermensch does not fulfill humanity, he fulfills that
which "in humanity is more originary than humanity," the will-to-power.
Thus the Obermensch is the fulfillment of the essence of life, not merely the
essence of man.28
Heidegger argues that Nietzsche identifies the essence of
contemporary humanity as incapable of correctly relating to "Being," i.e. the
will-to-power. Indeed, humanity in its present form is radically estranged
from its own essence—a type of ontological inauthenticity similar to
Heidegger's analysis in Sein undZ eit Heidegger asserts that the
Obermensch is more than a new expression of the heroic personality or even
an existential attitude, it is a new permutation of ontological relation:
26Thiele, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul, 47.
27Michel Haar, "Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language," in The N ew N ietzsche, ed. David
B. Allison, (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of technology Press, 1965), 25.
28Haar, "Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language," 26.
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With the name overman Nietzsche is by no means designating a
merely superdimensional human being of the kind that has prevailed
hitherto. Nor is he referring to a species of man that will cast off all
that is humane, making naked willfulness its law and titanic rage its
rule.29
Heidegger asserts that Nietzsche realizes humanity is no longer in
proper relation to the "being of Beings," again understood as the will-topower. This ontological estrangement is the cause of modem Dekadenz?0
The Ubermensch is therefore the reawakening of the innate constitution of
human ontology, which has become repressed (forgotten) through centuries
of doctrinal and philosophical error
. . . the overman—taking die word quite literally—is that human
being that goes beyond prior humanity solely in order to conduct
such humanity for the first tim e to its essence, an essence that is still
unattained, and to place humanity firm ly within that essence?1
For Heidegger, Nietzsche understands this ontological problem as a
value judgement "The question asks: Is man, in his essence as man
heretofore, prepared to assume dominion over the earth?"32 Nietzsche of
course answers in the negative. The question, then, is how to rectify this

29Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215.
30Nietzsche's use of the term Dekadenz does not correspond to the English "decadence."
Rather, Dekadenzconnotes decay, both individual and cultural, not hedonism. As such, I
have left it untranslated. This concept is discussed fully in Chapter Three.
31 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215. Italics mine.
32Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215.
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ontological alienation. The answer, and the problem, is to be found in
transcendence. Heidegger asks of Nietzsche:
Must not prior man be conducted beyond himself, aver his prior self,
in order to meet this challenge? If so, die 'over-man/ correctly
thought, cannot be the product of an unbridled and degenerate
fantasy that is plunging headlong into the world.33
Heidegger therefore argues that Nietzsche's political project must
remain ambiguous as he proceeds from an ontologically clouded
perspective. Nietzsche is unable to present a political theory because he is
unable to conceive of an authentic relation to Being. As such, an authentic,
non-repressive model for society eludes Nietzsche.
Daniel Conway's interpretation of Nietzsche's political thought can
be viewed as occupying the middle ground between the statist and
apolitical interpretations. Conway sees Nietzsche's political goal as the
perfection of the human being, not its replacement This perfection is best
served by the concentration of resources upon those few individuals who
show the possibility of becoming great "Throughout his productive career,
Nietzsche's political thinking centers around a simple, yet powerful, diesis:
human existence is justified only by the presence of those exemplary
individuals who re-define the horizons of human perfectibility."34

33 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215-216.
34 Daniel W. Conway, N ietzsche and the Political(New York: Routledge, 1997), 7.
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A community of these exemplary creatures does not look like a
modem state, with its leveling and normalizing mechanisms. However,
there is a community. This is not a community based upon some universal
ethical principle or rational systems of legislation, but rather upon a new
type of ethics. "[T]he founding labors of the Obermensch create a
community of friends in the particularly Nietzschean sense, of fellow
travelers who share a common aesthetic sensibility, who mutually elevate
one another through conflict and contest"35
Conway's assertion that the Obermensch can participate in a
community of friends is an intriguing notion, given the common
interpretation of the Obermensch as the quintessential anti-social
personality. Indeed, it must be asked whether the Obermensch, given the
characteristics described above, could exist in any state, whether composed
of equals or inferiors. Alasdair MacIntyre mirrors this concern in his
description of the Obermensch:
[T]he man who transcends, finds his good nowhere in the social
world to date, but only in that in himself which dictates his new law
and his own new table of the virtues. . . (T]he great man cannot enter
into relationships mediated by appeal to shared standards or virtues
or goods; he is his own only authority and his relationships to others
have to be exercises of that authority.36

35Conway, N ietzsche and the Political, 24.
36 Alasdair MacIntyre, A fter Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1986), 257258.
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This question of community raised by Conway retains its legitimacy
even if Nietzsche is taken to offer an essentially individualistic, separatist
politics. Humans will always have contact with the "other." Perhaps the
answer to this question is to be found in Nietzsche's conception of
friendship. This concept is scarcely mentioned in Nietzsche's works, and
then it is mentioned most prominently in Zarathustra. Nietzsche's
conception of friendship is coupled with the idea of contempt; one can only
love another if one can have an equal amount of contempt Therefore, one
can only be a friend with an equal.37 Because of these important concerns,
the concept of friendship will be analyzed in detail in this dissertation.
This review of the literature is by no means complete. However, it
has illuminated many of the main currents within the political
interpretations of Nietzsche. An evaluation of these interpretations is
difficult Each is well argued and scholarly. However, the arguments
advanced by Strong and Ansell-Pearson seem to have serious problems. It
is one thing to argue that Nietzsche envisioned a heroic Community, it is
quite another to argue that Nietzsche advanced the idea that there should be
positive state intervention to produce higher individuals. Thiele is correct in

37This conception of friendship obviously parallels Aristotle's discussion of friendship as
found in the Ethics. Conway's argument is persuasive, more so than the type of
community that Strong discusses. Strong and Ansell-Pearson imply that Nietzsche
envisioned an activist state with a positive goal of the creation of ubermenschen. This is
drastically different from a community of like-minded individuals, and will be discussed in
Chapter Four.
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asserting that this was an ideal Nietzsche did not believe would be
implemented, or even possible. Instead, it will be demonstrated that
Nietzsche's political theory is centered on the individual quest for selfmastery and ultimately self-creation.38
It is critical to note an enduring trend in Nietzsche literature,
especially relevant for political interpretations. The content of these
interpretations is largely tied to the texts that are relied upon. The
interpretations that cast Nietzsche in a statist lights Strong and AnsellPearson, tend to rely upon early texts. Interpretations that emphasize
nihilism and solipsism often rely on the NfachJass and the later aphoristic
works. This is especially true of Schacht and Heidegger. More pragmatic
interpretations like Nehamas and Thiele generally quote from most of
Nietzsche's texts but may draw predominately from one period.
Perhaps most striking among all of the political, and indeed most of
the philosophical interpretations, is the neglect of Zarathustra. The
literature explored above has sought to understand the political implications
of Nietzsche while ignoring his most important and profound treatise on the
subject Zarathustra. Scholars have ignored Zarathustra for several reasons,
none of which are explicit Traditionally, political theorists have preferred

38 This conclusion was foreshadowed as early as Kaufmann, N ietzsche: Philosopher,
Psychologist, Antichrist(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1964); and is most evident
in Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) and
in Thiele, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o fthe Soul.
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to deal with straightforward philosophical texts rather than narratives.
Further, it has been assumed that most of the important philosophical and
political points advanced in Zarathustra are duplicated and more explicitly
laid out in Beyond Good and Evil. This is a mistaken assumption. Indeed,
the narrative structure of Zarathustra is in itself an important facet of
Nietzsche's political thought which must be taken into account
The ambiguity that these interpreters have found in Nietzsche's
political theory may well flow from their consistent refusal to confront
Zarathustra. It is in Zarathustra that Nietzsche, at the height of his creative
and critical powers, brings together many of the disparate strands of his
social and political thought This project will seek to do what has not been
done by these previous interpretations: to examine Nietzsche's magnum
opus to resolve the contradictory impulses identified in Nietzsche's political
thought and reveal his underlying political thought Before moving to a
preliminary discussion of this project; a brief discussion of the literature
specifically addressing Zarathustra is in order.
IL
Jung observed:"Zarathustra. . . is a hell of confusion and
extraordinarily difficult"39 This is indeed an understatement and it seems
that the perceived difficulty of Zarathustra has contributed to die reluctance
39CG. Jung, N ietzsche's Zarathustra: N otes o fthe Seminar, VoL 1 ed. James L. Jarrett,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 3.
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of Nietzsche scholars to interpret Nietzsche's masterpiece. Despite the large
amount of interest in Nietzsche in recent years, across many disciplines and
languages, Zarathustra has largely been relegated to the top shelf; a book to
be admired but not studied.
Among the interpretations of Zarathustra, none has been more
influential than the short essay by Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's
Zarathustra?"40 This essay, written several years after Heideggers
monumental study of Nietzsche, attempts to minimize the radical nature of
Zarathustra by portraying it as an outgrowth of metaphysical thinking.
According to Heidegger, the central theme of Zarathustra is the overcoming
of the spirit of resentment against human finitude, which Nietzsche is not
able to bring to fruition because of his flawed theory of time. Heidegger's
analysis has influenced the interpretations of Zarathustra examined below,
some to a considerable degree. Because of its importance, a thorough
examination and critique of this article is included in this dissertation as an
appendix.
There have been only a handful of full-length studies of Zarathustra
in any language, and only four in English. All of these studies have been
written from a philosophical standpoint with only passing attention to die
political or social implications of Zarathustra. Indeed, in these studies only

40 Martin Heidegger "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?."
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a few pages are devoted to the political or social implications of Zarathustra.
To my knowledge, a political interpretation of Zarathustra has not been
completed in any language. In addition, there are very few journal articles
relating to Zarathustra, much less from the standpoint of political theory.
While this paucity of secondary literature presents some problems, it also
presents a rare opportunity for truly original research within the crowded
field of Nietzsche studies.
Lampert's study, Nietzsche's Teaching, is of exceptional quality.41
Lampert analyses each section of Zarathustra in order, giving a detailed
analysis of the arguments and symbolism in each section. Lampert is an
especially good source for examining the connection between Zarathustra
and German literature, especially Goethe. Lampert also draws connections
between Zarathustra and Nietzsche's other works. Especially valuable is
Lampert's discussion of the theme of education in Zarathustra. Other than
the chapter on education, Lampert does not explicitly deal with politics, and
this chapter is not written in terms of political analysis.
Specifically, Lampert's study is designed to illuminate Nietzsche's
break with the philosophical tradition:
As I will try to show, die main point of the action of Zarathustra is to
demonstrate first the need for a new teacher, then the nature of his

41 Laurence Lampert, N ietzsche's Teaching: A n Interpretation o f Thus Spoke Zarathustra
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
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teaching in the discoveries of the will to power and eternal return,
and finally the founding of that teaching by Zarathustra himself.42
Alderman's study, Nietzsche's Gift, is of a similar quality.43
Alderman is primarily concerned with Nietzsche's "masks." Alderman's
study is topical rather than a direct textual interpretation, focusing on the
dramatic format of Zarathustra. Alderman examines the themes of
transfiguration, will, comedy, and philosophy in terms of drama. This
study is useful for understanding die text as a whole, but it offers little
related to politics directly. In addition, Alderman explicitly states that his
interpretation is primarily guided by Heidegger's interpretation of
Nietzsche. As such, it has an agenda that differs from many contemporary
interpretations and studies of Nietzsche.
Stanley Rosen's analysis of Zarathustra is among the most recent and
perhaps influential interpretations.44 Rosen argues that Zarathustra is an
inherently political document "The book is best understood as a
philosophical mediation and as a political document. . . it is an incitement to
revolution, to the overthrowing of the old order and so to the preparation

42 Lampert, N ietzsche's Teaching 5.
43 Harold Alderman, N ietzsche's Gift (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1977).
44Stanley Rosen, The M ask o fEnlightenm entN ietzsche's Zarathustra (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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for a new order."45 However, Rosen interprets Nietzsche's politics in a very
concrete sense, presenting a statist analysis of Zarathustra.
In the broadest sense of the term, Nietzsche is not an ontologist or
metaphysician but indeed a political thinker. His most
comprehensive intention is to transform the collective circumstances
of human existence in order to breed a new race of mankind. It is in
this radical and comprehensive sense that Nietzsche is a prophet or
lawgiver.46
Rosen goes on to assert that Nietzsche's Zarathustra is an elaboration
of a political scheme analogous to Plato's Republic. "Nietzsche's enterprise
is Platonic in that he wishes to create by legislation a new race of human
beings."47 This argument is troubling, as it virtually ignores the critiques of
collective existence that are prominent in Zarathustra. Further, Rosen
disregards Nietzsche's call to solitude and the overcoming of nausea, both
of which are central metaphors in Zarathustra. Essentially, Rosen presents a
political interpretation that is skewed by a shallow reading of Nietzsche and
the stated desire to defend the Enlightenment project from Nietzsche's
critiques.48

45 Rosen, The M ask o fEnlightenment. 21.
46 Rosen, The M ask o fEnlightenm ent 56.
47Rosen, The M ask o fEnlightenm ent 247.
48"The decisive problem for the next philosophical generation is to separate justice from
pity and shame. This will be possible without a reconstitution of reason that enables us to
perceive once more the common root of truth and goodness. That root was once known as
philosophy. Nietzsche bears a heavy burden of guilt for the radical deterioration in the
second half of the twentieth century of our understanding of the nature of philosophy."
Rosen, The M ask o fEnlightenm ent 250.
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This literature review has pointed to the glaring absence of
scholarship on one of the most important philosophical texts to emerge in
the last few centuries. The few studies cited above, although of superior
quality, have been either too broad in scope or very tightly focused. Because
of the problematic nature of Zarathustra, this tendency may arise out of
necessity. However, the fact remains that there has been no study focused
upon the central theme of Zarathustra: the formation and overcoming of the
individual self through the process of self-discovery and self-creation. The
above interpretations hint at the project of self-creation or dismiss it, but
they do not explore this problem in any depth.

m.
This review of the literature has highlighted several problems with
previous political interpretations of Nietzsche that will be confronted in this
dissertation. Political theorists have failed to understand Nietzsche largely
because they do not appreciate the extent of the radical departure that
Nietzsche makes from traditional thought This misunderstanding is
doubtless exaggerated as Nietzsche presents some of his most penetrating
political reflections in the narrative format of Zarathustra. Although many
of the themes found in Zarathustra are elaborated upon in Nietzsche's later
works, particularly Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy o f Morality,
the structure of Zarathustra as a progressive narrative is itself an important
clue to Nietzsche's political theory.
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The most fundamental problem that renders interpretation of
Nietzsche by political theorists difficult is Nietzsche's radically different
perspective. Indeed, the presuppositions of political theorists coining from
a classic or modem tradition are exactly what Nietzsche is reacting against
As such, it is necessary to identify several key departures Nietzsche makes
from conventional political thought
Most fundamentally, Nietzsche abandons the idea of the self as a
discrete subject49 Therefore, it is impossible to understand the political
reflections of Nietzsche if one clings to the idea that the self can be
understood or even that the self is a relatively stable element of study.
Generally, Nietzsche sees the individual as the product of a social matrix
driven by repressive mechanisms beyond the conscious knowledge of the
members of the society. Given this, it is impossible to understand the
subject outside of this milieu. The self is tangential and therefore
indefinable, as the matrix of which it is a part largely determines its actions
and reactions.
However, Nietzsche does not see society or politics as natural.
Rather, society is an external construct that often acts in its own interest,
often against the best interests of die individual. Politics can not be
understood in terms of ontology, philosophical anthropology, or even in
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terms of the social contract as they all rely on some stable essence or human
nature. Collectivity is seen as a pathology, arising from the need for
protection and metaphysical consolation, not from noble sentiments or the
desire to pursue the common good. Similarly, the notion of selfpreservation leading to collectivity is illusory, as individuals bom into the
society do not choose to combine: their selves have been created by this
collectivity and they cannot opt out For Nietzsche, society is an abrogation
of the will-to-power to others in the form of an abstract collective.
Nietzsche argues that these traditional political theories are often
imbued with a creeping metaphysical element; whether an eschatology or
notions of teleology; either explicit or implicit In traditional political
theory, society is rarely questioned, it is seen as either part of the natural
(divine) order or the product of an unfolding teleology of existence. This
tendency is seen in the philosophical anthropology of Plato, and in the
dialectic of Hegel. For Nietzsche, all meta-theories of politics are essentially
flawed as they rely upon unquestioned concepts of the discrete subject or
the fundamental innateness of politics.
In addition, Nietzsche argues that history cannot be understood as
such. It is always to be understood as a hermeneutic exercise of the
manipulation of symbols in service of some power relation or another. This
49Besides Zarathustra, this is seen most prominently in The Genealogy o fM orality, in
which Nietzsche presents an analysis of the origin of the modem subject and a critique of
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view of history destroys the idea of progress in the Kantian and Hegelian
mode and brings into question the idea of the natural society that underlies
theories of social contract50 History can be instructive, but it is not possible
to draw teleological conclusions from the progression and evolution of
power relationships in vastly different contexts.
Nietzsche therefore rejects many of the fundamental presuppositions
of political theory. Perhaps most profoundly, Nietzsche argues that it is not
necessary to conceive of politics only in connection to a theory of the state.
Politics may be a function of power, but it is not necessary to conceive of
power only as the relation of a subject to some exterior object Politics
occurs in every conceivable context and situation, down to the functions
within the individual consciousness. If political theory is to have any
validity, it is necessary to abandon the obsession with the state and rather
begin examination of the constituent elements of the individual, the most
intimate and understandable arena of politics.
In keeping with these objections, it will be argued in chapter two that
Zarathustra offers the possibility of accessing Nietzsche's political thought
more directly than an analysis of widely-separated aphorisms or different
the idea of this notion of the independent subject
50"The equally stiff and decorous Tartuffery of the old Kant as he lures us on the dialectical
bypaths that lead to his 'categorical imperative'—really lead astray and seduce—this
spectacle makes us smile, as we are fastidious and find it quite amusing to watch closely the
subtle tricks of old moralists and preachers of morals." Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil,
$5.
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texts. It will be shown that Zarathustra is actually a coherent text with an
underlying political theory, partly revealed in the structure of its narrative.
Indeed, it is the central presupposition of this project that Zarathustra
represents the major expression of Nietzsche's critical and positive political
theory. This assertion is based upon several factors.
The departure point for Nietzsche's philosophy is a thoroughgoing
critique of Western philosophy and culture, continuing even to the
fundamental elements of language and imagery. Nietzsche employed
several "masks" in the attempt to transcend the limits of language,
including the aphoristic style and the use of allegory and irony.51 In order to
reach the most profound elements of Nietzsche's thought, it is necessary to
penetrate these masks. There is little doubt that Zarathustra represents
Nietzsche's greatest departure from conventional philosophical writing,
consisting of a highly symbolic narrative account of a spiritual and
philosophical journey. It would follow that an analysis of this work would
be most likely to reach the core of Nietzsche's philosophical and political
views.
The structure of this project is largely dictated by an interpretation of
Nietzsche's political argument in Zarathustra. Nietzsche examines various
types of human interaction, critiques them, and then moves on to a more
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basic level. In this manner Nietzsche critiques the modem state, then
examines the concept of the community, and finally presents an extended
discussion of the possibility of new forms of selfhood. This dissertation will
follow this structure to analyze Nietzsche's Zarathustrian political theory.
The "plot" of Zarathustra is somewhat disjointed, but it does follow a
narrative progression that is vitally important to the political interpretation
advanced in this dissertation. Zarathustra's journey can be interpreted as
the prototypical example of Nietzsche's theory of self-overcoming.
Therefore, the character's actions within the text and the order in which
Nietzsche presents them are indicative of the political argument that will be
extrapolated from the text Although this dissertation does not strictly
follow Zarathustra in a chronological manner, the order of the chapters in
the dissertation is based upon the narrative progression of the text
Zarathustra begins with a Prologue. Zarathustra is alone in his cave
and decides to go down to the people to teach them the wisdom he has
accumulated in solitude. This is a direct reversal of Plato's cave analogy: the
philosopher has gained knowledge within the cave, and must go down to
others who dwell below. Immediately, Zarathustra encounters problems
arising from the social nature of ordinary human existence. It is in this

51 As Nietzsche states: "What is profound loves masks; what is most profound hates even
imago and parable." Beyond Good and E vil §40.
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beginning section that Zarathustra elaborates his critique of collective
existence.
Accordingly, the first exegetical chapter, chapter three, will center
upon these important critiques and the political implications arising
therefrom. "The Cold Monster" will examine Nietzsche's critique of the
modem state and mass culture. Nietzsche concludes that the modem state
is given to usurping the identities of its members, conditioning them into
little more than cogs in the societal machine. The product of this state,
symbolized by the "last man," is no longer capable of creative action, much
less creative thought This renders the society stagnant, susceptible to the
ravages of nihilism, and ultimately self-destruction. Nietzsche argues that
this process is largely unavoidable within any mass society and can
therefore not be the home of the "authentic" self.
After his short sojourn in the town, Zarathustra abandons the notion
of mass education and leaves civilization. However, in his travels he meets
several characters who decide to follow him, to learn what they can.
Essentially, this part of the narrative is a discussion of smaller social groups
and the concept of friendship. Chapter four, "The Higher Men" will explore
Nietzsche's flirtation with the possibility of a community of equals.
Frustrated at his failure to teach self-overcoming to those in mass society,
Zarathustra attempts to teach this knowledge to those who actually want to
learn: a group of disciples. However, this mode of collective existence is
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soon abandoned, as its members all too quickly fall into the old traps of
repression and bad conscience that plagues the state. Nietzsche argues that
the small community of friends is less problematic than mass society, but
ultimately not capable of providing the context for the emergence of the
creative self.
It is Zarathustra's firm resolve to reclaim solitude that represents a
major turning point in the political argument of the narrative and this
dissertation. Chapter five, 'The Great Nausea," begins discussion of
Nietzsche's positive political thought, both within the text and the
dissertation. Finding community lacking, Nietzsche moves on to the last
level of human existence, the solitary individual. The mechanism by which
the individual can sever relations with the herd is that of existential nausea.
Through the great nausea, Zarathustra becomes aware of the absence of
order to existence and realizes that his quest for authentic humanity can
only take place within the individual self. It is only when the individual
embraced the horror of the meaninglessness of existence that a new
beginning is possible, free from the repression and normalizing mechanisms
of the Other. Because of this existential realignment, Zarathustra abandons
his disciples and begins a journey of self-discovery.
Chapter six, "The Ethics of Absurdity," discusses Nietzsche's
apparently separatist theory of politics. It is only in solitude that die
repressive mechanisms endemic to human existence can be mitigated.
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Nietzsche elaborates some concrete methods by which the individual can
begin this process of self-creation. This chapter centers upon the ethical
considerations of the concept of the eternal recurrence. It will be argued
that the concept of the eternal recurrence is intended as a guide to action, a
type of Nietzschean categorical imperative. Through the confrontation with
mortality and finitude the individual is able to begin the process of creating
the self as a work of art This chapter explores Nietzsche's elaboration of an
aesthetic ethics arising out of resistance to social norms and culminating in
individual self-creation.
Chapter seven, "Metamorphosis: The Transmuted Self," discusses
what this exceptional individual may actually resemble. Although
Nietzsche's elaboration of self-transcendence and self-creation is highly
speculative, it has great theoretical importance. This chapter centers upon
the symbol of Noontide, a central metaphor in the narrative. It is argued
that noon represents the consciousness ordered by a realization of the
primacy of the will-to-power, finally free from the constraints of societal
mechanisms.
The conclusion will argue that in Zarathustra Nietzsche offers a
comprehensive theory of politics taking all levels of human existence into
account, albeit a political theory centered upon the individual self. By
following the structure of the narrative, this study stays close to Nietzsche's
thought process and allows him to guide the analysis of his most important
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work. Rather than imposing preconceived models of political theory upon
Zarathustra or attempting to extract elements of the narrative to support a
conclusion, it is the purpose of this project to reveal the radical departure
from such interpretive strategies that have plagued previous Nietzsche
interpreters.
Importantly, this study of Zarathustra also reveals why Nietzsche did
not put forth a positive political theory of the state. Indeed, Nietzsche's lack
of a positive political theory is telling, as it is intentional. Any positive
political theory of collective action is inimical to the model of selfhood that
Nietzsche proposes. Nietzsche's model of selfhood, as revealed in the
progression of Zarathustra, is one of individual resistance to the social realm
and the socially-created self. Therefore, a Nietzschean political theory is
oxymoronic. Nietzsche's political relevance is in individual resistance and
self-overcoming, not collective existence.
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n

T h e H erm eneutics o f Existence

Nietzsche's philosophical texts are unconventional to be sure. They
are fragmented, polemic, and occasionally contradictory. Zarathustra is
radically different from even Nietzsche's usual "style." It contains a main
character, Zarathustra, and has a loose plot following his wanderings from
solitude through society and back into solitude. However, it is far from
being a conventional novel. Much of the text is concerned with
Zarathustra's internal dialogue and a series of what could be most
accurately termed visions. Further, the text is not linear and is confusing at
best Nietzsche's writing style is not overly complex in Zarathustra, but his
use of rather obscure imagery, much of which draws from classical and
Asian sources, calls for a great effort on the part of the reader. Arguably, the
most important element of the text is Nietzsche's shunning of the
prepositional model of philosophy in favor of a symbolic and metaphorical
presentation.
This chapter will argue that the narrative structure of Zarathustra is a
conscious attempt to illustrate Nietzsche's thoroughgoing critique of
conventional philosophical discourse. The symbolic and metaphorical
language Nietzsche employs in the text is an intentional response to the
inadequacies of philosophical language; and the fragmented structure of the
narrative is a direct result of Nietzsche's epistemological and existential
35
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presuppositions. Zarathustra, as a free-flowing narrative, is designed to be
representative of the actual operations of the human consciousness, which
Nietzsche argues are impossible to depict within the confines of the
discursive model employed by conventional philosophy.
There is no doubt that Zarathustra is a remarkable work, even more
so considering Nietzsche's unique view of the nature of language and
communication. Nietzsche actually seems contemptuous of the language of
philosophical discourse, writing in Zarathustra: "you do not speak: thus you
proclaim your wisdom."1 As a professional philologist, Nietzsche's critique
of language is especially compelling. Nietzsche was familiar with both the
intricacies and vicissitudes of language; therefore his condemnation of the

1Nietzsche, Zarathustra, m:4. It is a poor reflection on Anglophone scholarship that a
century after Nietzsche's death there is not yet a standard edition of Nietzsche's complete
works. The widely-accepted German edition of Nietzsche's works, the Kritische
Cesamtausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, is only now being issued
in English by Stanford University Press. This edition is proceeding at a glacial rate, with
only three volumes out of twenty appearing over the past decade. Although good
translations of Nietzsche's major published works have been completed, most notably by
Walter Kaufmarm and R. J. HoQingdale, there remains no complete translation of
Nietzsche's NachJass his vast collection of notes, lectures, and personal and professional
correspondence. This creates a nightmare for citation as each reader may have different
editions, each with different pagination and idiosyncratic translation. Fortunately, a rough
consensus on citing Nietzsche's works has developed over the past few years. Where
possible, especially in the aphoristic works, it is standard to cite by aphorism or section
number rather than by page number. Similarly, it has become standard to cite Thus Spoke
Zarathustra by book number and section number. Thus, the citation "Zarathustra, 111:8"
refers to the eighth section of Book Three," VorSonnen-Aufgang(Before Sunrise)."
Subdivisions that occur within a section, when specifically delineated by Nietzsche, are also
included in citations. I have relied heavily on the translations of both Kaufmann and
Hollingdale for assistance, and have placed linguistic and translation concerns within
footnotes wherever practicable.
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possibility of traditional philosophical language to communicate
philosophical insight must be examined carefully.
Nietzsche's apparent love-hate relationship with language and its
relation to philosophical thought renders Zarathustra a unique challenge to
interpretation/ as well as offering the opportunity to explore Nietzsche's
strategy for communicating philosophical knowledge. In order to present a
comprehensive analysis of Zarathustra, it is therefore necessary to analyze
the reasons Nietzsche chose to present his central philosophical work in the
form of a narrative laced with obscure symbols and metaphors. This task is
informed by Nietzsche's own reflections on Zarathustra, both in terms of die
process of its creation and its content
Nietzsche asserts that even the metaphorical language employed in
Zarathustra cannot convey the essentially incommunicable experiences
within the self. "Precisely in this width of space and this accessibility for
what is contradictory, Zarathustra experiences himself as the supreme type
o f all beings: and once one hears how he defines this, one will refrain from
seeking any metaphor for it"2
I do not yet have an objective impression of the whole thing; yet I feel
that it presents a not insignificant victory owes the "spirit of gravity,"
considering how difficult it is to present the problems in it That the
first part comprises a circle of feelings which forms a basis ior the

2Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §6.
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circle of feelings in the second part this seems to me to be easily
recognizable and a "good job of work" (To talk like a carpenter).3
It is important to note that Zarathustra was the product of distinct
moments of inspiration that occurred during two of his frequent walks, it
was not the product of a well-reasoned and outlined philosophical study.4
Nietzsche refers to the origin of Zarathustra almost as if it arose from his
unconscious mind: "It was on these two walks that the whole of Zarathustra
/occurred to me, and especially Zarathustra himself as a type: rather, he
overtook me.”5 Nietzsche uses the narrative to attempt to communicate
inner philosophical and psychological knowledge that transcends the
boundaries of rational discourse. In this sense, Zarathustra is the
quintessential postmodern text the presentation of the unpresentable.6 As a

3 Nietzsche, letter to Peter Gast, August, 1883, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 217.
4 Nietzsche reflected on the amount of personal agony evoked by the remembrance of this
process: "When I have looked into my Zarathustra, I walk up and down in my room for
half an hour, unable to master an unbearable fit of sobbing." Ecce Homo, 11:4.
5 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §1.
6"The postmodern would be that which, in the modem, puts forward the unpresentable in
presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a
taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable;
that which searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart
a stronger sense of the unpresentable. A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a
philosopher the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by
preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgement, by
applying familiar categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and categories are what
the work of art itself are looking for. The artist and writer, then, are working without rules
in order to formulate the rules of what w illhave been done. Hence the fact that the work
and text have the characters of an event hence also, they always come too late for their
author, or, what amounts to the same thing, their being put to work, their realization
always began too soon. Postmodern would have to be understood according to the
paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo)." Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, Vi.
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quasi-dramatic presentation, Zarathustra represents the mnemonic attempt
to achieve the integration of the conscious and unconscious within the
concrete text that Nietzsche envisions as the ultimate goal of his
philosophical project "This indeed is the secret of the soul: only when the
hero has deserted the soul does there approach it in dreams—the
superhero."7 Nietzsche is referring to visionary images, the dialogue of the
subconscious mind. Zarathustra represents the attempt to reintegrate
Dionysus into the Apollonian realm of philosophy. "A little wisdom is no
doubt possible; but I have found this happy certainty in all things: that they
prefer—to dance on the feet of chance."8
Nietzsche's critique of traditional philosophy proceeds partly from
these observations. The philosopher must have faith in his own internal
experiences, it is impossible to substitute the experiences of another. The
mind must retain some integrity, even if it is masked and continuously in
flux. "You are unfruitful: therefore you lack belief. But he who had to
create always had his prophetic dreams and star-auguries—and he believed
in belief!"9 Nietzsche incorporated imagery into Zarathustra because it
existed in his mind alongside traditionally accepted philosophical elements.

7Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:13.
8 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, m:4.
9 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40
Through incorporation of these elements, the text becomes intensely
personal, agonizingly so. Nietzsche writes of Zarathustra:
Probably I would, from artistic motives, have chosen darker and
more somber and garish colors for the first two parts, if I had kept my
soul serene and bright this year—for the sake of what happens at the
end
The detail contains an incredible amount of personal
experience and suffering which is intelligible only to me—there were
pages which seemed to me to drip with blood.10
Nietzsche's writings are so intimate that he begrudges his readers.
"If a man draws up the sum of a deep and hidden life, as I have been doing,
then the result is meant for the eyes and consciences of only the most select
people."11 Few will be able to understand Zarathustra enough to interpret it
in the manner Nietzsche wishes: intensely. Nietzsche envisions Zarathustra
as a crucible for interpretation, changing the reader permanently. "It is a
sort of abyss of the future—something to make one shudder, especially the
joy in it Everything in it is my own, without model, kindred, precursor; a
person who has lived in it will return to the world seeing things
differently."12
Nietzsche envisions that Zarathustra is destined to be misunderstood,
partially because it contains so much of his personal experiences and
imagery bom from his unconscious mind. Nietzsche's pessimism extends
10 Nietzsche, letter to Peter Gast, August, 1883, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 218.
11 Nietzsche, letter to Franz Overbeck, March 31,1885, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 239.
12Nietzsche, letter to Erwin Rohde, February 22,1884, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 220221.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41
even to his closest personal friend, to whom he writes: "[Zarathustra]. . . is
an unintelligible book, because it is based on experiences which I share with
nobody. If only I could give you a sense of my solitude! Among the living,
as among the dead, I have nobody with whom I have any affinity."13
Nietzsche seems to indicate that Zarathustra will only make sense to
someone who has already broken free of the strictures of conventional
philosophy and stands in opposition to concretized truth. In his last
productive year, Nietzsche wrote: "Of my Zarathustra, I tend to think that it
is the profoundest work in the German tongue, also the most perfect in its
language. But for others to feel this will require whole generations to catch
up with the inner experiences from which that work could arise."14
Zarathustra is a work which is always ahead of its time; it must be the right
time to each reader for it to be significant
Nietzsche can certainly be criticized for placing too much faith in the
reader. He relies upon the emergence of a competent reader who has
internal experiences similar to his own.15 Is Nietzsche, therefore, a type-

13Nietzsche, letter to Franz Overbeck, August 5,1886, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 254.
14Nietzsche, letter to Karl Knortz, June 21,1888, in Middleton, Selected Letters, 299.
15Nietzsche seems to realize this problem, and delights in the problems his writings cause
seemingly "sophisticated" readers: "When Dr. Heinrich von Stein once complained very
honestly that he didn't understand a word of my Zarathustra, I told him that this was
perfectly in order having understood six sentences from it—that is, to have really
experienced them—would raise one to a higher level of existence than 'modem' man could
attain. Given this feeling of distance, how could I possibly wish to be read by those
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former who seeks to produce like-minded individuals through the clever
use of archetypal symbols? If Nietzsche is not attempting to communicate
genuine internal philosophical experience, Zarathustra is little more than a
catharsis. However, if Nietzsche is correct and philosophical insight is
indeed based upon essentially incommunicable internal experience, it must
be asked why Nietzsche attempts to write at all, even in the narrative
format Nietzsche seems to be undermining his own critique of traditional
philosophy by embracing the myth of philosophical discourse that
emphasizes communication and concretization. By concretizing his own
internal experience, Nietzsche is violating his own injunctions.
Nietzsche's narrative form may be characterized as an attempt to
rehabilitate the discursive form that characterized philosophy in its original
Greek form. In this sense, Zarathustra represents an interpretive
conversation between the reader and the writer, both on their own footing.
Zarathustra then represents the attempt of Nietzsche to present to the
reader, on a level as equally as possible, his unique insights gained through
internal experiences that can never be described. Zarathustra is therefore an
absurd document, proposing to communicate the incommunicable. This
absurdity is not lost on Nietzsche; indeed he revels in it It makes no sense

'moderns' whom I know!" Ecce Hoorn, 111:1. Further, Nietzsche's mockery of Wagner's
inability to understand his works is legendary.
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to attempt to divine Nietzsche's "true" philosophy or his philosophical
intent to do so is a betrayal of his message.16
The narrative structure of Zarathustra is therefore the epitome of
Nietzsche's philosophical style, as he consciously structured his entire
mature philosophical oeuvre to defy cursory reading or superficial
interpretation.17 Even in his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche
avoided the scholarly strictures of meticulous citation and commentary on
previous philosophical and philological works, presenting his argument in a
series of polemical essays requiring some element of conscious
interpretation on the part of the reader. After his rejection by his colleagues
in philology and the beginning of his career as an itinerant writer, Nietzsche
became even more acutely aware of the role of the reader as an active
participant the process of philosophy. "He who knows the reader, does
nothing further for the reader. Another century of readers—and the spirit
itself will stink. That everyone can read will ruin in the long run not only
writing, but thinking as well."18

16Nietzsche explicitly speaks to this point in his reevaluation of his own philosophical
project: "Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he already
knows. For what one lacks access to from experience one will have no ear." Ecce Homo.

nti.
17"The most recent view that Nietzsche is at bottom a systematic thinker is just as correct,
and just as wrong, as the older view that he is an aphoristic literary author." Ltiwith,
N ietzsche's Philosophy o fthe EternalRecurrence o f the Same, trans. J. Harvey Lomax
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1997), 13.
18Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
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Nietzsche asserted that breaking away from the passive discourse
encouraged by conventional philosophical writing was the only possibility
for advancing the boundaries of human perception. Creation, as Nietzsche
argued consistently from The Birth o f Tragedy to Ecce Homo, is the proper
goal for human life, and can only progress through the synthesis of all
modes of human experience, including the poetic and artistic elements
neglected or rejected by philosophy. The manner of philosophical discourse
must therefore be open to radical experimentation, not bound to tradition
and regimented forms. With philosophy, the text cannot present a secure
and definite conclusion; instead the text must be dynamic and provoke
interpretation rather than imposing doctrines.19
Nietzsche employed the aphoristic format in a majority of his works
for this reason. Radically different from ordinary philosophical texts,
Human A ll To Human, Daybreak, The Science o f Joy, and Beyond Good and
Evil are collections of varyingly connected aphorisms and meditations on a
multitude of subjects. Although it is not accurate to label Nietzsche's style
19"From this perspective, philosophy follows the same movement as the other activities;
whereas romantic philosophy still appealed to a formal synthetic identity ensuring a
continuous intelligibility of matter (a priori synthesis), modem philosophy tends to
elaborate a material of thought in order to capture forces that are not thinkable in
themselves. This is Cosmos philosophy, after the manner of Nietzsche. The molecular
material has even become so deterritorialized that we can no longer even speak of matters
of expression, as we did in romantic territoriality. M atters o fexpression are superceded by
a m aterialo fcapture. The forces to be captured are no longer those of the earth, which still
constitute a great expressive Form, but the forces of an immaterial, nonformal, and
energetic Cosmos." Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism
and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1987), 342-343.
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in these works as "stream of consciousness," Nietzsche is trying to break
free of the bounds imposed by "rational" discourse, which he ultimately
attempts to demonstrate is itself an artifact of language.20 Nietzsche is
therefore not writing to advance a set of propositions as die "truth"; rather
he is inviting the reader to ask these questions as well:
He who writes in blood and aphorisms does not want to be read, he
wants to be learned by heart In the mountains the shortest route is
from peak to peak, but for that you must have long legs. Aphorisms
should be peaks, and those to whom they are spoken should be big
and tall of stature.21
In other words, many may read these works but only a few will
understand that the aphorisms are only guideposts along the way. Of
course, Nietzsche can be faulted for not giving guidance in this process of
interpretation that he claims to be so vital to his philosophical project If the
point of Nietzsche's philosophy is to create a self-critical stance within the
mind of the reader, then there may be no actual "point' to his texts beyond
the creation of this existential mood. The implication of this interpretation is
that the essential element of Nietzsche's philosophy is what occurs within
the mind of the reader. Only those who confront the text in this manner
have a chance to grasp philosophical insight from Nietzsche's works. Those
who seek to find "answers" or "a point" in Nietzsche's philosophy have

20"A fragment is an implicit system; a system is an explicit fragment" Paul Tillich,
System atic Theology, VoL 1 (London: Nisbit, 1953), 65.
21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
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seriously misunderstood his intentions and have demonstrated their own
intellectual m ed iocrity: "it needs greatness of soul for a person to stand my
writings at all. I have the good fortune to make all weak and virtuous
people embittered against me/'22 As Deleuze and Guattari note:
The aphorism, for example, is very different from the maxim, for a
maxim, in a republic of letters, is like an organic State act or sovereign
judgement, whereas an aphorism always awaits its meaning from a
new external source, a final force that must conquer and subjugate it,
utilize it23
Philosophy for Nietzsche is therefore less of a search for truth or
essences and more of an interpretive act, an act which permanently changes
the reader.24 This is demonstrated most specifically in Zarathustra. The
reader, following Zarathustra's journey of self-discovery, is himself
travelling the same road. The character of Zarathustra is therefore the
reader by proxy. Philosophical writing in the Zarathustrian mode is an
agonal challenge. Reading of a philosophical text should be an intense
exercise undertaken seriously. The narrative structure helps the reader
achieve this attitude. As Zarathustra says: "of all writings I love only that

22 Nietzsche, letter to Malwinda von Meysenburg, July, 1888, in Selected Letters, ed. and
trans. Christopher Middleton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 303.
23Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 376-377.
24"In Nietzsche, values must be interpreted because they are expressions of the strength
and the weakness of the will to power. Moreover, in Nietzsche, life itself is an
interpretation: in this way, philosophy itself becomes the interpretation of interpretations."
Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict o fInterpretations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1974), 12
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which is written with blood. Write with blood: and you will discover that
blood is spirit"25 This is not a paean to the VOlksgeist, but rather a call to an
especially intense, self-searching interpretation of Nietzsche's texts.
Needless to say, this is a difficult and dangerous task, both for the reader
and the writer.26
Nietzsche is certainly open to criticism for this position. His reliance
upon the reader and his call for a more active encounter with philosophical
texts is necessarily vague. Indeed, Nietzsche's emphasis upon style could be
blamed for his misappropriation by ideological movements or the
mischaracterization of his thought With so much open to interpretation,
there is little stability inherent in Nietzsche's philosophy that would allow
for a thoroughgoing analysis of Nietzsche's philosophical project
Nietzsche's interpretive philosophy can be no other than a hermeneutic
nightmare, but this is what Nietzsche seems to intend. His philosophy is no
less than the attempt to break the cycle of dogmatism that has grown up
around all of the pioneers of philosophy through the ages.
It must be asked whether Nietzsche can actually overcome the
strictures of traditional philosophy he despises. The radical style of
Zarathustra could be seen as a desperate attempt to transcend the linguistic
25Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
26 Nietzsche had his own problems with Zarathustra from the beginning as well
"Zarathustra /had been delayed, to Nietzsche's great annoyance, by the publication of
500,000 hymn books." Middleton, Selected Letters, 213n.
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trap that has rendered philosophy an academic pursuit rather than a
practical application of knowledge to the individual life. That Nietzsche
must resort to such a non-traditional format as the narrative to convey
philosophical insight highlights this proposition. However, if Nietzsche's
thought is to be constantly interpreted by each reader, can it be said that
there is in fact a philosophy that is genuinely Nietzsche's? As the text is
constantly reinterpreted, as Nietzsche's seems to desire, where is the line of
demarcation between Nietzsche's philosophy and that of the reader?
Nietzsche might argue that this is a false dichotomy, but the problem
remains nevertheless. Nietzsche does not provide us with the information
necessary to determine which interpretations are more valid, if this type of
determination is indeed possible.
The validity of Nietzsche's decentering of philosophy is certainly
bold, but it is also questionable. However, Nietzsche's emphasis upon
interpretation fits with his emphasis upon action over reactive modes of
discourse. Nietzsche does not seek to inform the reader, he seeks to
provoke the reader. In this sense, Nietzsche's philosophical style represents
the logical extension of his presuppositions regarding the perspectival
nature of philosophical insight
However, it could be argued that Nietzsche's attempt to force the
reader to think through philosophical problems independent of the text
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represents the call to a type of second-order philosophizing, in which die
reader confronts philosophical problems in a manner already framed by
another Nietzsche. If this is the case, Nietzsche has failed in his gamble and
is simply setting up a more insidious power relation than traditional
philosophy. Nietzsche forces the reader to think through problems; that is
to be sure. But these problems have been selected by Nietzsche and framed
in a manner that will lead the reader to certain conclusions at the expense of
other possibilities. This criticism is difficult to overcome, but Nietzsche may
not be claiming such a dramatic break with traditional philosophical
writing. Nietzsche's narrative style represents an attem pt to prod the
reader; it is not a perfect vehicle to convey the necessity for interpretation.
However successful or unsuccessful, Nietzsche's interpretive
philosophy stands in radical opposition to traditional philosophical forms.
This disjunction is the artifact of a thorough critique of philosophy and its
reliance upon language. Further, Nietzsche's own communicative scheme is
based upon his critique of traditional epistemological presuppositions,
partially stemming from his larger critique of language. It is therefore
necessary to examine Nietzsche's criticism of traditional philosophy in order
to understand his novel approach to the communication of ideas and his
subsequent de-centering of philosophy.
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L
Nietzsche identifies several significant problems with traditional
academic philosophy. Both the content and the style of his writings are
largely in opposition to these "fundamental errors." The most fundamental
problem with philosophy is its reliance upon what could be termed the
"tyranny of language."
Language, taken as a tool for communication, is not itself the
problem. The difficulty arises when philosophers forget the limitations of
language and begin to believe that language can indeed serve as an
adequate vehicle for expressing philosophical insights, which are largely
abstract and subjective. Language that does not confront the reader with the
demand for independent interpretation, typified by the traditional text
taken to have an independent and definite meaning, is the prime example of
this problem. Philosophy, in its original form, was a discursive discipline,
not the presentation of fixed ideas. Philosophy was therefore a fluid pursuit
of individual insight, well-suited to the interpretation of a radicallyuncertain universe. Non-discursive language, petrified in the form of a text,
is insufficient for this task, given the contingent nature and genealogical
origin of grammar. It has been forgotten that language is not an objective
set of signs with discrete codified meanings; it is rather an organic system of
communication that has arisen and developed over centuries as file result of
a random and sometimes irrational process.
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As a philologist, Nietzsche was acutely aware of the contingent
nature of language. Indeed, the first essay of The Genealogy o f M orality is
devoted to the development of the linguistic symbols "good" and "evil,"
demonstrating in each a set of attached psychological and moral
implications far beyond the seemingly simple definitions commonly
attached. Nietzsche views language as a set of symbols that have become
more or less detached from their original meanings and have taken on a life
of their own.27
Truly, men have given themselves all their good and evil. Truly, they
did not take it, they did not find it, it did not descend to them as a
voice from heaven. Man first implanted values into things to
maintain himself—he created the meaning of things, a human
meaning!28
Therefore, although language is a natural expression and outgrowth
of human existence, it remains marked by the experiences of its creator, who
created the linguistic symbol that is now taken for granted and imbued with
an independent meaning apart from the perceiving subject29 Importantly,

27"The whole range of available narrative and even stylistic operators is put into play
without concern for the unity of the whole, and new operators are tried. The grammar and
vocabulary of the literary language are no loner accepted as given; rather, they appear as
academic forms, as rituals originating in piety (as Nietzsche said) which prevent the
unpresentable from being put forward." Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition;
A Report on Knowledge trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1964), The Postmodern Condition, 80-81.
28Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
29"For if language is the product of the artistic activity of the human subject—the sole
author of these metaphors—then it necessarily conceals a 'natural' element Words,
expressing through their sounds and rhythms the movements of the psyche manifest some
type of Will to Power and thus reflect not only the essence of things, but also the essence of
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philosophers have largely ignored the contingent nature of the symbols they
use and therefore open themselves up to an entire array of problems.
Most importantly, language, as a system of symbols long detached
from their original meanings, essentially devalues itself. This tendency is
especially seen in modem academic philosophy, which has sought to attach
more and more stable meanings to words in an attempt to foster a scientific
view of reality. Language, as it is called upon to place more and more
specific meanings to phenomena, further demonstrates its fundamental
inadequacy.30 In the realm of philosophy this is fatal. The more philosophy
calls upon language to explain abstract concepts in concrete terms, the more
language reveals its impotence. This insidious process has largely been
ignored by philosophy, but it threatens to destroy the philosophical
enterprise.

subjectivity
Linguistic fictions disguise their fictive character; language consists of dead
fictions become independent of their author through amnesia. Hence, any return to the
'origin' of language, to the metaphoric activity of the artistic Will to Power, is impossible—
at least within the ordinary use of the linguistic code
Not only is language intrinsically
ill, it is also the carrier of the universal illness: nihilism, the triumph of the reactive forces..
.. But in what sense is language a'symbol'? It is a symbol in that it is a radically unfaithful
replica... but it is also a relation of analogy, from which all exact imitation is excluded__
Language suffers from a fundamental powerlessness to reveal what it claims to reveal:
'Language, as an organ and symbol of manifestation (i-e., as a symbol of a symbol) can
never bring forth the most intimate [basis].'" Haar, N ietzsche and M etaphysics, 69-71.
30"Modernity, in whatever age it appears, cannot exist without a shattering of belief and
without discovery of the 'lack of reality' of reality, together with the invention of other
realities. What does this'lack of reality'signify if one tries to free it from a narrowly
historidzed interpretation? The phase is of course akin to what Nietzsche calls nihilism."
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 77.
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Philosophers, trapped by the tyranny of language, essentially censor
themselves because of the lack of sufficient language.31 Unable to
communicate what cannot be written, the deepest and most personal truths
regarding existence and ontology remain unexpressed. Rational
philosophical discourse simply cannot come to terms with the most innate
features of existence, and must therefore concern itself with shallower
pursuits. "Neither in the incomprehensible nor in the irrational can you be
at home."32 As Nietzsche argues:
We no longer esteem ourselves sufficiently when we communicate
ourselves. Our true experiences are not at all garrulous. They could
not communicate themselves if they tried. That is because they lack
the right word. Whatever we have the right words for, that we have
already gone beyond
With language the speaker immediately
vulgarizes himself.33
Philosophical insight becomes petrified through language and the
reliance upon the text a tendency that can be traced to Plato's commitment

31 "What provokes one to look at all philosophers half-suspidously, half-mockingly, is not
that one discovers again and again how innocent they are—how often and how easily that
make mistakes and go astray. .. but that they are not honest enough in their work,
although they al make a lot of virtuous noise when the problem of truthfulness is touched
even remotely. They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions
through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic (as opposed to
the mystics of every rank, who are more honest and doltish—and talk of'inspiration');
while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of 'inspiration'—most often a
desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract—that they defend with reasons
they have sought after the fact" Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §5.
32 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
33 Nietzsche, Twilight o fthe Idols trans. Walter Kaufinann in The Portable N ietzsche (New
York: Viking Penguin 1954)530-531.
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to paper of Socrates' dialogues.34 Through the creation of an independent
text philosophers have created an external signifier which stands in
opposition to the reader. Haar notes:
The essence of Nietzsche's distrust is rather that language tends
inevitably to vulgarize, to make herd-like. The dominant language is
always reactive—simultaneously reducer and castrater as well as
protector of the weak against "dangerous" impulses and the
emergence of explosive differences. Language becomes the means to
this end thanks to the invention of logical, grammatical, and
metaphysical categories that effect the triumph of reactive forces.35
Language, then, is innately political. It is formed through once
concrete and identifiable power relations, which over time become obscured
or forgotten. At the same time, it is forgotten that linguistic communication
is an essentially interpretive endeavor attempting to explain or define an
innately mutable existence. Language is a power relation, operating in
furtherance of the creeping marginalization of philosophy. The failure of
language to communicate philosophical insight is not seen as the failure of
language, but rather as the failure o f philosophy. Philosophy, by becoming

34"The purifying, consecrating influence of literature, the destruction of the passions
through knowledge and the word; the idea of literature as the highway to understanding,
to forgiveness, and to love; the saving power of speech; the literary spirit as the noblest
manifestation of the human spirit altogether; the literary man as man fulfilled, as saint___
But in Nietzsche's terminology, as announced in The Birth o f Tragedy, this precisely was
the character of Socrates, Socratic man, as prototype and protagonist of'the Decadence,' in
the sense of the intellect subduing, disorienting, and dissolving life, unloving of its
imperfection, sterilized to its mystery. . . those who attribute to local, temporal conditions
the ills inherent in life itself, and, in their zeal to correct, discompose the life they would
save." Joseph Campbell, The M asks o fCod: Creative M ythology (New York: Penguin,
1968), 377.
35Haar, Nietzsche and M etaphysics 74.
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tied to language, has chosen a medium through which it can never fulfill its
goals.
As Klossowski states: "Nietzsche says that we have no language to
express what is in becoming Thought is always the result of a momentary
relation of power between impulses, principally between those that
dominate and those that resist"36 Words demand meanings; there is no
vocabulary for flux or that is capable of recognizing the epistemological
uncertainty inherent in the Nietzschean outlook. Jaspers notes "Nietzsche
recognizes the reason why the essential—the truth itself—is
incommunicable: Only that which can be said can be communicated; only
the intelligible can be said, but what is intelligible is always interpretative...
. What is said, as such, has already ceased to be true."37
Rather than accepting die incommunicability of philosophy through
language, philosophy still clings to language as the only valid
communicative form. It is this insistence that has let to the stagnation of
philosophy and its tendency towards increasing concretization. Because of
the limits of language, philosophy has become dominated by the demand to
produce acceptable, fundamental precepts, in other words, "truth."
Nietzsche terms this tendency die "will-to-truth."

36 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 49-50.
37 Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to H is PhilosophicalA ctivity, trans. Charles
Wallraff and Frederick Schmitz (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1965), 404.
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Nietzsche argues that this fundamental need for philosophical
stability is not completely the fault of language. Humans m ust have a belief
in stability; the will-to-truth is a psychological precondition for society.38
The concretizing effect of language and its disastrous implications for
philosophy are but one outgrowth of this innate need. Essentially,
Nietzsche argues that language, philosophy, even societal institutions are
the handmaidens of the will-to-truth, fostering a belief in the stability of
existence. Specifically, philosophy has become chained to several
fundamental errors that have delivered it into the hand of dogma and
Dekadenz.
We must draw up a list of these illusions, just as Nietzsche. . . listed
the "four great errors" . . . First of all there is the illusion o f
transcendence, which, perhaps, comes before all others (in its double
aspect of making immanence immanent to something and of
rediscovering a transcendence within immanence itself); then the
illusion o f universals when concepts are confused with the plane.. . .
Then there is the illusion o f the eternal when it is forgotten that
concepts must be created . . . the illusion o f discursiveness when
propositions are confused with concepts. It would be wrong to think
that all of these illusions logically entail one another like
propositions, but they resonate or reverberate and form a thick fog
around the plane.39
38"Judgements concerning truth and falsehood are at bottom assertions of belief.
Assertions of belief are, in turn, valuations. Valuations, in their turn, express covert
conditions of preservation and growth. Nietzsche argues further that all organs of
knowledge and our senses as well are, without exceptions, developed in terms of
preservation and growth. And then, perhaps, Nietzsche's most striking observation
surfaces: he argues that stability, security, predictability, permanence, are preconditions for
every living being. Doubt concerning essential values is impermissible. Something must be
held to be true—that is our common weal." Bemd Magnus, N ietzsche's Existential
Im perative (Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1978), 193.
39Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Whatis Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomplinson and
Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 49-50.
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The errors of philosophy, grave though they are, are essentially
driven by the need for stability and the longing for transcendence. These
tendencies are essentially unhealthy as they repress the questioning
necessary to open human perception beyond tradition and to challenge the
will-to-truth. Philosophical errors fostered by the will-to-truth hamstring
philosophy and deliver it into the hands of the hypocritical:
There have always been many sickly people among those who invent
fables and long for God: they have a raging hate for the enlightened
man and for that youngest of virtues, which is called honesty. They
are always looking back to the dark ages: then, indeed, illusion and
faith were a different matter; raving of the reason was likeness to
God, and doubt was sin.. . . That is why they hearken to preachers of
death and themselves preach afterworlds.40
Thus, the positing of an external signiffer, whether God, Absolute
Reason, or the Forms, is the product of intellectual laziness or dishonesty.
"Weariness, which wants to reach the Ultimate with a single leap, with a
death-leap, a poor ignorant weariness, which no longer desires even to
desire: that created all gods and afterworlds."41 Nietzsche's dictum "God is
dead" is more than an expression of theological inadequacy, it extends to
the failure of all the external signifiers to which humans have attached
themselves. Science, theology, metaphysics, even history are all entrapped
by the tyranny of language. All of this is a manifestation of the will-to-

40Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
41 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
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truth.42 "But that 'other world', that inhuman, dehumanized world which is
a heavenly Nothing, is well hidden from men; and the belly of being does
not speak to man, except as man."43 Nietzsche argues that the "other
world" is silent we mistake our concrete consciousness for the transcendent
"God is a supposition: but I want your supposing to be bounded by
conceivability."44 However, the will-to-truth refuses to allow for the
possibility of philosophical error, leading even to the concretization of the
Beyond:Could you conceive a god?—But may the will-to-truth mean this to
you: that everything shall be transformed into the humanlyconceivable, the humanly-evident, the humanly-palpable! You
should follow your own senses to the end! And you yourselves
should create what you have hitherto called the World: the World
should be formed in your image by your reason, your will, and your
love!45
Nietzsche asserts that rather than a concrete independent reality, the
world is an undifferentiated field of force. The world is not a totality of
entities and things, as these cannot be understood independently, much less
together. Hearkening back to Heraclitus, Nietzsche emphasizes die

42"Nietzsche's godlessness is the most extreme expression of his total breakvritix traditional
historical substance insofar as the language of this latter lays claim to universal validity. All
human ideals seem to him to have come to nothing: He wishes to reject morality and
surrender reason and humanity. He views truth as a universal lie; previous philosophy as
an established deception; Christianity as the triumph of the misfits and the failures, the
weak and the impotent; there is nothing holy or valid that he does not condemn." Jaspers,
Nietzsche, 441.
43 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
44 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
45 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
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contingent nature of existence. However, because of the vast array of
societal and philosophical crutches that have been constructed to reassure
humans of the essential stability of existence, this epistemological insight is
incomprehensible to most people:
When water is planked over so that it can be walked upon, when
gangway and railings span the stream: truly, he that says "everything
is in flux" is not believed. On the contrary, even simpletons
contradict him
"Over the stream everything is firmly fixed, all
the values of things, the bridges, concepts, all 'Good' and 'Evil': all
are firm ly fix e d ."
The will-to-truth therefore fosters the needed belief in stability to
insure the continued existence of prevailing power mechanisms. However,
just as language eventually becomes devalued as its inadequacy is
demonstrated, the will-to-truth simply cannot repress the chaotic nature of
reality. Nietzsche continues:
"Fundamentally, everything stands still"—that is a proper winter
doctrine, a fine thing for unfruitful seasons, a fine consolation for
hibemators and stay-at-homes . . . the thawing wind, however,
preaches to the contrary. The thawing w ind. . . a destroyer that
breaks ice with its angry horns! Ice, however —breaks gangwayd. O
my brothers, is everything not now influx? Have not all failings and
gangways fallen into the water and come to nothing? Who can still
cling to "good" and "evil"? "Woe to us! Hail to us! The thawing
wind is blowing!"47
For Nietzsche, it makes no sense to speak of the universe as such, as
the Um w elt is inextricably connected to the observer. The individual is a

46 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.8.
47 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, III:12il.
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part of the universe he seeks to observe. This makes independent or
empirical research an impossible task. A//knowledge, whatever it purports
to be, is by necessity individual knowledge. By extension, therefore,
knowledge is always perspectival and contingent Since the individual and
the universe are tied together, knowledge is an uncertain task. Deleuze and
Guattari note: "As Nietzsche succeeded in making us understand, thought is
creation, not will to truth."48
However, the exigencies of the will-to-truth preclude the
acknowledgement of the perspectival reality of knowledge. As such, the
"truth" advanced by philosophy is no more than a widely-accepted
interpretation, although it is bolstered by an entire societal apparatus
devoted to fostering its legitimacy. This does not however, change the
underlying epistemological uncertainty that spurs the will-to-truth.
Stripped of its legitimating mechanisms, "truth" is shown to be a selective
and reductionist notion devoted to suppressing questioning of the
prevailing conceptual power structure, the primacy of reason. In the
modernist mindset, philosophy has become devoted to fostering the illusion
of metaphysical and epistemological stability necessary to maintain the

48 Deleuze and Guattari, Whatis Philosophy?
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modem ideology of progress. As Nietzsche notes: "Hitherto all knowledge
has grown up beside bad conscience!"49
Despite its ideological manipulation, Nietzsche does not seek to
destroy the notion of "truth," but to inform us of its misuse as an ideological
and metaphysical tool. Nietzsche argues that inasmuch as we seek to posit
truths which are eternally stable and reliable, we are setting ourselves up for
disappointment at best, manipulation at worst50 The "true world" fostered
by the will-to-truth is nothing more than a mythological construct51
Nietzsche, although he is a perspectivist does not deny the value of
knowledge. Some perspectives or interpretations are indeed more
persuasive or reliable than others. This attitude of interpretation and
evaluation is healthy and useful. However, by attaching the linguistic
symbol of "truth" to an interpretation, the entire meaning of die interpretive
argument is changed and a whole variety of power mechanisms come into
play to support the validity of that particular interpretation.
49 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.7.
50"Expressed exotically, Nietzsche's understanding of truth is a fluidly protean, quasiaesthetic, mytho-poietic ideal of nonexclusive truth. Expressed simply, simplistically, we
may also say that for Nietzsche there is no truth. The only truth is die lie of truth and the
truth seeker is condemned to such a lie, where at its best one has the truth that there is no
truth." Babette E. Babich, N ietzsche's Philosophy o fScience (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1994),15.
51 "Nietzsche reveals so-called ideal being as a 'realm' that is exterior and superior to
human volition. Prohibition and condemnation come down to man from this realm of the
outside and up-above. But this'realm 'is, after all,'nothing.' It emerges only from the
weakness of the slave morality, which projects itself into the heavens. The task of the
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Nietzsche counters that absolute knowledge is oxymoronic. Since
reality itself is not stable, knowledge must be supple by definition.
However, metaphysics and science can never accept or even acknowledge
the chaotic state of the universe. Philosophy is therefore delivered into
hands of the ideology of truth, the tyranny of the will-to-truth:
Into the bondage of false values and false scriptures! Ah, that
someone would redeem them from their Redeemer! Once, as the sea
tossed them about, they thought they had landed upon an island; but
behold, it was a sleeping monster! False values and false scriptures:
they are the worst monsters for mortal men—fate sleeps and waits
long within them. But at last it comes and awakes and eats and
devours all that have built their huts upon it52
Inasmuch as truth is an ideological tool, philosophy has become the
servant of the prevailing power structure. Devoted to the search for truth,
philosophy cannot become anything but Even philosophy that is
apparently critical never really attacks the presuppositions that underlie the
will-to-truth: "You have served the people and the people's superstitions,
all you famous philosophers!—you have not served truth! And it is
precisely for that reason that they paid you reverence."53
Caught in the trap of the will-to-truth and its attendant institutional
structures, philosophy has receded further into the absurdity of concretizing

philological and genealogical method is to reveal this ideal source as a nothingness."
Ricoeur, The Conflict o finterpretations, 443.
52Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:4.
53Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:8.
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"truth." The "philosophical embarrassment" of the dialectic is perhaps the
ultimate expression of the will-to-truth. It seeks to concretize reality in an
all-encompassing formula, and devalues or absorbs all that is not in accord
with its precepts. The dialectic, which purports to eliminate all but the
essential in its quest for absolute truth, has become a parody. Taken to its
logical concussion, the dialectic becomes an overtly reductionist mechanism
for further repressing the possibility for instability.54
Theological worldviews are even more constrictive, as they do not
generally allow for reinterpretation or the advancement of new hypotheses.
Theology, when coupled with philosophy in the guise of metaphysics, takes
the will-to-truth to a new level. Rather than a "search-for -truth", truth is
taken as already revealed, preventing the need for further exploration. The
fear of instability leads to the exclusion of entire sections of human
experience and the disallowing of unacceptable interpretations. As
Nietzsche states: "Churches they call their sweet-smelling caves

Who

created such caves and penitential steps? Was it not those who wanted to
hide themselves and were ashamed before the clear sky?"55

54" According to Nietzsche's self-understanding, this real dialectic may be characterized as
follows: (1) the movement is not an arbitrary and undirected process, it is self-related.
Nietzsche calls it' ovenx>nung(Uberwindun$.' (2) Due to its connection with the possible
£ustenzwhich inspires life, this thinking is substantialand quite distinct from intellectual
arbitrariness. (3) It is constructive in its purpose, though by its very nature it is in constant
danger of sinking into negation. (4) It has direction butno term inus, and the ground that is
lost is never regained; its substantiality consists simply in its being-on-the-way." Jaspers,
N ietzsche, 390.
55 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:4.
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Coupled with theological elements, philosophy is exceptionally
selective as to the manner in which it will sanction knowledge. The will-totruth, as an ideology that actually operates to repress serious questioning,
has hampered philosophy and made moral or political theory impotent and
bound to prevailing power structures. Philosophy, in the guise if the willto-truth, is hypocritical: "And let this be called by me immaculate
perception of all things: "that I desire nothing of things, except that I may lie
down before them like a mirror with a hundred eyes." Oh, you sentimental
hypocrites, you lustful men!"56 The ultimate outcome of the will-to-truth is
complacency, the enemy of knowledge. The role of the philosopher is to
reassure and to console, not to question and provoke:
His wisdom is: stay awake in order to sleep well
Now it is clear
to me that what people were once seeking above all when they
sought the teachers of virtue. They sought good sleep and opium
virtues to bring it about! To all of these lauded wise men of the
academic chairs, wisdom meant sleep without dreams: they knew no
better meaning of life.57
For Nietzsche, it is necessary to realize that all symbolizations,
whether linguistic or moral, are necessarily mutable. "For all things are
baptized at the fount of eternity and beyond good and evil; good and evil
themselves, however, are only intervening shadows and damp afflictions

56Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:15.
57Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:2.
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and passing clouds."58 Philosophy, however, is unable or unwilling to
accept the essential instability of existence and clings to pipe dreams of a
comprehendible universe.59 The drive to find the truth, the will-to-truth
devalues contradiction and leads to the petrifaction of ideas into "concepts"
and "doctrines."60 It is this concretization that Nietzsche reacts against
through his de-centering of philosophy and critique of truth. Nietzsche
does not seek to destroy philosophical errors or deny transcendence in order
to collapse societal mechanisms; he seeks to cause people to question for
themselves the foundations of truth.61 Haar notes: "Nietzsche's style aims
finally at destroying, or at least checking, all logical and, especially,

58 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ni:4.
59"Without knowledge of what knowledge is, the possibility of absolute truth becomes a
metaphysical fantasy—a 'fable' in Nietzsche's words." Babich, N ietzsche's Philosophy o f
Science, 78.
60"Our logical and psychological categories derive their falsehood precisely from this 'will
to find out the truth,' i.e., what is fixed, stable, identical, and noncontradictory. But by
devaluing contradiction, we bring into evidence a m oralprejudice A the very basis of
knowledge. This prejudice can be summed up as follows: what is always stable, always
identical, is not only True, but also Good, and in a twofold way: knowledge claims to bring
salvation and is itself haunted by an ideal of ethical honesty. It is as shameful to deceive as
it is to be deceived, and the true has more ethkalvalue than the false. If the will to know
the true is the will to be good and to be saved, this will is, then, a way of negating 'life.'"
Haar, N ietzsche and M etaphysics, 16-17.
61 "Nietzsche does not mean to sacrifice God for the sake of Nothing, for while recognizing
the deadly truth that God died he aims at transforming it into a life-inspiring one or rather
to discover in the depth of the deadly truth its opposite. Sacrificing God for the sake of
Nothing would be an extreme form of world-denial or of pessimism." Leo Strauss, "Note
on the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and EviT in Studies in Platonic Political
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 180.
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dialectical 'seriousness/ the goal of which is always to establish identities or
to reveal the one absolute Identity."62
Nietzsche argues in Zarathustra that it is necessary to break free of
herd philosophy the will-to-truth, which necessarily denigrates individual
insight "And we believe in the people and its 'wisdom' as if there were a
special secret entrance to knowledge which is blocked to him who has
learned anything."63 Philosophical knowledge can only be valuable if it is
gained outside of traditional philosophy, in the agonal sphere of individual
contemplation and activity:
They wrote letters of blood on the path they followed, and their folly
taught that truth is proved by blood. But blood is the worst witness
of truth; blood poisons and transforms the purest teaching to
delusion and hatred of the heart And if someone goes through fire
for his teaching—what does that prove? Truly, it is more when one's
own teaching comes out of one's own burning!64
It is only through this separation that real knowledge can be
obtained. Therefore, as Magnus notes, Nietzsche's critique of philosophy is
much more than a critique of the inadequacy of language, it is an
indictment "Nietzsche's critique is certainly not restricted to nor motivated
by linguistic considerations alone. Such considerations play a role, to be

62Haar, N ietzsche and M etaphysics, 4.
63Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:17.
64 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:4.
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sure. But the habits which Nietzsche would have us transform are habits of
living."65
IL
Nietzsche therefore argues that the degeneration of academic
philosophy into ideology is inescapable, as authentic philosophical
knowledge is only to be gained by intense individual reflection and activity.
It is foolish to expect to gain philosophical insight from abstract speculation
or rumination on texts, as this is merely the reflection upon another's
insight As Nietzsche writes: "it is not an easy thing to understand
unfamiliar blood: I hate the idling reader."66 The task of philosophical
reading in its passive, conventional sense is impossible. Communication of
essential philosophical insight simply cannot be accomplished through
traditional linguistic or communicative forms.
Communication of philosophy through a text is essentially the
production of a semblance of individually-gained knowledge, expressed
symbolically through linguistic forms. The further philosophy moves away
from its individual and discursive roots, the less effective it becomes and the
more danger it faces of becoming vulgarized. As individual philosophical

65 Magnus, N ietzsche's ExistentialImperative, 71.
66 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7. The interpreter, as opposed to the "reader" is an active
participant in the text, he makes it a part of himself.
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insights become interpreted and reinterpreted, the reader is faced with a
difficult problem: the existence of the original, rigidly constructed text
The text and by extension the writer, becomes an external signifier
that stands in opposition to the reader. It is essentially impossible to escape
the tendency of the experience of philosophical interpretation to degenerate
into a repressive power relationship.67 Nietzsche is therefore faced with the
challenge of constructing a new type of philosophical discourse that will not
degenerate into an external signifier. Thus, he must deal with language and
therefore symbol.
Nietzsche is open to criticism on this point He can certainly not be
naive enough to assert that he is capable of producing a new milieu of
symbolic discourse that will not fall into the traps he identifies and criticizes.
Nietzsche's main critique of traditional philosophy is that it tends to
concretize symbols and cause them to become detached from their original
meaning, while at the same time legitimating their practical force. If
Nietzsche is correct and symbols arise out of the concrete experience of
individuals, he is falling prey to this same problem. Nietzsche is certainly
concretizing philosophical experience in the guise of a symbolic discourse,

67 As Foucault notes: "For Nietzsche, it was not a matter of knowing what good and evil
were in themselves, but of who was being designated, or rather who was speaJdngwben
one said Agathos to designate oneself and D eilosto designate others. For it is there, in the
holder oi the discourse and, more profoundly still, in the possessor o f the word, that
language is gathered together in its entirety." The Order o f Things: A n Archaeology o fthe
Human Sciences Qiew York: Vintage, 1970), 305.
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even if he is up front about this fact However, he does not fully heed his
own imperative to avoid the tyranny of language. If Nietzsche's
metaphorical discourse is to remain attached to the original experiences that
engendered them, it is necessary for him to insure that these symbols are
capable of representing die internal experiences they represent without
become vulgarized.
In order to overcome this criticism, Nietzsche must argue that the
symbols in Zarathustra are not the type of symbols that can be the substrate
for a new philosophical language. Unlike mythological experience, these
symbols are not intended to explain the world or universals. They are
rhetorical tools designed to evoke in the mind of the reader a semblance of
Nietzsche's internal philosophical experience. As Jaspers notes:
The fact that he used an abundance of symbols, especially in
Zarathustra, must not mislead us. These do not have the weight of
symbols that are really believed; they represent a less formal
language and, in their intention and effect, never anything more. In
his youth, Nietzsche as a classical philologist often spoke of myths,
but in later life he seldom so much as used the word.68
Thus, Nietzsche's symbolic language is not a mythical discourse
designed to replace traditional language. Nietzsche is attempting to
transcend the strictures of language as much as possible, not to reform i t 69

68Jaspers, Nietzsche, 371.
» "Still, although he never mentions an intentional creation or replacement of myths, he
sees with increasing clarity a new, virtually mythical reality: the dynamic presence of
landscape and weather, of nature and life, and of the entire infra-human world." Jaspers,
N ietzsche, 371.
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Nietzsche's version of interpretive philosophy demands a communicative
form which is capable of that which both myth and language are incapable:
the elaboration of internal thought patterns and cognitive structures which
are at the same time irrational and inextricably connected to the individual's
personal experiences.
How can one hope to communicate philosophical ideas in the form of
discourse bounded by an artificial ordering principle—reason? If the
philosopher is to reach the mind of the reader, it must be in terms that the
human consciousness will intuitively recognize. This will necessarily render
the text confusing and even self-contradictory.70 However, contradiction is
valuable to uncovering philosophical errors, as it is innately part of the
human cognitive experience.71 A coherent, non-contradictory text is by
definition contrived. As Nietzsche notes: "With all things one thing is

70"Of course, self-contradictions within a text are inevitable from Nietzsche's point of view,
and he makes no claim to being exempt The inevitability of contradiction justifies
Nietzsche's refutation of the 'internalist' perspective's attempt to establish norms of rational
acceptability based on coherence, simplicity, common sense, or other contextually accepted
standards
For Nietzsche, the conditions of rational acceptability have been culturally
produced and always stand in danger of immanent contradiction." John McGowan,
Postmodernism and Its Critics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 74.
71 "Man's 'sickness' is shown by the fact that human development rests upon radical errors.
Man became 'human' only through illusion and folly. Consequently, man is 'a highly
mendacious, artificial, and opaque animal.' The disease of humanity, 'in contrast to the
condition of the animals, all of whose instincts are adapted to very specific tasks,' is
expressed by the fact that man, being a mere bundle of unfulfilled possibilities of
'indeterminate nature,' 'abounds in contradictory evaluations and, consequently, in
contradictory desires.' What makes man sick is precisely that which constitutes his value.
The sickness itself becomes the bearer or value " Jaspers, Nietzsche, 130.
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impossible—rationality!"72 Traditional philosophy ignores the fact that
there are at least two participants in the task of philosophy: the writer and
the reader. The original action, the creation of the text is only the first step.
The interpretation of the text is of equal importance. Conventional
philosophical discourse ignores the subjective role of the reader as
interpreter, as Deleuze and Guattari note: "signifier enthusiasts take an
oversimplified situation as their implicit model: word and thing. From the
word they extract the signifier, and from the thing a signified in conformity
with the word, and therefore subjugated to the signifier."73
Traditional philosophical writing is therefore somewhat naive, as it
assumes that the text is imbued with objective meaning separate from the
reader. Nietzsche realizes this fallacy and attempts to find a solution. By
acknowledging the reader as the actual site of philosophy, Nietzsche is able
to mitigate the problem of the text as a signifier and the problem of
symbolism. However, Nietzsche also places a great deal of emphasis upon
the act of reading. It is ultimately the responsibility of the reader to confront
the text and engage in the act of serious interpretation.
In this sense, the narrative format of Zarathustra is the natural next
step in Nietzsche's desire to confound the casual reader. It is simply not
possible to approach Zarathustra as a traditional philosophical text
72 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IIL4.
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Nietzsche demands serious attention on the part of the reader "It disgusts
me to think of Zarathustra going into the world as a piece of literary
entertainment; who will be serious enough for it!. . . [N]ow nobody can
save me from being cast among the writers of belles lettres. Hell!"74
Zarathustra is not to be read as a diversion, it is to become a diversion.
Most fundamentally, Nietzsche envisioned the narrative form
employed in Zarathustra to be the only method available to convey his own
internal experiences. Because the narrative by its very nature demands
interpretation rather than merely comprehension, it is qualitatively different
from the ordinary philosophical text Rational, logical thought is an
inaccurate representation of the operation of the human mind. Humans do
not think in the manner of carefully-constructed, tightly argued texts.
Human thought is more organic, composed of images and feelings not
rationally tied together. Nietzsche argues that discourse must be freed from
the creeping reductionism inherent in philosophical language. As Foucault
notes:
And now, in this philosophical-philological space opened up for us
by Nietzsche, language wells up in an enigmatic multiplicity that
must be mastered. There appear, like so many projects (or chimeras,
who can tell as yet?), the themes of a universal formulation of all
discourse, or the themes of an internal exegesis of the world which
would at the same time be its total demystification, or those of a
73Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 66.
74Nietzsche, Letter to Peter Gast, April 6,1883, in Middleton, Selected Letters o fFriedrich
N ietzsche, 212.
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general theory of signs; or again, the themes (historically probably
the first) of a transformation without residuum, of a total
reabsorption of all forms of discourse into a single word, of all books
into a single page, of the whole world into one book.75
The creation of the narrative is itself an act of critical judgement and
aesthetic creation.76 Through this creative act Nietzsche hopes to transcend
the logical requirements of language and communicate internal images
through a communicative systems of metaphor and symbol that are not tied
to the exigencies of the will-to-truth. Nietzsche speaks of the process by
which he chose the narrative format for his most important philosophical
work in these terms:
Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century a clear idea of what
poets of strong ages call inspiration?. . . in the sense that suddenly,
with indescribable certainty and subtlety, something becomes visible,
audible, something that shakes one to the last depths and throws one
down—that merely describes the facts. One hears, one does not seek;
one accepts, one does not ask who gives; like lightning, a thought
flashes up, with necessity, without hesitation regarding its form—I
never had any choice.77
In Ecce Homo Nietzsche describes the metaphorical language of
Zarathustra as a complex web of image and that which it supposedly
represents:
75Foucault, The Order o f Things: A n Archaeology o f the Human Sciences, 305.
76"The world is not the mere appearance of the will-to-power, for as we know, the
distinction between a phenomenal 'apparent' world and a transcendent 'real' world is
rejected by Nietzsche. But more than th at The very positing of a distinction between'teal'
and 'apparent' is part of the problem, not a contribution to the solution. The positing of
that distinction is a symptom of decadence, of the decline of life. The world is no illusion."
Magnus, N ietzsche's ExistentialIm perative, 22.
77 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §3.
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The involuntariness of image and metaphor is strangest of all; one no
longer has any notion of what is an image or a metaphor, everything
offers itself as the nearest, most obvious, simplest expression. It
actually seems, to allude to something Zarathustra says, as if the
things themselves approached and offered themselves as
metaphors.78
In Zarathustra Nietzsche hopes to use metaphorical language to
express the essentially inexpressible: internal experience. Nietzsche argues
that imagery, metaphor, and symbols unadulterated by the conceptual
constraints of grammar can communicate philosophical insight more
accurately than language. Essentially, Nietzsche uses a convergence of
imagery to inspire in the mind of the interpreter a semblance of Nietzsche's
own internal experience. "There is no wisdom, no investigation of the soul,
no art of speech before Zarathustra: what is nearest and most everyday, here
speaks unheard-of things. Epigrams trembling with passion, eloquence
become music, lightning bolts hurled forward into hitherto unfathomed
futures."79
Nietzsche describes the metaphorical language employed in
Zarathustra as beyond the capacity of normal language. "The most
powerful capacity for metaphors that has existed so far is poor and mere
child's play compared with this return of language to the nature of

78 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §3.
79 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §6.
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imagery."80 Nietzsche creates concepts, to be sure, but not mythological
ones designed to be adopted by others or developed into dogma.81 Through
this attack on language, Nietzsche repudiates analytic and speculative
philosophy as incapable of reaching authentic knowledge. Instead, one
must actively engage philosophical problems directly, not through the
writings of others:
For this is the truth: I have left the house of scholars and slammed the
door behind me. Too long did my soul sit hungry at their table; I
have not been schooled, as they have, to crack knowledge as one
cracks nuts . . . they sit cool in the cool shade: they want to be mere
spectators in everything and they care not to sit where the sun burns
upon the steps, like those who stand in the street and stare at the
people passing by, so they too wait and stare at thoughts that others
have thought82
Similarly, it is impossible to use the methods of discourse favored by
these modes: dialectics, empiricism, and mysticism. A new mode of
communication must be advanced: self-communication. Only discourse
taking place within the self can be of success, as it alone can recognize the

80 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §6.
81"It might be thought that Nietzsche renounces concepts. However, he creates immense
and intense concepts ('forces,' 'value/ 'becoming,' 'life'; and repulsive concepts like
ressentim entand T*ad conscience'), just as he lays out a new plane of imminence (infinite
movements of the will to power and eternal return) that completely changes the image of
thought (criticism of the will to truth). .. But in Nietzsche, the conceptual personae
involved never remain implicit It is true that their manifestation for themselves gives rise
to an ambiguity that leads many readers to see Nietzsche as a poet thaumaturge, or creator
of myths. But conceptual personae, in Nietzsche and elsewhere, are not mythical
personifications or historical persons or literary or novelistic heroes." Deleuze and
Guattari, Whatis Philosophy?65.
82Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:16.
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fact that the individual cannot seek understanding outside of interpretation.
Internal dialogue can only be communicated through imagery, but it is in
the end the most effective type of communication as it is the most intimate.
Nietzsche's self-communication takes the form of anamnetic meditation.
Nietzsche is therefore writing for himself, but the fact that he chooses to
publish his works demonstrates that Nietzsche's internal dialogue is to be
shared.83
Nietzsche argues that in order to foster this internal interpretive
dialogue, it is necessary to return to the most concrete, fundamental
experiences. "Truly, all being is hard to demonstrate; it is hard to make it
speak. Yet tell me, brothers, is not the most wonderful of all things most
clearly demonstrated?"84 It makes more sense to interrogate existence that is
the closest to us and the most comprehensible, our concrete consciousness.
However, we have fooled ourselves by buying into the myth of
transcendence. This leads to a rank ordering of types of insight, ranking
83It is reported that Nietzsche actually tried to get the few copies of his published works
back before is breakdown in 1888. If so, this would strengthen my point However, I
cannot find definitive evidence for this outside of the secondary literature, and so have
reserved judgement on this matter. Nietzsche, at the end of his career, states: "I am one
thing, my writings are another matter.... Some day institutions will be needed in which
men live and teach as I conceive of living and teaching; it might even happen that a few
chairs will then be set aside for the interpretation of Zarathustra. But it then would
contradict my character entirely if I expected ears and hands for my truths today: that today
doesn't hear me and doesn't accept my ideas is not only understandable, it even seems
right to me. I don't want to be confounded with others—not even by myself." ... My
triumph is precisely the opposite of Schopenhauer's: I say, 'non legor, non legar. (I am not
read, I w illnot be read.'" Ecce Homo, 111:1.
MNietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
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externally-actuated form of insight, often concretized in "authoritative"
texts, as superior to the experiences of the individual consciousness in
relation to the cosmos. This has led to the neglect of internal experience as a
ground for knowledge:
Once the soul looked contemptuously upon die body: and then this
contempt was the supreme good—the soul wanted the body lean,
monstrous, emaciated. So the soul thought to escape from the body
and from the earth
But tell me, brothers: what does your body
say about your soul? Is not your soul poverty and dirt and miserable
escape?85
The narrative format may offer an answer, as it requires the conscious
act of interpretation, unlike the philosophical format that is not honest in its
need for interpretation. Zarathustra does not have a meaning as such, and
the reader does not expect to find one outside of the individual
interpretation. The reader expects to have to interpret the text, as opposed
to reading for the philosopher's intended meaning.
Nietzsche refers to this type of interpretive endeavor as "beingmasked." The mask is a necessity because of the inexpressibility of
knowledge; one must take on the mask in order to experience existence from
a different perspective. As Jaspers notes:
The necessity of being masked throws its shadow on the meaning of a
work: No thoughts that go into a work can convey the truth itself.
The lack of authenticity in everything determinate results in the
ambiguity of the authentic; incommunicability produces the

as Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3.
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loneliness that hides behind masks. The work of a thinker who has
allowed this boundary-experience to permeate his very being is
identifiable, as it were, by stigmata.86
The metaphor of the mask suggests a much deeper level of
engagement than mere reading. Being masked necessarily destroys the
impulse to the will-to-truth, representing a conscious choice to expand the
level of perception and engage in an interpretive endeavor. The mask
operates on a more primal level than speech, it signifies a change in
perception on the level of consciousness itself. Klossowski states:
The mask, which forms a determined physiognomy all the same,
even when it hides its absence, belongs to external interpretation, but
corresponds to an internal desire of suggestion. Even more, it reveals
that the person who appears to wear the mask must also have
decided on such-and-such a face with regard to "him self'. . . Just as
the mask hides the absence of a determinate physiognomy—and thus
conceals Chaos, the richness of Chaos—so the gesture that
accompanies the mask (the histrionic gesture) is strictly related to the
designation of the lived emotion before it is signified by speech.87
Unlike language, the idea of the mask retains an innate authenticity.
Since the mask becomes a part of the interpreter, it is in each case genuine.88
However, this is not to imply some sort of passive adoption of a different
perspective. The adoption of masks is a constant flux of identity, in keeping
with the reality of internal experience. Much as internal dialogue is

86Jaspers, N ietzsche, 409.
87Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle 224.
88"Nietzsche distinguishes the mask, of which he approves, from histrionics, in which all
genuineness in lost" Jaspers, Nietzsche, 406.
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fragmented and irrational, Nietzsche constructs his works faithful to the
disjointed character of the mind. Haar notes: "the fragmented, aphoristic,
and bursting character of the text corresponds to Nietzsche's own grasp of
the world: it is a world scattered to pieces, teeming with explosions. . . a
world made of moving and light surfaces where the incessant shifting of
masks is named laughter, dance, game."89
A vital element in Nietzsche's interpretive philosophy is the act of
critique. Critique is a creative act that places the reader in opposition to the
text or the philosophy at hand.90 Eventually, Nietzsche calls upon the
individual to turn the critique inward and investigate the possibilities of
personal metamorphosis, which will be discussed at length in Chapter
Seven. This takes the form of an enduring interpretation of the
manifestations of the will-to-power as it manifests within the self, which are
at bottom the internal experiences Nietzsche discusses:
The world is a process of becoming, conceived as a unity. It is willto-power in the sense that will-to-power is its intelligible character.
89 Haar, Nietzsche and M etaphysics, 4.
90"Nietzsche contrasts the activity of critique with revenge, grudge or ressentim ent
Zarathustra will be followed from one end of the book to the other by his ape, his 'buffoon',
his 'demon'; but the ape is as different from Zarathustra as revenge and icssentim entare
from critique itself. To be confused with his ape; this is what Zarathustra feels as one of the
frightful temptations held out to him
Critique is not a re-action of re-sentim ent\m t the
active expression of an active mode of existence; attack and not revenge, the natural
aggression of a way of being, the divine wickedness without which perfection could not be
imagined
This way of being is that of the philosopher precisely because he intends to
wield the differential element as critic and therefore as a hammer." GiOes Deleuze,
N ietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press,
1983), 3.
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We presumably can see will-to-power expressing itself in and as
everything if we modify our perspective, if we abandon traditional
habits of thought and speech. Will-to-power is therefore to be
understood only as existing in and through "its" manifestations.91
By relocating the site of philosophy to the critique of internal
manifestations of the will-to-power, Nietzsche brings his thought full circle.
All of existence is seen to be an interpretation of the will-to-power in its
varied permutations. Philosophy, therefore, is nothing if it is not the
interpretation of these interpretations.92 Ricoeur states:
Where positivism says, There are only facts, Nietzsche says, There are
no facts, only interpretations. In extending the critique to so-called
internal experience, Nietzsche destroys in its principle the exceptional
character of the cogito with respect to the doubt that Descartes
directed to the distinction between the world of dreams and the
world of waking. To assume the phenomenality of the internal world
is, in addition, to align the connection of inner experience with
external "causation," which is also an illusion that conceals the play
of forces under the artifice of order. It is, as well, to posit an entirely
arbitrary fiction called "thinking," apart from the bristling
multiplicity of instincts. And finally, it is to imagine a "substratum of
subject" in which the acts of thought would have their origin.99
Perpetual critique of this kind leads to a philosophical project that is
never complete. As each reader confronts the text the imagery is

91 Magnus, N ietzsche's ExistentialImperative^ 22.
92"Indeed [one] will doubt whether a philosopher could possiU yhave 'ultimate and real'
opinions, whether behind every one of his caves there is not, must not be, another deeper
cave—a more comprehensive, stranger, richer world beyond the surface, an abysmally deep
ground behind every ground, under every attempt to furnish 'grounds.'... Every
philosophy also concealsa philosophy; every opinion is also a hideout every word also a
mask." Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, § 289.
93 Paul Ricoeur, O neselfas Another, brans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992), 15.
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reconstituted according to the experiences of the reader and is interpreted
accordingly. Jaspers confirms this point, "But at the same time we find here
a philosophy that exists only in Nietzsche and cannot be transmitted, one
that speaks without disclosing the way and that /s without being a model."94
This interpretation argues that Zarathustra represents Nietzsche's
conscious attempt to remedy the seeming impossibility of philosophical
communication.95 The first sections of Zarathustra, concerning the state and
community, are largely critical The symbolic language in these sections is
negative, consisting of metaphors of destruction of the self and immersion in
the dehumanizing social matrix. On the contrary, Nietzsche's metaphors
concerning the possibility of self-creation are much more positive, if more
problematic. It is therefore necessary to look to the structure and images of
Zarathustra itself to determine the insights that can be gained through

94Jaspers, Nietzsche, 449.
85 In his autobiography, Nietzsche writes of this problem: "To communicate a state, an
inward tension of pathos, by means of signs, including the tempo of these signs—that is the
meaning of every style; and considering that the multiplicity of inward states is
exceptionally large in my case, I have many stylistic possibilities—the most multifarious art
of style that has ever been at the disposal of one man. Good is any style that really
communicates an inward state, that makes no mistake about the signs, the tempo of the
signs, the gestures—all the laws about how long periods are concerned with the art of
gestures. Here my instinct is infallible. Good style in itself—&pure folly, mere 'idealism/
on a level with the 'beautiful in itself/ the 'good in itself/ the 'thing in itself.' Always
presupposing that there are ears—that there are those capable and worthy of the same
pathos, that there is no lack of those to whom one m ay communicate oneself.—My
Zarathustra, for example, is still looking for those—alas, it will have to keep looking for
some time yet!... And until then there will be nobody to understand the art that has been
squandered here: nobody ever was in a position to squander more new, unheard-of artistic
devices that has actually been created only for this purpose." Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 111:4.
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careful interpretation, and which reveal themselves to be manifestly
political.
The overarching purpose of Zarathustra is to evoke a hyperaware
self-critical awareness, and through this existential stance to provoke the
possibility of personal transmutation. However, Nietzsche asserts that the
self is largely made through collective forces and social interaction; political
forces that exist independently from the individual but are internalized.
Since the self is therefore largely socially-created, it must be deconstructed
in order to reveal the substrate of the individual self. This project is
demonstrated specifically through the narrative progression in Zarathustra.
As the most influential actor of social creation, the state receives Nietzsche's
most virulent attack.
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T h e c o l d M onster : T h e S tate a n d M a ss C ulture

Nietzsche's political analysis in Zarathustra does not proceed in a
linear fashion; nevertheless it is a dearly-defined argument Within the
course of the narrative, Zarathustra moves from solitude to sodety and back
to solitude. This begins within the Prologue when Zarathustra leaves the
solitude of his cave and goes down to human society below. He encounters
a town, where he attempts to teach die inhabitants die knowledge he has
accumulated through his years of solitary introspection. The fact that he
chooses to leave the town is also important, as it indicates that Nietzsche
does not view collective existence as the end of Zarathustra's journey, but
rather as a necessary part of his journey towards personal insight and
growth.
Implied in this narrative progression is Nietzsche's rejection of
collective forms of existence and his call to a self-actualized mode of being.
In Zarathustra Nietzsche criticizes the various levels of human collective
existence from the greatest level of aggregation down to the most basic
levels of association. Nietzsche identifies two major elements of collective
existence for his critique: die state and mass culture. However, Nietzsche
does not make fine distinctions between these two; they are seen as
interdependent and symbiotic.

83
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For Nietzsche, the most fundamental element of collective existence is
K u ltu r (culture), understood as the symbolic underpinnings of a given

society. The culture of a society need not be concretely institutionalized in
terms of political power, but these symbolic associations invariably become
concretized as they are prime resources for political manipulation.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to remember that culture exists independent of
prevailing political forms. Importantly, Nietzsche argues that modem
culture is no longer a creative factor, but is largely a product of and a tool of
the modem state. As such, Nietzsche largely offers a critique of "mass"
culture, which is therefore the handmaiden of the state. It is therefore
proper to examine Nietzsche's critique of the state first
Nietzsche's concept of the state is directly connected to the idea of
institutionalized power.1 Nietzsche treats the state separately from mass
culture in part due to his ongoing genealogical analysis of the modes of
human association. Nietzsche examines the origins of institutionalized
government as early as The Birth o f Tragedy, and the correspondence
between the character of a culture and the governmental structures that
grow out of it remains an enduring theme, culminating in the essays that
1It is dear that Nietzsche is not speaking only of Prussian nationalism, although it is a
prime example of the spirit underlying the runaway bureaucratic state. As Nietzsche
argues in Daybreak "How degenerate in its taste, how slavish before dignities, classes,
decorations, pomp and splendor, must a people have been when it evaluated the Schlkhte
[the simple] as the ScM echte[the bad], the simple man the bad man! The moral arrogance
of the Germans should always be confronted with this little word' schlecht: nothing further
is needed." §231.
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form The Genealogy o f Morality. Throughout his work Nietzsche
continuously emphasizes the essential separation that necessarily grows
between the people and their government as the institutions of government
grow more and more detached horn the culture underlying the society. The
most essential of the institutions is the "law/' which Nietzsche argues is a
mythological construct which derives its legitimacy from the society's belief
in its transcendent rectitude. Although it is a state construct, the law gains
an epistemological independence that becomes unquestioned by the
masses.2
This separation of the people and the state is exacerbated by the
tendency of societies to concretize existing power relations into stable
institutions. Originally, these state institutions reflect the cultural prejudices
and presuppositions underlying a society. However, the nature of
institutions undercuts the essential fluidity of human culture and society.
The symbols that support state institutions lose their original meanings and
are simply taken for granted. Furthermore, the state actively seeks to
promulgate its legitimacy by co-opting religious, cultural, and ethnic

2"There are moralities which are meant to justify their creator before others. .. .This
morality is used by its creator to forget, that one to have others forget him or something
about him. Some moralists want to vent their power and creative whims on humanity;
some others, perhaps including Kant, suggest with their morality: 'What deserves respect in
me is that I can obey—and you oughtnot to be different from m e/—In short, moralities are
also merely a sign language o fthe affects.” Nietzsche, Beyond Good and E vil §187.
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symbols. The state structure that emerges from this process is an essentially
independent political actor with its own agenda and sense of survival.3
This conclusion foreshadows Max Weber's analysis of the
bureaucratic state, which is in sympathy with Nietzsche's critique of the
institutionalized state. Nietzsche's views on the origin and operation of the
state also mirrors the methodological debate within the field of comparative
politics, which has for some time been struggling with whether political
culture or political structures are predominant in determining political
change. Nietzsche's analysis suggests that political culture, or mass society,
provides the superstructure of symbols and constraints that ultimately
determine the type of political structures that can be institutionalized. In the
Nietzschean sense, culture begets structure, and structure then shapes
culture.
Nietzsche therefore envisions the "state" as a relatively fixed
constellation of concrete power relations that exists independently from the
essentially psychological normalizing mechanisms of mass culture, upon
and from which the state was originally founded. This concretization of
power relations in the state, because it now has an independent stable
existence, is self-replicating and resistant to change. As such, the state
becomes a radically disconnected political actor that seeks to usurp the
3 Nietzsche refers to the belief in the validity and independence of the state as "insanity"
and a form of "pathological estrangement." Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §256.
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original normalizing mechanisms of mass culture in order to retain and
maximize its own power within the confines of the society as a whole. As
the culture of a society changes over time, the state structures are threatened
and become more deeply entrenched, causing a rupture which undermines
the legitimacy of the state.4 As Nietzsche later argues: "Our institutions are
no good anymore: on that there is universal agreement However, it is not
their fault but ours. Once we have lost ail the instincts out of which
institutions grow, we lose institutions altogether because we are no longer
good for them."5
The state is, then, an artifact of preceding generations. It is a creature
of myth, but one with very real power and the willingness to destroy in
order to maintain its existence. Indeed, the state is die true opiate of the
masses, cultivating a sense of dependence not unlike addiction.
Unfortunately for its citizens, the state has through the generations

*"How the tradition has arisenis here a matter of indifference, and has in any event
nothing to do with good and evil or with any kind of immanent categorical imperative, it is
above all directed at the preservation of a community, a people; every superstitious usage
which has arisen on the basis of some chance event mistakenly interpreted enforces a
tradition which is in accordance with custom to follow; for to sever oneself from it is
dangerous, and even more injurious to the com m unity than to the individual
Every
tradition now continually grows more venerable the farther away its origin lies and the
more this origin is forgotten; the respect paid to it increases from generation to generation,
the tradition at last becomes holy and evokes awe and reverence; and thus the morality of
piety is in any event a much older morality than that which demands unegoistic actions."
Nietzsche, Human all too Human § 96.
5 Nietzsche, The Twilight o fthe Idols, 939.
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conditioned them to be an unquestioning audience to this political theatre of
symbols and noise:
The State, Zarathustra teaches, is to be held in suspicion, for its claim
to speak for all can only be maintained by its concealing its origins in
the act of creation
The people, those gathered like a herd in the
market-place, have little appreciation of greatness and creativeness,
they have only a taste for good actors.6
Nietzsche's contempt for die state, therefore, is based upon his
conviction that the state is the most ruthlessly efficient destroyer of human
potentiality possible. "I call it die state where everyone, good and bad,
drinks poison: the state where everyone, good and bad, loses himself: the
state where universal slow suicide is called—life."7 The state not only
quashes individual initiative and creativity, but it actively seeks to cause its
citizens to internalize the values of conformity and quiescence. Reared and
trapped within the confines of the state, individuals are infantilized and
have become the vassals of an oppressor more concrete than religion and
more cruelly repressive. Nietzsche writes, "there are still peoples and herds
somewhere, but not with us, brothers: here there are states. The state?
What is that? Well then! Now open your ears, for I shall now speak to you
of the death of peoples. The state is the coldest of all cold monsters."8

6 Ansell-Pearson, N ietzsche Contra Rousseau, 163.
7 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, t i l .
8 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Lll.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89
Nietzsche attacks the central myth that supports the state, whether its
theoretical justification is founded in consent or divine right This is the
myth that the state actually represents or is in some way constitutive of die
people, rather than being a mechanism designed to preserve prevailing
power relations:
Coldly it lies, too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: "I, the state, am
the people." It is a lie! It was creators who created peoples and hung
a faith and a love over them: thus they served life. It is destroyers
who set snares for many and call it the state: they hang a sword and
a hundred desires over them.9
The modem state is the legacy of its founders, and the modem
manifestation of these relationships as embodied in institutions is still
manipulated by those in power. However the rulers of the state, as
products of it, are themselves constrained within die institutional structures
they claim to control. Indeed, the leaders of modem society are often the
most corrupted by the mythology surrounding the state. As great actors,
they are master manipulators but do not possess creative energy which
would allow them to supercede their subservient status.
This corruption of leadership is a symptom of die state, but also leads
to the increasing vanity of die masses. The ethos of conformity becomes a
positive virtue, further ensuring mediocrity and the repression of the
individual:

9 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
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There is no harder misfortune in all human destiny than when the
powerful of the earth are not also the first men. Then everything
becomes false and awry and monstrous. And when they are even the
last men and more beast than man, then die value of die rabble rises
higher and higher and at last the rabble-virtue says: Behold, I alone
am virtue!10
Nietzsche therefore consistendy refers to the state as die triumph of
the "superfluous," essentially meaning complacent dependent mediocrity.11
The state creates willing subjects, draws them in, and then uses their labor
and devotion to promulgate itself into the next generation. "Many too many
are born: the state was invented for the superfluous! Just see how it lures
them, the many-too-many! How it devours them, and chews them, and re
chews them!"12
Just look at these superfluous people! They steal for themselves the
works of inventors and the treasures of the wise: they call their theft
culture—and they turn everything to sickness and calamity. Just look
at these superfluous people! They are always ill, they their bile and
call it a newspaper. They devour one another and cannot even digest
themselves.13
It is difficult to believe that vital, creative individuals could arise out
of this mire, as Nietzsche seems to hope. Zarathustra himself laments the
difficulty of this hope: "I myself, to be sure—I have never yet seen a great

10 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:3.
11 "Superfluous" could also be rendered as "parasites"; or perhaps more poetically "co
dependent vampires."
12

Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Lll.

13Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
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man. The eye of the subtlest is crude today for what is great It is the
kingdom of the mob

Today belongs to the mob: who still knows what is

great what small! Who could successfully seeks greatness there! Only a
fool: a fool would succeed."14 Nietzsche's critiques of the state are therefore
not designed to provide practical reforms that would make collective
institutionalized existence less repressive.15 Nietzsche instead turns to a
critique of the individual created by the confluence of mass culture and state
action. Because of the culture of conformity, these individuals seek to
corrupt others with their own Dekadenz in furtherance of the state:
What is this man? A heap of diseases that reach out into the world
through the spirit there they want to catch their prey. What is Bus
man? A knot of savage serpents that are seldom at peace among
themselves—thus they go forth alone to seek prey in the world.16
Politics and society in the classical sense is inimical to the state.
Whereas Plato and Aristotle linked the polis and die just individual,
Nietzsche argues that the modem state and perhaps society in general are
inevitably coercive and therefore destructive of the individual self. Healthy
individuals, and by extension healthy cultures, intuitively recognize the

14 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:5.
15Several Nietzsche interpreters make the opposite argument, particularly Strong and
Ansell-Pearson. However, I argue that if Nietzsche wanted to present a political theory of
the state he would have simply done so. Rather, Nietzsche consistently focuses on the
status of the individual and presents his positive thought accordingly. Nietzsche critiques
the state unmercifully, but reserves his recommendations and hope for the future for the
individual.
16 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:6.
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pathological nature of the institutionalized state. "Where a people still
exists, there the people do not understand the state and hate it as the evil
eye and sin against custom and law."17 Because it is no longer connected to
the fundamental elements of its indigenous culture or the citizens currently
comprising the populace, the state is actually an impediment to the search
for justice or positive political change, contrary to the prevailing statist
myth. This is primarily due to the desire of the state to prevent its citizens
from venturing outside of accepted parameters.
The state proffers pre-existing collective social identities that usurp
the innate identities of its citizens. This is carried out largely through the
use of political myths such as nationalism, the belief in equality, or cultural
and ethnic superiority. Group identity subsumes all and leads to needless
(valueless) conflict with little opportunity for personal glory. This conflict
serves to strengthen ties to the institutions of the state while preventing
either meaningful interpersonal relationships or a meaningful dialogue with
the self.18
Nietzsche argues that the most pernicious political myth arising from
this disconnection is that of human equality. Nietzsche does not seem to
17Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
18"To be moral, to act in accordance with custom, to be ethical means to practice obedience
towards a law or tradition established from of old. Whether one subjects oneself with effort
or gladly and willingly makes no difference, it is enough that one does it He is called
"good" who doers what is customary as if by nature, as a result of a long inheritance, that is
to say easily and gladly." Nietzsche, Human a ll too Human §96.
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imply that humans should necessarily be ranked or that human life is
meaningless apart from greatness. Rather, Nietzsche objects that the myth
of equality has been manipulated by those in power to prevent the
emergence of creativity or greatness within a society. Partially motivated by
bad conscience, leaders promulgate the notion of equality in order to
disguise their own mediocrity: "Thus do I speak to you in parables, you
who make the soul giddy, you preachers of equality. You are tarantulas and
dealers in hidden revengefulness!"19 This is the hypocrisy of those who
preach equality; they seek to level others so they no longer feel inadequate.
Indeed, the state relies on the institutionalized belief in equality to
regulate human behavior. As the generations progress, this belief becomes
less questioned until it has become a quasi-religious dogma. However, the
belief in equality remains in some sense attached to the feelings of guilt and
inadequacy from which it sprang:
You preachers of equality, thus from you the mad tyranny of
impotence cries for "equality': thus your most secret tyranny of
appetite disguises itself in words of virtue. Soured self-conceit,
repressed envy, perhaps your fathers' self-conceit and envy: they
burst from you as a flame and madness of revenge.20
Nietzsche's critique is not aimed at putting individuals in their place
or setting up a new class structure. However, Nietzsche seeks to inform the

19Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:7.
20Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:7.
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individual that the belief in equality is no more than a myth. Because his
goal is to emancipate the individual from the psychological grip of mass
culture and the confines of the state, he must destroy file fundamental errors
underlying their grip on the person. "I do not want to be confused with
these preachers of equality, nor taken for one of them. For justice speaks
thus to me. "Men are not equal." And they should not become so, either!
For what were my love of the Obermensch if I spoke otherwise?"21
The state and mass culture, however, are composed of these overly
normalized individuals who are not able to recognize, or chose not to
perceive, the mythological basis underlying governmental institutions.
Because of this, the state is preoccupied with petty questions, and, at the
same time, prohibits individuals from taking positions or asking questions
injurious to the status quo. As such, the search for knowledge is stunted:
The marketplace is full of solemn buffoons—and the people boast of
their great men! These are their heroes of the hour. But the hour
presses them: so they press you. And from you too they require a
Yes or a No. And woe to you if you want to set your chair between
For and Against Do not be jealous, lover of truth, because of these
inflexible men! Truth has never yet clung to the arm of an inflexible
man.22

21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL7.
22Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.
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The ultimate product of mass culture is the paragon of collective
being, referred to by Zarathustra as the "Ultimate Man."23 The defining
characteristic of the Ultimate Man is smug self-satisfaction. This inertia,
linked with pride, leads to a lack of self-critical ability. "The time of the
most contemptible man is coming, the man who can no longer despise
himself. Behold! I shall show you the Ultimate Man."24 The Ultimate Man
may be afflicted by bad conscience or existential guilt but is not able to
conceive of different possibilities. This narcissism inevitably extends into
arrogance: "They have something of which they are proud. What is it
called that makes them proud? They call it culture, it distinguishes them
from goatherds."25
Nietzsche, however, speaks with great contempt for the Ultimate
Man, which he considers to be a pitiful waste of human existence. Society
has become a vehicle for the continuance of physical comfort, at the expense
of the struggle that produced greatness in heroic societies. '"We have
discovered happiness/" say the Ultimate Men and blink. They have left the

23This phrase has been popularly translated as the "last man", although this does not have
the connotation that I believe Nietzsche intends. The "Last Man" connotes that human
development is at an end. However, Nietzsche wants to transcend the metaphor of human
progress altogether with his philosophy of overcoming. Hence, the "Ultimate Man" is the
pinnacle of social development, the social man par excellence.
24Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $5.
25 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
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places where living was hard: for one needs warmth. One still loves one's
neighbor and rubs oneself against him: for one needs warmth."26
Society has become an uninspired herd, dedicated to the lowest
common denominator. Rather than seeking cultural advancement the state
serves as a sopoforic, ensuring its citizens that they have reached the
pinnace of societal development "A little poison now and then: that
produces pleasant dreams. And a lot of poison at last for a pleasant
death."27 In turn, the citizens become lazy and easily led:
They still work, for work is entertainment But they take care that die
entertainment does not exhaust them. Nobody grows rich or poor
anymore: both are too much of a burden. Who still wants to rule?
Who obey? Both are too much of a burden. No herdsman and one
herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever
thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the asylum.28
The myth of progress is also bound up with the state, imbuing a
teleology to social existence that is manifestly contrived. As such, the state
is invested with legitimacy arising from the perception of inevitable social
evolution or the increasing rationalization of human life.29 As long as
individuals accept the state as a rational construct or an inevitable product

26 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5. In this sense Nietzsche agrees with Hobbes that
people cluster together out of fear and convenience.
27Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
28Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
29It is possible to read this as an implicit critique of Hegel, who envisioned the state as the
embodiment of perfect reason and therefore the ultimate goal of societal evolution.
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of the laws of history, rather than the embodiment of concrete and
identifiable power relations, they have little interest in resistance.
"Formerly all the world was mad," the most acute of them say and
blink They are clever and know everything that has ever happened:
so their mockery is endless. They still quarrel, but soon reconcile—
otherwise indigestion would result They have their little pleasure by
day and their little pleasure by night but they respect health. "We
have discovered happiness," say the Ultimate Men and blink30
Laziness, complacency, and social pressure keep people from
straying too far. This leads to mediocrity and stagnation. This misreading
of history, or the manipulation of history into justification of the state, is an
impediment to the individual's possibility of self-overcoming
(Selbstiiberwingdung'f1 "Thus all that is past is handed oven for the mob
could one day become master, and all time be drowned in shallow waters.
Therefore, O my brothers, is a new nobility needed', to oppose all mob-rule
and all despotism and to write anew upon new law-tables the word:
'Noble'."32
Perhaps the most telling episode in Zarathustra concerning the
psychological imperatives of mass culture occurs after Zarathustra's critique
of the Ultimate Man. The crowd actually begins to call for Zarathustra to

30 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
31 Nietzsche specifically deals with this question in his early essay The Use and Abuse o f
H istory/or Lite.
32Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.11.
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bring them this paragon of social being, demonstrating their predisposition
to mediocrity:
"Give us this Ultimate Man, O Zarathustra"—they cried—"make us
into this Ultimate Man. You can have die Obermensch." And all die
people laughed and shouted. But Zarathustra grew sad and spoke to
his heart: They do not understand me: I am not the mouth for these
ears. Perhaps I lived too long in the mountains, listened too much to
the trees and the streams: now I speak to them as goatherds.33
Thus, the masses actively aspire to this pitiable condition, they no
longer desire self-advancement Indeed, the possibility of such
contemplation is seen as undesirable, if not criminal or insane. The state, by
robbing the desire for individual improvement from its citizens, has
triumphed. Zarathustra realizes that he cannot speak to the masses as a
leader. This is not the type of quest that he is proposing, a new power
relationship. Nussbaum mirrors this point
[Nietzsche's] description of the so-called "last man" in Zarathustra
predicts for the future of human morality in European bourgeois
democracy the extinction of recognizable humanity, precisely
through the extinction of the Platonic longing for self-transcendence.
"The time of the most despicable man is coming," says Zarathustra,
"he that is no longer able to despise himself." As one might expect,
Zarathustra's audience, much like some of Plato's contemporary
critics, ignored the fact that his speech was a praise of the "great
longing" and called out, "Give us this last man."34
The psychological condition of the Ultimate Man demonstrates the
essential D ekadenzoi society as fostered by the state. For Nietzsche, the
33 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
34 Martha C Nussbaum, The Fragility o fGoodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 163.
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state offers an inversion of essentially healthy values and a replacement
doctrine of obedience and salvation through adherence to statist dogma.
These inverted values are inimical to any type of authentic human life,
leading instead to die inevitable eclipse of the self and the destruction of
human possibility: "Everything about it is false, it bites with stolen teeth.
Even its belly is false. Confusion of the language of good and evil; I offer
you this sign as the sign of the state. Truly, this sign indicates the will to
death! Truly it beckons to the preachers of death!"35
Ultimately, the state has usurped the language of morality and
incorporated religious and psychological models of guilt into its matrix of
normalizing mechanisms. Nietzsche ultimately concludes that mass culture
and the state are no more than parasites, draining the vitality of its citizens
to create mere shadows of the potential individual:
Parasite: that is a worm, a creeping, supple worm, that wants to grow
fat on your sick, sore places. And it is its art to divine the weary
spots in climbing souls: it builds its loathsome nest in your grief and
dejection, in your tender modesty. Where the strong man is too
weak, where die noble man is too gende, there it builds its loathsome
n e st. . . For the soul which possesses die longest ladder and can
descend the deepest how should the most parasites not sit upon it?96
Nietzsche's analysis of the state is open to criticism on several levels.
He does not take into account any of die positive actions that die state could

35Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
36 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.19.
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take even to foster the goal of the transmuted individual. Nietzsche seems
to dismiss out of hand the possibility of rehabilitating state structures to
become less repressive or even constructive. He refuses to even entertain
state action on behalf of the individual, instead arguing that mass existence
is necessarily corrupting. If the state is so repressive, how was Nietzsche
able to transcend this repression enough to critique the problem of mass
existence? The state can therefore not be as repressive as Nietzsche argues,
his analysis seems exaggerated and somewhat contrived.
More fundamentally, Nietzsche seems to imbue the state with too
much intentionality. Although he defines the state in terms of a collection of
mythological elements, he treats the state as if it were an independent
political actor acting in a self-conscious manner. The state could not then be
a vague collection of mythological elements; indeed it is even more than an
aggregation of concrete power relations. For Nietzsche to be correct, he
must demonstrate that there is a conscious element to the operations of the
state that is identifiable. Nietzsche never attempts to provide a framework
for this analysis, although he implies that mass culture is nothing but the
symbolic legitimization of the ascendancy of the dominant power structure.
Nietzsche is partially able to address these criticisms by pointing to
the individuals that compose society rather than centering upon state
actions. The state does not really have intentionality, but its citizens act as
thought it does. In the vacuum left by the collapse of theological
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interpretation of reality, individuals have instead made the state their
external signifier and thereby imbue the state with the semblance of
intentionality.
L
The greatest success of the state has therefore also been its most
brilliantly insidious: the state has replaced the deceased idol of God as the
ultimate object of bad conscience. "Once spirit was God, then it became
man, and now it is even becoming the mob."37 The location of perfect
reason within the dictates of the vox populi or the bureaucratic state has
made government a type of "religionized secularity," fostering the cult of
the state. It is in Zarathustra that Nietzsche fully explores this fascinating
proposition. "The New Idol" is the metaphorical phrase that Nietzsche uses
in his most specific and complete critique of the psychological mode
underlying the state. The title of this section foreshadows Nietzsche's
analysis in The Genealogy o f Morality, in which he later provides a detailed
analysis of the mechanism of bad conscience as it operates in regards to
morality.
Bad conscience is the internalization of the desire to punish, which in
modem society has been co-opted by die state through increasing levels of
restriction on both individual action and thought This tendency has been

37Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
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exacerbated by the presence of Christianity, which stresses the essential
wretchedness of the soul as well as the unredeemable corruption of the
world. Caught between a society that restricts cruelty and the irrepressible
desire to express this same cruelty, the self has no choice but to turn this
impulse upon itself. Because the external signifier, God, is posited as
infinitely larger and more perfect than the individual, and it is taught that
the soul cannot be redeemed other than through the sacrifice of this perfect
God, the individual has no hope to alleviate this existential guilt
Nietzsche therefore argues that bad conscience is also partially the
outcome of the degeneration of one of the most integral characteristics of the
mediating process within the psyche: forgetfulness. Nietzsche does not
mean mere thoughtlessness or some form of dementia. For Nietzsche,
forgetfulness is necessary for health; it is a type of mental hygiene.
Forgetfulness allows for peace, no happiness would be possible without it38
Nietzsche's concept of forgetfulness is similar in application to Freud's
concept of the unconscious mind, which also results in a type of mental
economy operating to preserve sanity. Nietzsche expresses a similar
sentiment in his earlier work:
The Greeks gradually learned to organize the chaos by following the
Delphic teaching and thinking back to themselves, that is, to their real
needs, and letting their pseudo-needs die out Thus they again took
38 Nietzsche offers an extended analysis of forgetfulness, or "mental parsimony," in On the
Genealogy o fM orality, 38. This analysis undoubtedly influenced psychoanalytic theories
of repression and sublimation.
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possession of themselves;. . . This is a parable for each of us: he must
organize the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs.39
The task of making man into this reliable creature, "answerable for
his own future," has been accomplished through the customs of society.40
The "conscience" of man is socially constructed and designed to preserve
the prevailing social order; it does not emanate from some divine source
outside of convention. The repression of the self by society ultimately leads
to a form of self-loathing: bad conscience. "All instincts which are not
discharged outwardly turn inwards—ibis is what I call the internalization of
man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his 'soul.'"41
Nietzsche determines that the triumph of "slave morality7' in the
modem age has left society incapable of responding to the challenge of
nihilism engendered by the collapse of the modem worldview, primarily
because the individual is caught up in the personal torments of "bad
conscience," rendering him incapable of realizing his true potential. For
Nietzsche, modem society is missing the ability to produce a culture based
upon positive, aesthetic values rather than the repression of natural, healthy
drives.

39Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life", in Untim ely
M editations, trans. R.J. HoDingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 123.
40Nietzsche, Genealogy o fM orality, 39.
41 Nietzsche, Genealogy o fMorality, 61.
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Nietzsche concludes that the transfer of bad conscience to the state is
largely a function of the inherent unreliability of the masses, which renders
them easy to manipulate. Herd morality, the vox populi, is really nothing
other than the echoes of previous state teachings, inculcated over the
generations by governmental institutions. Despite the state's protestations
to the contrary, political truth has become little more than a rhetorical
exercise in which leaders placate the masses by appealing to their vanity:
In the world even the best things are worthless apart from him who
first presents them: people call these presenters "great men." The
people have little idea of greatness, that is to say: creativeness. But
they have a taste for all presenters and actors of great things. The
world revolves around the inventor of new values: imperceptibly it
revolves. But the people and the glory revolve around the acton that
is "the way of the world."42
Because of its lack of creativity and therefore its philosophical
impotence, mass culture cannot hope to resist "Does this present not
belong to the mob? The mob, however, does not know what is great or
small, what is straight and honest it is innocently crooked, it always lies."43
The masses do not wish to seek truth, and are inevitably resistant to social
criticism. "Who could overturn with reasons what die mob has once
learned to believe without reasons? In die marketplace, one convinces with

42Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12. Nietzsche argues that greatness is creativity, but the herd
sees greatness as persuasive power. Therefore, the people shun substance in favor of
presentation (example: Hitler).
43 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.8.
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gestures. However reasons make the mob distrustful."44 Instead, the
masses have made as their external signifier the voice of the state, as
embodied in such institutions as the law.
"There is nothing greater on earth that I, the regulating finger of
God"—thus the monster bellows. And not only the long-eared and
short-sighted sink to their knees! Ah, it whispers its dismal lies to
you too, you great souls! Ah, it divines the abundant hearts that like
to squander themselves! Yes, it divines you too, you conquers of the
old God! You grow weary in battle and now your weariness serves
the new idol!45
As an external signifier, the state acts in the same manner as the
monotheistic God who inspired bad conscience. Individuals, unsure of how
to express or alleviate their existential guilt and feelings of inadequacy,
transfer these feelings from God to the state. The state is all too willing to
accept this devotion from its citizens:
It would like to range heroes and honorable men about it, this new
idol! It likes to sun itself in the sunshine of good consciences—this
cold monster! It will give you everything if you worship it, this new
idol: thus it buys for itself the luster of your virtues and the glance of
your proud eyes. It wants to use you to lure the many-too-many.
Yes, a cunning device of Hell has been devised, a horse of death
jingling with the trappings of divine honors! Yes, a death for many
has been devised that glorifies itself as life: truly, a heart-felt service
to all preachers of death.46
Thus, the essentially empty institutions of the state derive a measure
of legitimacy otherwise unattainable from this development Trapped in
44Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.9.
45Nietzsche, Zarathustra, t i l .
46Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
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bad conscience, the individual is unable to escape the debt owed to the state
and can never forget this supposed obligation. Therefore, in a sense, the
individual internalizes and perpetuates his own serfdom. "To o v erth ro w —
to him that means to prove. To drive frantic—to him that means: to
convince. And blood is to him the best of all arguments. A truth that
penetrates only sensitive ears he calls a lie and a thing of nothing. Truly, he
believes only in gods who make a great noise in the world!"47
Thus, the analysis of existential debt ultimately leads to Nietzsche's
conclusion that the State has become the signifier of eternal bad conscience.
This has occurred through the evolution of debt into a type of subconscious
memory, passed down through generations as encouraged by the state. As
Deleuze and Guattari note:
Nietzsche says: it is a matter of an active faculty of forgetting (oubli),
by means of a repression of biological memory, must create an other
memory, one that is collective, a memory of words (paroled) and no
longer a memory of things, a memory of signs and no longer of
effects. This organization, which traces its signs directly on the body,
constitutes a system of cruelty, a terrible alphabet48
Deleuze and Guattari go on to confirm Nietzsche's genealogical
analysis of the usurpation of ancient signifiers of bad conscience by the
institutions of the state. However, unlike religion, the state also has file

47 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.
48 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-O edipus, trans. Robery Hurley, Mark Seem, Helen Lane
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1963), 145.
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monopoly on force, rendering the reign of the state virtually unassailable.
Through symbolic appropriation, the state incorporates all that it can into its
own sphere, constantly seeking to totalize the political arena within its
institutional confines. This totalization causes the state to replace the
infinitely larger deity as the perfect object of bad conscience:
And Nietzsche suggests how this new socius proceeds: a terror
without precedent, in comparison with which ancient forms of
cruelty, the forms of primitive regimentation and punishment, are
nothing. A concerted destruction of all the primitive codings, or
worse yet, their derisory perversion, their reduction to the condition
of secondary parts in the new machine, and the new apparatus of
repression. All that constituted the essential element of the primitive
inscription machine—the blocks of mobile, open finite debts, "the
parcels of destiny"—finds itself taken into an immense machinery
that renders the debt infinite and. no longer forms anything but one
and the same crushing fate.. . . The earth becomes a madhouse.49
As Nietzsche argues, "the good have to crucify him who devises his
own virtue!"50 Mass culture, crippled through its own repressive
mechanisms, cannot create, and therefore must prevent any act of creation
on the part of the individual. Convinced that it is the embodiment of
transcendental reason, die state feels justified in quelling creative action,
especially in the realm of politics. The political gadfly is therefore viewed as
a traitorous enemy, who must be destroyed to preserve the stability of the
state:

49Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 192.
50Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IU:1Z26.
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They hate the creator most him who breaks the law-tables and the
old values, tire breaker—they call him the law-breaker. For the
good—cannotcreate they are always the beginning of die end: they
crucify him who writes new values on law-tables, they sacrifice the
future to themselves—they crucify the whole human future! The
good—have always been die beginning of the end.51
Mass culture and its progeny, the state, rely upon this culture of
repression for their survival. This is especially true for theories of the
organic or V&lkish State with which Nietzsche was all too familiar. This is
also an implicit critique of German Idealism as expressed in the political
theory of Kant and Hegel, in which the state is seen as the teleological
outcome of human existence. Under these theories, the purpose of human
existence is the attainment of an ideal collective consciousness.52
This idealistic thought imbues the state with a transcendental, even
mystic, character, placing it in the position high above mere mortals that
God previously held. The state is therefore an even better object for bad
conscience than God, as it is made a part of the phenomenal and pneumenal
realms, a concrete object rather than an abstract one. Because of its tendency
towards totalization and repression, Nietzsche concludes that the state and
the mentality underlying it are the principal impediment to human
development In the name of the public good, mass culture has condemned
itself to mediocrity:
51 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.26.
52 Marx carried this line of thought to its fruition. It is therefore possible to read Nietzsche
as an implicit critique of Marx.
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Oh my brothers! With whom does the greatest danger for die whole
human future lie? Is it not with the good and just? With those who
say and feel in their hearts: "We already know what is good and just
we possess it too; woe to those who are still searching for it!" And
whatever harm the wicked may do, the harm the good do is die most
harmful!53
Indeed, the mentality of the Ultimate Man reveals an uneasy truth
about human society. The state, repressive though it may be, has not so
much conquered humanity as it was encouraged to conquer by the masses.
Centuries of embedded power mechanisms and normalizing practices have
created a culture in which the highest desire of the common man is to be
led, not to leadI54 Virtue is not to be found in creativity, but in obedience
and duty. The noise of the state and society drowns out the internal
conversation of the self.
What would Nietzsche have us do? Nietzsche argues that it is not
possible to separate the culture from the institutional practices that arose
from it; this symbiotic relationship is too firmly embedded within the state
and the individual mind. The modem state is indeed modem man writ
large; both are irretrievably Dekadent However, because this cycle of
institutionalization of concrete practices has occurred throughout history, it
is also not possible to reform politics in its modem sense. For Nietzsche,
there is only one possibility: separation.

53 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1226.
54 Foucault terms this "internal fascism."
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It can be argues that Nietzsche's critique of the state is overly
simplistic. Nietzsche may be too drastic in his assessment of the repression
fostered by the state. If Nietzsche is correct; the state possesses repressive
power that is unmatched in the history of existence. Such a state,
legitimated by bad conscience, would be so psychologically powerful as to
destroy the possibility of free will. The individual, socially-created and
hampered by internalized repression, would have no possibility' of
resistance. Indeed, the desire to resist would be a foreign thought to such an
individual, much less the inclination to separate from the comfort of the
state and begin the painful process of self-overcoming.55
IL
In order to counter this criticism, Nietzsche reverses the myth of the
state in a fundamental manner. As opposed to the statist myth fostered by
bad conscience, Nietzsche asserts that the state has no independent
existence; it is a merely a collection of self-replicating power relations. As
such, the state can be dismissed by the individual as an object of knowledge

55" Selbsttlberwingdung or 'self-overcoming' is related to Nietzsche's other notions of
Sublim ierung or 'sublimation', Vergeistigung or 'spiritualization' and SelbstaufhebungA ufhebung being a term that defies translation by a single English word: as Kaufmarm
observes, Nietzsche uses it with its Hegelian sense in mind of a dialectical process involving
' a simultaneous preserving, canceling, and lifting up.' However, in Nietzsche's usage the
lifting-up is not necessarily to something higher. Unlike Hegel's Geist, whose dialectical
movement is progressive and hierarchical, Nietzsche's basic force, the will to power—at
least when human consciousness enters the process—can degenerate: man has evolved
from the ape, but may also degenerate back into the ape." Robert Morrison, N ietzsche and
Buddhism: A Study in N ihilism and Ironic A ffin ities (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997).157-158.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I ll
or as a signifier for truth. In her analysis of the political implications of
existentialism, Hazel Bames mirrors Nietzsche's critique of the state:
Existentialist writers agree in rejecting any society in which some
men are sacrificed either for a privileged minority or for a mystic
State. They disagree with regard to the extent to which they are
willing to compromise in order to achieve a classless society, but they
are alike in condemning either fascism, unrestrained capitalism, or a
communism which sets a mystical Whole above existing individuals.
They oppose the view of a Serious World in which one is bom with a
particular place prepared for him and in which social values are preestablished and not to be questioned. They are against the principle
of sacrificing persons to abstractions. The State is nothing but the
individuals who compose it 56
However, Nietzsche argues that collectivities are not inclined to allow
the myths that they rely upon to be deconstructed. Further, individuals,
insofar as they are socially constructed beings, are not inclined to respond to
critiques of the state they revere. Nevertheless, individuals can recognize
the holes in the statist myth, especially as the state continues to extend its
monopoly over the political realm.
Nietzsche paradoxically argues that the totalizing impulse of the state
actually leads towards an individually based impulse to resist57 In a sense,
external coercion fosters an individual compulsion to explore the forbidden

56 Hazel Bames, Humanistic Existentialism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1959),
75.
57Nietzsche's argument on this point foreshadows Heidegger's discussion of the call to
authenticity. Because of the importance of this point to Nietzsche's political thought, it is
thoroughly discussed in Chapter Six and the Appendix.
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facets of one's own nature. This begins though the individual's
confrontation with the normalizing effect of mass culture.
Collective existence as found in the state paradoxically leads toward
individual existence by fostering the sense of revulsion at the masses. This
revulsion is essentially instigated by a realization of the hypocrisy of
modem virtue. To individuals, who have the inescapable impulse to
exercise their will-to-power through acts of creation, the reactive slave
mentality of the herd can do no less than inspire derision:
Alas, how ill the word "virtue" sounds in their mouths! And when
the say: "I am just;" it always sounds like: "I am revenged." They
want to scratch out the eyes of their enemies with their virtue; and
they raise themselves only in order to lower others. And again, there
are those who sit in their swamp and speak thus from the rushes:
"Virtue—that means to sit quietly in the swamp".58
It becomes apparent that the masses seek nothing less than the
appearance of virtue, even as the mob defines it Whether the masses
conform out of a sense of duty or even out of coercion, there is no real
conviction behind their actions. The desire to punish dissent has become an
outlet to vent frustration: "mistrust all in whom the urge to punish is
strong!"59 Because the institutions of die modem state are essentially
hollow, political activity has become blind obsequience, and fear of chaos

58 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 115.
59Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:7.
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prevents the individual from seriously questioning the strictures of the
culture.
And again, there are those who like posing and think: Virtue is a sort
of pose. Their knees are always worshipping and their hands are
glorifications of virtue, but their heart knows nothing of it And
again, there are those who hold it a virtue to say: "Virtue is
necessary7'; but fundamentally they believe only that the police are
necessary.60
Despite these powerful mechanisms of normalization, the individual
necessarily recognizes the artificiality of the state and the cherished
institutions of society. This leads to existential guilt that can break one free
of society and cause one to recognize the need for self-exploration. The vast
majority of individuals simply repress this realization out of fear or guilt
However, for the few that choose to heed this internal call and recognize the
need for the transvaluation of their own values; a metamorphosis of the self
must begin which will necessarily lead them away from the institutions of
society and which for them have now irretrievably collapsed.61

60 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:5.
61 "Every choice human being strives instinctively for a citadel and a secrecy where he is
saved from the crowd, the many, the great majority—where he may forget 'men who are
the rule,' being their exception—excepting only the one case in which he is pushed straight
to such men by a still stronger instinct, as a seeker after knowledge in the great and
exceptional sense. Anyone who, in intercourse with men, does not occasionally glisten in
all the colors of distress, green and gray with disgust, satiety, sympathy, gloomishness, and
loneliness, is certainly not a man of elevated tastes; supposing, however, that he does not
take all this burden and disgust upon himself voluntarily, that he persistently avoids it, and
remains, as I said, quietly and proudly hidden in his citadel, one thing is certain: he was not
made, he was not predestined, for knowledge. If he were, he would one day have to say to
himself’ 'The devil take my good taste! But the rule is more interesting than the
exception—than myself, the exception!" And he would go down, and above all, he would
go 'inside.'" Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §26.
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The argument in Zarathustra implies that it is therefore necessary for
the individual to suffer collective existence in order to begin the quest for
autocreated selfhood. "Human society is a trial: thus I teach—a long trial;
and what it tries to find is the commander. A trial, O my brothers, and not a
'contract' Break, break this word of the softhearted and the half-andhalf."62
This is not to be understood, as statist interpreters have, that
Nietzsche is calling for a reform or replacement of state institutions.63 "Go
your own ways! And let the people and peoples go theirs—dark ways,
truly, on which not a single hope flashes any more."64 Nietzsche, although
espousing limited praise of pre-Socratic "heroic" societies, has little use for
the modem state, which he consistently derides. Even Nietzsche's apparent
praise of pre-Socratic heroic societies confirms this point, despite the
protestations of Strong, Ansell-Pearson, and Conway. It is only in his early
works that Nietzsche praises heroic societies as a model of human existence.
However, it is often ignored by political theorists that Nietzsche uncovered
the "tragic flaw" of Greek political society: the third archetype in the Birth o f
62 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.25.
63 As Voegelin argues: "Nietzsche's transvaluation of values. . . is a conscious attempt to
transcend the crisis and to find a firm ground for the erection of a new and stable order of
values. The ground cannot be found by developing one more utopia of a new society, but
only by creating in one's own personality—with the means at hand, and with precarious
chances of success—a new order beyond the crisis." Eric Voegelin, (1944), "Nietzsche, the
Crisis, and the War'', Journal o fPolitics 6 (1944). 184-185.
64Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12^1.
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Tragedy. Socrates. Nietzsche argues that the impulse to rationalize life is so
ingrained in humankind that not even die essentially healthy Greek model
of politics was able to escape the assault by Socrates and his followers. By
extension, while it may be possible to recreate a heroic society, it will
inevitably become bureaucratic and therefore succumb to Dekadenz. As
Jaspers notes:
Nietzsche approves the state when he looks upon the movements of
peoples and when he sees culture and individual creativity as
possible and only in and through it But he rejects die state as die
ruin of man when it functions as a solidifying force in favor of mass
and mediocrity and when it is no longer concerned about the unique
and unmatched but only about the replaceable "superfluous ones."65
Ultimately, it becomes clear in Zarathustra that Nietzsche is not
interested in "humankind"; it is precisely the aggregation of individuals that
has led to the sorry state of humanity. Rather, Nietzsche is primarily
concerned with the fate of the individual struggling against drowning in the
totalizing field of power that is the "cold monster" of die state. The great
political imperative of Zarathustra is summed in Nietzsche's exhortation:
"Flee, my friend, into your solitude! I see you deafened by die uproar of the
great men and pricked by die stings of die small ones."66
Essentially, Nietzsche argues that individuals have been conditioned
to drag down or demonize those that seek to rise above die lowest common

65Jaspers, Nietzsche, 256.
66 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12
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denominator. The quasi-religious devotion of die masses to die state
ensures that they will assist this normalization protocol. However, die
masses also harbor a secret jealously against the individual who defies
convention, hearkening back to their own repressed knowledge of the
emptiness of the state: "Flee, my friend, into your solitude: I see you stung
by poisonous flies. Flee to where the raw, rough breeze blows! Flee into
your solitude! You have lived too near the small and pitiable men. Flee
from their hidden vengeance! Towards you they are nothing but
vengeance."67
The masses therefore try to drag down the exceptional individual and
they are dangerous; not necessarily from any great action, but from constant
noise: "No longer lift your arm against them! They are innumerable and it
is not your destiny to be a fly-swatter. Innumerable are these small and
pitiable men; and raindrops and weeds have already brought about the
destruction of many a proud building."68 Essentially the masses suffer from
frustrated will-to-power, they naturally must seek to drive down those who
rise above:
I see you wearied by poisonous flies, I see you bloodily tom in a
hundred places; and your pride refuses even to be angry. They want
blood from you in all innocence, their bloodless souls thirst for
blood—and therefore they sting in all innocence. But you, profound

67Nietzsche, Zarathustra, LIZ
68 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, LIZ

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

117
man, you suffer to profoundly even from small wounds; and before
you have recovered, the same poison-worm is again crawling over
your hand.69
This "innocence" Nietzsche discusses is not a conscious process, but
driven by herd mentality, as is all the state and its apparatus.
Normalization operates as the political subconscious of the state and mass
culture: all impulses are directed towards it but only a few are recognized.
It is impossible to determine which of the institutions and interactions
necessarily to collective existence are harmful. For Nietzsche, aggregated
existence in a societal sense is necessarily and inherently contaminated, and
will continue to infect the individual with its Dekadenz,
Nietzsche sees hope only in the separation of politics from this type
of collective existence. Indeed, the authentic human being cannot tolerate
the company of the masses and the contempt they provoke. This is not only
because the masses represent the worst of humanity, but the pathological
nature of repressive society may prove detrimental to the struggling free
spirit
Their idol, that cold monster, smells unpleasant to me: all of them, all
these idolaters, smell unpleasant to me. My brothers, so you want to
suffocate in the fumes of their animal mouths and appetites? Better
to break to windows and leap into the open air! Avoid this bad odor!
Leave the idolatry of the superfluous! Avoid this bad odor! Leave the
smoke of these human sacrifices!70

49Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.
70Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
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The great opiate of mass existence, materialism, must also be
confronted. The great effort expended in the struggle for material
possessions and success exhausts the individual and clouds his perspective,
rendering him more susceptible to societal pressures.
Just look at these superfluous people! They acquire wealth and make
themselves poorer with it They desire power and especially the
lever of power, plenty of money—these impotent power! See them
clamber, these nimble apes! They clamber over one another and so
scuffle into the mud and the abyss. They all strive towards the
throne: it is a madness they have—as if happiness sat upon the
throne! Often filth sits upon the throne—and often the throne upon
filth, too.71
Nietzsche is certainly not advocating an ascetic lifestyle, but warns
the individual against becoming entwined in societal priorities: "Many
places—the odor of tranquil seas blowing about them—are still empty for
solitaries and solitary couples. A free life still remains for great souls.
Truly, he who possesses little is so much the less possessed: praised be a
moderate poverty!"72
In effect Nietzsche warns the individual to avoid interaction with
mass existence like the plague that it is. It is only in solitude that the
individual can avoid the temptations and normalizing mechanisms of mass
culture. "Where solitude ceases, there the marketplace begins; and where

71 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
71Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
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the marketplace begins, there begins the uproar of the great actors and the
buzzing of poisonous flies."73
This extreme freedom from society is necessarily harsh. To what
extent this appeal to separate from others is to be carried out will be
examined in Chapters Four and Five. However, Nietzsche is without doubt
advocating a negative definition of freedom.74 The individual can only be
free to explore his or herself when there is an absence of restraints,
especially the type of arbitrary and capricious restraints that abound in
modem society.
The most spacious soul, which can run and stray and roam the
furthest into itself; the most necessary soul, which out of joy hurls
itself into chance—the existing soul which plunges into becoming; the
possessing soul which wants to partake in desire and longing—the
soul fleeing from itself which retrieves itself in the widest sphere; the
wisest soul, to which foolishness speaks sweetest—the soul that loves
itself the most, in which all things have their current and countercurrent and ebb and flow—oh how should not the highest soul
possess the worst parasites?75
It is only when the institutions that form modem society collapse in
the individual consciousness that the individual is truly free. As Deleuze
and Guattari note: "The breakup of the institutional structures that mask
the society into a plurality of experimental spheres finally revealing the true
73Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.
74"Postmodernism inherits from Nietzsche an extreme version of negative freedom, the
association of freedom with detachment from determinative wholes." McGowan,
Postmodernism and Its Critics, 71.
75 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:12.19.
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face of modernity—an ultimate phase that Nietzsche saw as the end result of
the evolution of societies."76
This is not a process of self-aggrandizement; it is a painfully slow
process of withdrawal from what one has been taught to value towards a
new set of self-created goals. "The experience of all deep wells in slow:
they must wait long until they know what has fallen into their depths. All
great things occur away from glory and the marketplace: the inventors of
all new values have always lived away from glory and the marketplace."77
This individual, finally free horn the noise of society, can set about
retrieving an authentic selfhood. "Only there, where the state ceases, does
the man who is not superfluous begin: does the song of the necessary man,
the unique and irreplaceable melody, begin. There, where the state ceases—
look there, brothers?"78
Is Nietzsche arguing that human life can only be valuable if it is lived
alone? The narrative of Zarathustra suggests that this is not his assertion.
Nietzsche's pessimism over die state stems in part from die essential divide
between the imperatives of mass culture and the imperatives of the
individual. Rather than embracing Zarathustra's individually-centered

76 Deleuze and Gnattari, Anti-O edipus, 368.
77Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.
78 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:11.
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teachings, the town sees it as a threat and drives Zarathustra out This is not
a failure of Zarathustra as a teacher but rather of die utter impossibility of
educating the public to transcend themselves. This realization leads to die
political discussion of the next level of society, the small, voluntarily related
group.
Nietzsche's critique of the state is certainly harsh, and it essentially
precludes the possibility of an authentic collective existence. He does not
offer any concrete suggestions to rehabilitate mass existence; indeed he
seems ready to write off the state as inherentiy destructive. However,
Nietzsche's critique of the state as the incarnation of unhealthy, reactive
drives does fit within his rhetorical scheme.
Nietzsche does not otter any empirical examples of the corrupt state
as he is actually producing ideal types for political analysis. The repressive
state, with the attendant problems of bad conscience and normalization, is
an ideal type that encompasses a collection of tendencies found in all
governmental schemes. Likewise, the symbol of the Ultimate Man
represents a collection of traits found in the smug, self-congratulating
denizen of mass culture. Indeed, the symbol of the struggling, resisting
individual is an ideal type for the person reacting against these repressive
institutions and traits that seeks a more active attitude towards personal
existence.
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Taken in this manner, Nietzsche's critique of the state is not to be
taken as seriously as the rhetoric suggests, but is meant no less harshly. By
positing these ideal types, Nietzsche hopes to spur the individual towards
the contemplation of the very real problems of collective existence that often
prove psychologically damaging to the individual. Nietzsche can be validly
taken to task for the oversimplification of his critique of the state, but it is
important to remember that this critique is only a means to an end.
Nietzsche does not intend to present a positive political theory of the state,
he therefore needs the ideal type of the repressive state to react against in
the elaboration of his positive theory.
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C h apter IV
T h e H ig h er M e n : Fr ie n d sh ip a n d th e C o m m unity

Nietzsche's criticism of the state occurs during Zarathustra's sojourn
within the town, mostly found in the Prologue and Book One. Nietzsche's
discussions of the state are overwhelmingly critical, giving credence to the
assertion that Nietzsche does not wish to rehabilitate the state or modem
society. However, the next section of Zarathustra is devoted to an extended
narrative of Zarathustra's relations with several characters who seek to learn
from him. This represents an important development in the narrative and
Nietzsche's political thought, as he spends a great deal of time exploring the
possibility of a community of superior individuals.
This is somewhat surprising, as despite Nietzsche's criticism of the
state and his disgust at modem man, it is clear that one of Zarathustra's
primary goals is to educate others about his project of self-overcoming.
Indeed, Zarathustra decides to leave his solitude specifically for this reason:
"I am weary of my wisdom, like a bee that has gathered too much honey; I
need outstretched hands to receive i t . . . To this end, I must descend into
the depths . . . I must go down—as men, to whom I want to descend, call
it"*

1 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §1.
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It is necessary to determine to what extent Zarathustra's teachings
may be meant to apply to a societal context This chapter will explore
Zarathustra's attempt to communicate his findings to others, and why a text
that emphasizes solitude and self-exploration begins with phrases like "the
cup wants to be empty again, and Zarathustra wants to be man again."2
Ultimately, however, Zarathustra's social experiment ends in failure and he
once again seeks solitude, away from his friends and disciples. It is the
development of Zarathustra's goal from one of education to apparent
solipsism that is important to this political analysis.
It is poetic that Zarathustra's first proper "disciple" is a dead man,
the tightrope walker. The tightrope walker appears after Zarathustra
admits his failure to reach the masses, explored above, when they call for
the Ultimate Man. The imagery of the tightrope walker further illuminates
the horizontal nature of the consciousness, explored in a later chapter, as
well as the dire peril of self-overcoming. "He had emerged from a little
door and was proceeding across the rope, which was stretched between two
towers and thus hung over the people and the market square."3 The two
towers hark back to Zarathustra's earlier speech referring to man stretched
between animal and die Vbermensch. The people below, die masses, are the

2Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §1.
3 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $6.
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abyss. Mired in the torment of societal bad conscience, they lust to express
their repressed vengeance upon the exceptional individual.
Behold the good and the just! Whom do they hate most? Him who
smashes their tables of values, die breaker, die lawbreaker—but he is
the creator. Behold the faithful of all faiths! Whom do they hate the
most? Him who smashes their tables of values, the breaker, the law
breaker —but he is the creator.4
The buffoon that leads to the death of the tightrope walker represents
the problem of social consciousness, which is inextricably tied to bad
conscience.5 He speaks to the tightrope walker "You belong in the tower,
you should be locked up, you are blocking the way of a man better than
yourself!"6 The buffoon is mocking the tightrope walker, suggesting that he
has come from the mediocrity of the state, should remain locked in the
tower of herd existence. The buffoon jumps over the tightrope walker,
causing him to fall to die marketplace below.
This is a further elaboration of Nietzsche's assertion that the state
cannot allow its members to transcend the herd, those who try must be
discredited or destroyed. Is, then, the tightrope walker an example of failed
transmutation? He has attempted to overcome societal identities and the

4 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $9.
5The buffoon or "dwarf' has been identified as symbolizing a veritable laundry list of
psychological manifestations by various commentators. However, Nietzsche employs
metaphors such as the dwarf consistently in his work, usually symbolizing socially-based
self-doubt. See for example The Science o//qy §332. All such mockery is Schadenfrohes.
6 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $6.
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herd, but has been stupefied by the incessant droning of bad conscience, as
discussed in the previous chapter. However, Zarathustra does not react to
the tightrope walker as a failure or with the condescension given to the
Ultimate Man. Rather, Zarathustra reacts to the tightrope walker's fall
without pity, but as an honorable individual worthy of Zarathustra's most
fundamental knowledge. The tightrope walker bemoans his fate as a
failure, seeing it as an existential failure. Zarathustra's first disciple is the
recipient of the most chilling speech in the entire text
"On my honor, friend," replied Zarathustra, "all you have spoken of
does not exist there is no Devil and no Hell. Your soul will be dead
even before your body: Therefore there is nothing more to fear!" The
man looked up mistrustfully. "If you are speaking the truth," he said
then, "I leave nothing when I leave life. I am not much more than an
animal which has been taught to dance by blows and starvation."7
Nietzsche here is attempting to demonstrate the essential nobility of
life, even apart from institutions of social acceptance or religious salvation.
The social realm seeks to define individual worth in terms of empty
affirmations. Rather, Zarathustra asserts that all of these constructs are
essentially meaningless. In effect, through the attempt to overcome the
tightrope walker has demonstrated his initial socially-constructed status to
be inauthentic. His failure to complete this task is not important
"Not so," said Zarathustra, "you have made danger your calling,
there is nothing despicable in that Now you perish through your
calling: so I will bury you with my own hands." When Zarathustra
7 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

127
had said this the dying man said nothing more; but he motioned with
his hand, as if he sought Zarathustra's hand to thank him.8
The honorable death of this man encourages Zarathustra and causes
him to reaffirm his task as education. However, Zarathustra's limited
success with the tightrope walker has led him to believe that his teachings
are best suited to the individuals who have already heard the internal call to
self-exploration.9 Society is not willing to allow his teachings, and the
people who compose mass society are ill-suited to the task. Zarathustra
laments, "I want to teach men the meaning of their existence: which is the
Obermensch, the lightning from the dark cloud man. But I am still distant
from them, and my meaning does not speak to their minds. To men, I am
still a cross between a fool and a corpse."10
The buffoon, again representing societal bad conscience, warns
Zarathustra away. The bad conscience of the society still threatens to
subsume Zarathustra:
The good and the just hate you and call you their enemy and
despiser; the faithful of the true faith hate you, and they call you a
danger to the people. It was lucky for you that they laughed at you:
and truly you spoke like a buffoon. It was lucky for you that you
made company with the dead dog; by so abasing yourself you have

8 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $6.
9This mechanism, nausea, arises from disgust at the Dekadenz of society and the
realization of individual finitude. This is the subject of the next chapter.
10 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

128
saved yourself for today. But leave this town—or tomorrow I shall
jump over you, a living man over a dead one.11
Zarathustra's harrowing experience with the town and the buffoon
certainly gives him pause, and enlightens him to die essential nature of
social existence. Zarathustra's frustration with the inhabitants of mass
society leads him to the realization that the state will not, indeed cannot^
allow his teaching. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the state are so
normalized into mass culture that they are incapable of understanding his
teaching. They are only receptive to presentation and myth: "Must one first
shatter their ears to teach them to hear with their eyes? Must one rumble
like drums and Lenten preachers? Or do they believe only those who
stammer?"12
L
Nietzsche therefore argues that his philosophy has no place among
the masses. Rather, it is necessary to examine a smaller social milieu.
Zarathustra, frustrated and depressed by his failure in the town must
rethink his task. "But at length he opened his eyes: in surprise Zarathustra
gazed into the forest and in the stillness, in surprise he gazed into himself.
Then he arose quickly, like a seafarer who suddenly sees land, and rejoiced:

n Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §8.
12Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
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for he beheld a new truth."13 This new truth is that it is only possible for
Zarathustra to teach those who wish, and are capable, of learning his
message.
Zarathustra exclaims, "a light has dawned for me: I need
companions, living ones, not dead companions and corpses which I carry
with me wherever I wish."14 The "dead" represent the social beings
prevalent in mass society, who rely on the interpretation of reality by others
long gone. Concern for the state and others is a burden that must be shed;
but bad conscience, like the buffoon, dogs our steps. It is the hardest to
overcome. Zarathustra instead allows those who wish to learn to come to
him rather than seeking them out
But I need living companions who follow me because they want to
follow themselves—and who want to go where I want to go. A light
has dawned for me: Zarathustra shall not speak to the people but to
companions! Zarathustra shall not be herdsman and dog to the herd!
To lure many away from the herd—that is why I have come. The
people and the herd will be angry with me: the herdsmen shall call
Zarathustra a robber.15
By casting Zarathustra's new role as a fellow-traveler rather than as a
traditional teacher, a subtle shift in Nietzsche's political thought can be
detected. Unlike the institutionalization characteristic of the state,
Nietzsche's political thought is not a replacement model for social existence.
13Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §9.
14Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §9.
15Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §9.
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If Nietzsche is indeed proposing a community, it is a radically de
centralized one, hopefully free of the constraints of bad conscience.
Zarathustra, inasmuch as he is the herald of internal control and self
creation, does not seek to impose himself on others. As Nietzsche writes:
"the creator seeks companions, not corpses or herds or believers. The
creator seeks fellow-creators, those who inscribe new values on new
tables."16
Zarathustra has fully purged himself of the delusion that mass
society will listen to him, and in doing so has also purged himself of the
desire to speak to the masses. "I will not be herdsman or gravedigger. I will
not speak again to the people: I have spoken to a dead man for the last
time."17 Nietzsche's language in this respect could not be stronger; his
message is meant for a few select individuals who have come to the
realization of societal Dekadenz on their own, and seek a new path.
Nevertheless, there are a few individuals in the town who hear
Zarathustra's message and decide to follow him. However, Nietzsche will
have none of this.
When Zarathustra had taken leave of the town. . . there followed him
many who called themselves his disciples and escorted him. Thus

16Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §9.
17Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue $9.
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they came to a crossroad: there Zarathustra told them that from then
on he wanted to go alone; for he was a friend of going-alone.18
Zarathustra therefore dismisses the first group of individuals who
seek to follow him, a point that is often overlooked. Zarathustra realizes that
they are not yet ready and must do some serious work on themselves first
Zarathustra then goes into a discourse on the importance of internal
symbolism in the act of self-creation. The implication of this episode is that
the masses, accustomed to the noise of the "great actors" in the marketplace,
are simply following Zarathustra with the same misguided devotion they
offer to politicians. The followers Zarathustra seeks will follow him because
of their own internal imperative; discovered from aesthetic reflection upon
themselves. In this sense, Nietzsche distinguishes himself from traditional
leaders and educators. Zarathustra does not impose his teaching upon
others, but seeks to instruct them when they are ready to hear his message.
It is only much later in the text that Zarathustra invites a few individuals,
called the "Higher Men", to learn from him. The dynamics of this group
form Nietzsche's examination and critique of the small social group. In
essence, this group of Higher Men forms a uniquely Nietzschean
community.
Nietzsche's analysis is this regard can be critiqued as undeniably
elitist even down to die characterization of Zarathustra's followers as
18Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:22.1.
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"higher" men. It must be asked why Nietzsche chooses to present his
discussion in these terms. Although Nietzsche denies that he is elaborating
criteria for a new rank-ordering of humanity/ his discussion of the Higher
Men certainly has this connotation. It is necessary to probe beyond the
apparently elitist framework of Zarathustra's followers to grasp the
philosophical justification for Nietzsche's apparently utopian vision of the
community of the Higher Men.

n.
A "community" is by definition a group that shares some common
aspect In the case of the Higher Men, it is their desire to learn self
overcoming. This community has arisen out of the need to escape the
corrupting elements of the state and the normalizing effects of others. "The
earth is full of the superfluous, life has been corrupted by the many-toomany."19 If there is to be any hope for individual recovery, it must occur
outside of this corrupted context and within a new, non-institutionalized
environment
Nietzsche discusses the ideal of a healthy community liberally in his
early works, especially "The Greek State", "Homer on Competition", and
the Birth o f Tragedy. In these works, Nietzsche praises ancient Greek
society as essentially healthy, fostering constructive values and reinforcing

19Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:9.
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the positive traits of the individual. While Nietzsche never loses his
admiration of the pre-Socratic Greeks, it will be shown that die Higher Men
do not represent a reestablishment of Homeric society.
The Greek mode of society as described by Nietzsche is composed of
various practices designed to produce complete individuals. Throughout
his productive career, Nietzsche looked back to the Greeks as an example of
a healthy community. Beginning with his early essays on Greek society
Nietzsche asserted that the community must provide outlets for creativity
and competition without coupling these with repression and normalizing
mechanisms. Nietzsche praised Greek political theory as the "profound
secret study of the connection between state and genius."20 Although
Nietzsche's thought is grounded along drastically different grounds than
the ancients, he admires their focus upon individual greatness within the
social realm. "Hellenic popular teaching commands that every talent must
develop through struggle: whereas modem educators fear nothing more
than the unleashing of so-called ambition."21 Nietzsche's model embraces
the political elements of the heroic Greek model, even while denying its
epistemological foundations.

20Nietzsche, "The Greek State," in On the Genealogy o fM orality, 186.
21 Nietzsche, "Homer on Competition," in On the Genealogy o fM orality, 192.
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However, Nietzsche is not naive enough to assert that society should
return to the Greek model. We must accept the circumstances of the current
age, but we do not have to internalize them. It is up to individuals to move
past their circumstances and work for a new type of self and community in
the here and now. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to reconceptualize politics. The focus of politics must shift from concern over die
institutional arrangements of government which has characterized
traditional political theory. The primary concern of politics should instead
be the individual self. This new politics is concerned with the production of
individuals who can relate to each other in a manner that is healthier than is
possible in state-centered modem politics.
This argument, however, points to a fundamental tension in the
theory of community. The causal lines between the sovereign individual
and the healthy community are not clear. The heroic Greek model insisted
that the positive task of the community was to produce complete
individuals; it was doubted that individuals could become complete on their
own. Nietzsche initially seems to be sympathetic to this assertion, but his
radically individualistic outlook causes him to eschew even die heroic
paradigm. Nietzsche is primarily concerned with separation from the
modem idea of die state, and as such de-emphasizes the positive role of
society in die completion of the individual self. The implication of this line
of thought is that the new version of community can only arise from
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individuals who have been able to complete themselves through some form
of aesthetic ethics. External processes can not create such a community, it
must arise endogenously from within its future members.
This leads to a further tension in this line of thought Nietzsche
presents a model of selfhood that is predicated upon resistance to societal
norms. In essence, societal repression leads to selfhood. Is it possible, then,
for a sovereign individual to emerge from a context of a non-repressive
society or a context of no social interaction at all? This is a problematic and
profound question. Nietzsche does not present a model of selfhood apart
from social creation, except as an ethic of resistance. A possible conclusion
is that there can be no selfhood apart from that initially created by the social
realm. Without the social, therefore, there can be no resistance, and thus no
self-creation.
The community of die Higher Men apparently mitigates these
concerns. These individuals have already separated from larger
aggregations of individuals. Further, it is clear that this community is not
designed to replicate itself. This is not the prelude to the formation of a
revolutionary cadre of exceptional humans.22 At no time does Nietzsche

22Although not evangelical the Higher Men are certainly revolutionary in their
epistemological perspective: "The revolutionary pole of group fantasy becomes visible, on
the contrary, in the power to experience institutions themselves as mortal to destroy them
or change them according to the articulations of desire and the social field, by making the
death instinct into a veritable institutional creativity. For that is precisely the criterion—at
least the formal criterion—that distinguishes the revolutionary institutions from the
enormous inertia which the law communicates to institutions in an established order. As
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discuss with the Higher Men any obligation to return to society and liberate
it from repression. Rather, the Higher Men must resist the urge to help
others, as this will only subject them once again to the dangers of mass
society.
Unlike any type of society or state, the community of Higher Men is
an association of fellow-travelers, self-selected members. They were not
bom into customs or norms of the group. Rather, the Zarathustrian
community is a totally new associative form, with no predetermined roles
for its members or fixed patterns of association. This community is
therefore not imbued with inherited bad conscience and should offer a
conducive environment for self-exploration and overcoming.
It is important to note that the Higher Men are not identical to, or
perhaps even unrelated, to the Obermensch. The Higher Men are superior
human beings insofar as they have realized the need to separate from the
herd and seek self-overcoming. As Schutte notes:
The idea of the Obermensch results from an aesthetic-ontological
conception of the will to power.. . . On the other hand, the category
of the 'higher man' results primarily horn a psychological-political
interpretation of the will to power. Both types, however, have
affinities toward one another. Nietzsche emphasizes the
psychological superiority of the Obermensch with respect to human

Nietzsche says; churches, armies. States—which of all these dogs wants to die?" Deleuze
and Guattari, Anti-O edipus, 63. However, unlike Deleuze and Guattari's analysis, the
Higher Men never attain a group consciousness necessary for a revolutionary movement
The revolution remains internal and individual
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beings as well as the aesthetic superiority of the higher man with
respect to the herd.23
The Higher Man thus feels the need to separate from the masses,
though perhaps not for the right reason. Rebellion against political practices
or even intellectualized oppression do not lead to the mentality necessary
for self-overcoming. Rather, they lead to a reformist attitude and the
establishment of new political institutions. Nietzsche seems to want to
transcend practical politics altogether and move towards a mode of
existence fundamentally different from those of traditional collective
existence. Zarathustra seeks to educate the Higher Men to overcome
themselves in aesthetic terms, rather than in practico-political terms.
This type of transformation is foreign to die Higher Men, who seem
to misunderstand Zarathustra's message. The Higher Men, conditioned by
society, do not have a perspective suited to Zarathustra's message. They
must learn to supercede their identities through creative action, not solemn
contemplation:
You Higher Men, the worst thing about you is: none of you has
learned to dance as a man ought to dance—to dance beyond
yourselves. . . lift up your hearts, you fine dancers, high! Higher!
And do not forget to laugh well. This laughter crown, this rosewreath crown: to you, my brothers, do I throw this crown! I have
canonized laughter; you Higher Men, team—to laugh!24

23Ofelia Schutte, Beyond N ihilism : N ietzsche w ithoutMasks, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984), 127.
24

Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.20.
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In order for an aesthetic transformation to occur, the individual must
confront the unpleasant truths that are varnished over by societal myths.
Nietzsche identifies a tension that occurs within the Higher Men which
threatens the possibility of their self-overcoming. There is a conflict within
each individual—fear and vision; ambition and complacency. These dual
impulses must be confronted and overcome in order to progress with self
creation. However, Nietzsche argues that this conflict holds even the
superior individual to others.
It is not the height but the abyss that is terrible! The abyss where die
glance plunges downward and the hand grasps upward. There the
heart grows giddy through its twofold will. Ah, friends, have you,
too, divined my hearts twofold will? That my glance plunges into
the heights and that my hand wants to hold on to the depths and lean
there—that, that is m y abyss and my danger. My will clings to
mankind, I bind myself to mankind with fetters, because I am drawn
up to the Obermensch for my other will wants to draw me up to the
Obermensch.75
This internal conflict is dangerous as it is easy for the struggling
individual to fall back into the morass of social existence. This type of self
exploration is certainly not a superficial exercise, and the potential
Obermensch call easily be seduced into abandoning this difficult and
painful quest Indeed, this is why Zarathustra's experience with the
community is a disappointing failure. The knowledge he seeks to
communicate to the Higher Men proves to be incommunicable without

25Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:21.
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resorting to the type of repressive mechanisms that characterize the state
and mass culture. Indeed, Zarathustra is unable to explain any concrete
methods of self-overcoming to the Higher Men, these are saved for
Zarathustra's dialogues with himself and his animals.

m.
Rather than being an affirmation of community, Zarathustra becomes
a condemnation of the possibility of communal action, even in a small, nonfoundational context Zarathustra has failed to teach those who wish to
learn, in an environment outside of the state. The failure of Zarathustra to
teach the Higher Men represents the realization of the ultimate impossibility
of collective self-overcoming. Nietzsche implies that even in this most ideal
setting, the problems of aggregated existence continue to impede
Zarathustra's message.
This tendency is demonstrated vividly in the Higher Men. The desire
of the Higher Men to follow Zarathustra is ultimately corrupted into the
desire to be M e Zarathustra. This runs the very real risk of degenerating
into a dogma, and is a betrayal of Nietzsche's individualistic project
Zarathustra may be an ideal type for self-overcoming, but he is not a type
setter. However, societal conditioning has set the stage for the desire to
replicate Zarathustra, and the herd mentality inherent even in a small
community contributes to this tendency.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140
Each disciple only hears a portion of Zarathustra's message and
ultimately exaggerates this. Zarathustra realizes that none of the Higher
Men are fully separated from others, as demonstrated by their desire to copy
him. By copying Zarathustra, the Higher Men have simply constructed a
new cycle of power relations, superimposing Zarathustra's will over their
own. The inability of the Higher Men to realize Zarathustra's message as an
individually-actuated journey is indicative of their failure to fully overcome
the mechanisms of collective existence:
I need pure, smooth mirrors for my teaching; upon your surface even
my own reflection is distorted. Many a burden, many a memory
weighs down your shoulders; many an evil buffoon crouches in your
comers. And there is hidden mob in you, too. And although you are
of a higher type, much in you is crooked and malformed. There is no
smith in the world who could hammer you straight and into shape
for me.26
By following Zarathustra rather than accompanying him the Higher
Men are little more than the parasites Zarathustra decries in his critique of
the state. The Higher Men have come to the realization of the emptiness of
the state and the hollowness of social existence, this is what makes them
"Higher Men." However, they have not been able to realize that
Zarathustra is not to be followed. He may be the voice in die wilderness,
but he cannot instruct others how to overcome themselves.

26Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:11.
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The Higher Men seek an easy answer, an easy way to expunge their
existential pain. They therefore willingly allow their wills to be supplanted
by Zarathustra. This mirrors Zarathustra's critique of the denizens of the
state: "some of them will, but most of them are only willed. Some of them
are genuine, but most of them are bad actors."27 The Higher Men, inasmuch
as they desire self-overcoming, are pointed in the right direction. However,
their inherent weakness and desire for comfort eventually overcome them.
They eventually show themselves to be no better than the Ultimate Man. In
this sense, the Higher Men represent the failed Obermensch, who began the
journey but backslide into collective existence. They simply have not been
able to exert their wills over that of their teacher "Oh, that you understood
my saying: 'Always do what you will-but first be such as can w ill
Because Zarathustra (and indeed anyone) is unique, it is impossible for his
disciples to measure up. In setting themselves up as disciples of Zarathustra
rather than as companions on the journey to self-overcoming, they have
doomed themselves to failure:
The higher the type, the less often does a thing succeed. You Higher
Men here, are you not all—failures? Be of good courage, what does it
matter! How much is still possible! Learn to laugh at yourselves as a
man ought to laugh!. . . And truly, how much has already
succeeded! How rich this earth is in good little perfect things, in
well-constituted things!. . . Perfect things teach hope.29
27Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:5.2.
28Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:5.3.
29 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.15.
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Rather than heeding Zarathustra's call to treat the failure to copy him
as a victory for themselves, the Higher Men seem ready to abandon their
quest and found a new mode of collective existence around Zarathustra.
Thus, each Higher Man is necessarily a parody of Zarathustra rather than an
authentic follower. Following from Nietzsche's critique of mass culture,
Nietzsche argues that Zarathustra becomes an external signifier to this
community and ultimately becomes the object for bad conscience.
Nevertheless, Zarathustra remains ambivalent concerning the Higher Men.
As Deleuze notes:
[E]ach character of the higher man has the two aspects in differing
proportions; representing both reactive forces and their triumph,
species activity and its product We must take this double aspect into
account in order to understand why Zarathustra treats the higher
man in two ways: sometimes as an enemy who will consider any
trap, any infamy, in order to divert Zarathustra from his path and
sometimes as a host almost a companion who is engaged in an
enterprise close to that of Zarathustra himself.30
Zarathustra realizes that the Higher Men are the closest people he has
encountered to his goal, and does not wish to see them fail. Deleuze
continues:
Consider the way in which the higher men are presented: their
despair, their disgust their cry of distress and their "unhappy
consciousness". They all know and feel the abortive character of die
goal that they attain, the failed nature of the product that they are.. . .

30 Deleuze, N ietzsche and Philosophy, 166.
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The shadow has lost its goal, not because it has reached it but because
the goal which it has reached is itself a lost goal.31
It is in this sense that the Higher Men represent more than
Zarathustra's failure, they are also potentially his undoing. Indeed,
Zarathustra fears that his desire to communicate his knowledge to others
will ultimately be his undoing. "It is difficult to live among men because
keeping silent is so difficult Especially for a babbler."32 Zarathustra
identifies his greatest temptation towards others as pity. His pity for the
masses in society draws him to the town, and his pity for the Higher Men
leads him to tolerate these poor disciples. However, if Zarathustra is to
succeed in his own self-overcoming, he cannot drown in the pity that he
feels for these abortive Obermenschen.33
Indeed, Zarathustra's speeches to the Higher Men can easily be read
as a caution to Zarathustra himself. He cannot afford to attach himself to
the Higher Men, or he will destroy them as well as their teacher.
Zarathustra argues that all great individuals necessarily inspire bad
conscience in others:

31 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 168.
32Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:20.
33"The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues: as 'Zarathustra's temptation' I
invented a situation in which a great cry of distress reaches him, as pity tries to attack him
like a final sin that would entice him away from him self. To remain the master at this
point, to keep the eminence of one's task undefiled by the many lower and more myopic
impulses that are at work in so-called selfless actions, that is the test; perhaps the ultimate
test, which a Zarathustra must pass—his real proofof strength." Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, L4.
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Yes, my friend, you are the bad conscience of your neighbors: for they
are unworthy of you. Thus they hate you and would dearly like to
drain your blood. Your neighbors will always be poisonous flies: that
about you which is great, that itself must make them more poisonous
and ever more fly-like.34
Eventually, those who suffer from bad conscience begin to doubt the
greatness of their external signifier, deconstructing the original positive
power relation and replacing it with one of ressentiment and suspicion. A
young man on the mountainside says to Zarathustra: "Behold, what have I
been since you appeared among us? It is envy of you which has destroyed
me!"35 This demonstrates the tendency of the individual actively to seek out
a signifier for bad conscience. It is therefore only through the destruction of
the signifier that the individual can alleviate this existential envy:
They think about you a great deal with their narrow souls—you are
always suspicious to them. Everything that is thought about a great
deal is finally thought suspicious. They punish you for your virtues.
Fundamentally they forgive you only for—your mistakes
Before
you, they feel themselves small, and their baseness glimmers and
glows against you in hidden vengeance. Have you not noticed how
often they become silent when you approached them, and how their
strength left them like smoke from a dying fire?96
This highlights part of the reason that all human forms of collective
existence will eventually degenerate into bad conscience and normalization.

34 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12. The state has become the modem focus for bad conscience,
but the potential Obermensch stands to be an even more problematic object of bad
conscience, as he is more personal and imminently confrontational.
35Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
36Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

145
Through his genealogical analyses Nietzsche has come to realize that
collectivities, in whatever form, must necessarily create evaluative criteria:
Zarathustra has found no greater power on earth than good and evil.
No people could live without evaluating; but if it wishes to maintain
itself it must not evaluate as its neighbor evaluates. Much that
seemed good to one people seemed shame and disgrace to another,
thus I found. I found that much that was called evil in one place was
in another decked with royal honors. One neighbor never
understood another his soul was always amazed at his neighbor's
madness and wickedness.37
Zarathustra sees this dynamic forming among the Higher Men and
himself, exactly the tendencies that Zarathustra urges the individual to
avoid. This will lead his disciples to Dekadenz and destroy any possibility
of their own self-overcoming. "They are a poor, sick, mob type: they look
upon this life with an ill will, they have an evil eye for this earth.. . . They
have heavy feet and sultry hearts—they do not know how to dance. How
could the earth be light to such men!"38
It is therefore clear that Zarathustra must abandon his disciples if he
is to have any hope, either for them or himself. The last section of
Zarathustra's dealings with the Higher Men, "The Last Supper," is more
than a parody of Christ and his disciples. Nietzsche seeks to demonstrate
that the only true follower of Zarathustra cannot be a disciple, and must
actively oppose his teacher.

37 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
38 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.16.
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Unlike Christ, Zarathustra will not be a sacrifice for his followers. He
will maintain his integrity and will neither be held back by others nor drag
them down. By removing himself as a signifier for bad conscience, he
achieves something Christ could not do. Zarathustra does not urge his
followers to supplant their identities for his. He will not become a preacher
of death, the tool of dogmatists. Zarathustra's message is a teaching-not-toleam, essentially an anti-education. Zarathustra laments: "they take from
me: but do I yet touch their souls? A gulf stands between giving and
receiving; and the smallest gulf must be bridged at last"39 This gulf is
bridged by Zarathustra giving the Higher Men the only thing that can save
them: solitude.
It is through this pessimistic assessment of the Higher Men that
Nietzsche abandons his early optimism regarding the revival of community
in the Greek model. Heroic society is simply not possible, "the hero is to
them an affliction and a terror."40 Greatness and supranormality are simply
not tolerated in a collective context; even the much-venerated Greeks
executed Socrates. The mechanisms of society are simply too strong for the
individual to bear, and the exigencies of the will-to-power insure that new
power relations will form in whatever new context is developed.

39 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL9.
40 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
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A community of exceptional individuals can therefore never replicate
itself. Any community will eventually degenerate into mass society and
become the breeding ground for mediocrity and repression. Nietzsche
argues it is necessary to become separate even from a community of the
most tolerant individuals in order to achieve a lasting and meaningful
selfhood:
My children are still green in their first spring, standing close
together and shaken in common by the winds, the trees of my garden
and my best soil
Where such trees stand together, there the
blissful islands and But one day I will uproot them and set each one
up by itself, that it may learn solitude and defiance and foresight
Then it shall stand by the sea, gnarled and twisted and with supple
hardness, a living lighthouse of unconquerable life.41
IV.
Does this separation from others, however, preclude the most basic of
human associations, friendship? Zarathustra explicitly states: "I do not
teach you the neighbor but the friend."42 This possibility of interpersonal
connection on the most basic level may salvage collective existence albeit at
a limited level. Nietzsche's conception of friendship is largely based upon a
theory of power. As Nietzsche argues, it is not possible to be a friend to
someone of unequal ability or power. This would be no more than an
oppressive relationship:

41 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:3.
42 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:16.
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Are you pure air and solitude and bread and medicine to your
friend? Many a one cannot deliver himself from his own chains and
yet he is his friend's deliverer. Are you a slave? If so, you cannot be
a friend. Are you a tyrant? If so, you cannot have friends.43
The ideal friendship would be an adversarial relationship in which
each individual challenges the other to higher and higher forms of self
creation and overcoming. This is the true ideal behind the heroic
community, which was lost through societal corruption. "If you want a
friend, you must also be willing to wage war for him: and to wage war, you
must be capable of being an enemy. You should honor even the enemy in
your friend

In your friend you should possess your best enemy."44

Nietzsche, however, retains his pessimistic attitude. The conditions
necessary for an authentic friendship are rare, and the desire to be with
others is most likely to lead to ruin. Generally, individuals seek others for
support and consolation. In this sense, friendship represents failure to
communicate adequately with the self. "Our faith in others betrays wherein
we would dearly like to have faith in ourselves. Our longing for a friend is
our betrayer."45 The friend is therefore our own projected bad conscience,
the creation of our need for an external signifier. Stripped of God, the state,

43 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:14. This conception of friendship has obvious parallels with
Aristotle.
44 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:14.
45 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:14.
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and the community, die friend remains the last temptation on the road to
self-overcoming:
Have you ever watched your friend asleep—to discover what he
looked like? Yet your friend's face is something else beside. It is
your own face, in a rough and imperfect mirror
Were you not
startled to see what he looked like? O my friend, man is something
that must be overcome.46
Even more insidious is the fact that individuals perceive die "Other"
in an objective manner, lending undue concreteness to the presence and
identity of others. The unformed self is easily drawn into this inviting circle
and runs the risk of losing himself in the formation of collective identity.
You crowd together with your neighbors and have beautiful words
for it But I tell you: Your love for your neighbor is your bad love of
yourselves. You flee to your neighbor away from yourselves and
would like to make a virtue of it but I see through your
"selflessness." The "you" is older than the "I"; the "You" has been
consecrated, but not yet the "I": so man crowds towards his neighbor.
. . . You cannot endure to be alone with yourselves and do not love
yourselves enough: now you want to mislead your neighbor into
love and gild yourselves with his mistake. I wish rather that you
could not endure to be with any kind of neighbor or with your
neighbor's neighbor; then you would have to create your friend and
his overflowing heart out of yourselves.47
Rather than solitude becoming a possibility for self-growth, the
individual actually feels guilty about being alone. The individual feels that
being alone is a reflection of personal failure or inadequacy, rather than as a
triumph of the liberated self. "One man runs to his neighbor because he is

46Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:14.
47Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:16.
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looking for himself, and another because he wants to lose himself. Your bad
love of yourselves makes solitude a prison to you."48
Rather than affirming friendship, Nietzsche ultimately condemns it
as yet another form of bad conscience. "Do I exhort you to love of your
neighbor? I exhort you rattier to flight from your neighbor and to love of
the most distant!"49 Any dealings with others, even on the most primal
level, is necessarily repressive and ultimately dangerous. The path to self
overcoming must be a lonely one. As Schutte argues, this conclusion is the
logical outcome of Nietzsche's political analysis. "Nietzsche seems to have
thought that as long as social conditions remain what they are—i.e. modeled
upon a structure of domination—the person who seeks to go beyond good
and evil must enter the path of solitude, leaving all social relationships
behind."50
Zarathustra's time with the higher men has served only to muddy the
waters and delay his progress. He must ultimately leave the company of all
other humans if he is to complete his quest Zarathustra does not leave the
company of others with sorrow or regret, but with an attitude of relief and
liberation. It is telling that the animals reappear only when Zarathustra
leaves the others:
48 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:16.
49 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:16.
50Ofelia Schutte, Beyond N ihilism N ietzsche w ithoutM asks, 127.
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And Zarathustra said again: "I love you, my animals!" But the eagle
and the serpent pressed around him when he said these words, and
looked up at him. All three stood silently together in this attitude,
and sniffed and breathed in the good air together. For the air here
outside was better than with die Higher Men.51
Zarathustra then leaves without fanfare. "But that night he went
away alone and forsook his friends."52 The Higher Men, it seems, are left to
sink or swim according to their own abilities and inclinations. Nietzsche is
sure, however, that they will be better off without Zarathustra. It has
become apparent that his example will overshadow the Higher Men and
lead to nothing but repression.
There is another, more nuanced reason that Nietzsche abandons the
possibility of the community of Higher Men. Zarathustra's project of self>
overcoming is essentially an internal aesthetic process. Zarathustra realizes
that it is simply impossible to communicate this experience, either to a small
group of like-minded individuals or even to a friend. Zarathustra asks
himself," why does Zarathustra speak to his pupils differently—than to
himself?"53 It is because he must, there is no other way. This, as much as
the concrete problems of collective existence, dooms the community to

51 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:14.1.
52Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:22. This is the end of Part II, and of Zarathustra's dealings with
others. He must return to his solitude, and his internal conversation, in order to hilly
comprehend the enormity of his repressed knowledge of the void.
53Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL20.
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failure. In order to have the individual experience of self-overcoming and
self-creation, Zarathustra must return to his solitude.
In conclusion, the problems of communicating Zarathustra's theory
of self-exploration to others prove insurmountable. The remainder of the
narrative is devoted to the concrete experience of individual self
overcoming and self-creation that is the core of Nietzsche's positive theory.
Having dismissed the possibility of collective existence as inherently
repressive, Nietzsche articulates an alternative vision of individual existence
that seeks to locate sovereignty squarely within the individual
consciousness and the responsibility for personal growth within the
province of the individual self.
Nietzsche has often been accused of fostering a solipsistic view of
politics, and this analysis seems to support this criticism. Nietzsche's
critique of the state precluded mass existence, and his critique of the
community precludes even small-scale voluntary association. Nietzsche
seems to destroy the possibility for any type of human association that is not
repressive. Even the most primal of human relationships, the one-on-one
friendship, is discarded by Nietzsche as essentially destructive to toe self.
Again, Nietzsche can be accused of exaggeration. Are we to believe that toe
only possibility for self-overcoming is to abandon all forms of interpersonal
association?
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Nietzsche certainly does not offer any positive guidance for
reforming the community or rehabilitating personal relationships. If
Nietzsche is to be taken seriously, the only hope for the individual seeking
to overcome himself is to separate from other humans totally. Nietzsche
does not even elaborate whether it is possible for the transmuted individual
to someday rejoin society or whether he must remain apart perpetually.
However, if Nietzsche is taken to be offering an ideal type, that of the
Higher Man, his critique of community becomes more plausible. As with
the state, it is necessary to avoid concretizing Nietzsche's concepts. The
Higher Men are essentially ideal types of individuals who are likely to
attempt the process of self-overcoming. The fact that they fail is
illuminating, as they are attempting this necessarily individual process
within a social context, which allows power mechanisms to form.
Nietzsche's discussion of the Higher Men is a thought experiment designed
to test whether it is possible to create a non-repressive context for self
overcoming in a collective environment Nietzsche's intent is not to destroy
the possibility for collective existence, but to illuminate the problems
inherent in even small groups. The Higher Men are therefore a warning to
die individual to beware the influence of others, no matter how wellintentioned.
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C hapter V
T h e G reat N ausea

Zarathustra's decision to return to solitude is the turning point of the
text Indeed, it marks the beginning of Nietzsche's articulation of his
positive thought of authentic selfhood. In the first sections of Zarathustra,
Nietzsche provides the critical substrate on which to build his theory of
selfhood: the pathological character of the state and mass existence, the
danger of conformity, and the impossibility of reforming collective
existence. Zarathustra returns to solitude and faces his greatest challenge,
which proves to be a confrontation with nausea.
Nausea is featured prominently in Zarathustra, indeed it is one of the
central metaphors found in die narrative. Nietzsche's concept of nausea
represents an important element of a profound account of human existence
within a seemingly chaotic and hostile universe.1 In addition, the discussion
of nausea represents the turning point in the narrative of Zarathustra,
representing the bridge between Nietzsche's critique of society and the

1Existential nausea has become a philosophical tradition in the postmodern era. This
concept has appeared most vividly in the works of Sartre, although it is found prominently
in Dostoevsky and Kundera as well. In addition, there is a similar concept found in
phenomenological thought, especially in Heidegger's concept of throwitness and factidty.
For all of these authors, "nausea" is a profoundly disturbing state of uneasiness that follows
a radical reorientation of the self towards the universe or existence as a whole. Existential
nausea is more than the sense of tension experienced by Hegel's "homeless spirit" in search
of philosophical truth. Nausea represents the destruction of preexisting meaning and the
calling into question of both the individual's existence and the existential and ontological
status of the universe. Nausea is therefore a violent and painful process, but one that can
lead to the positive reevaluation of existence and self-worth.
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articulation of his theory of the transmuted self. Therefore, Nietzsche's
concept of nausea is vitally important to the understanding of his thought as
a whole. This chapter will examine the concept of nausea that Nietzsche
introduces in Thus Spoke Zarathustra as well as its essential relevance to the
understanding of one of Nietzsche's most controversial "doctrines": the
eternal recurrence of die same.
Nausea is an integral metaphor of Zarathustra, as well as one of the
enduring themes of Nietzsche's philosophy. Twice within the narrative
Zarathustra is recognized as the man without nausea, once at the beginning
of the text and again towards the end, yet he suffers this affliction in the
center. Therefore, an important development in the narrative can be
observed. Initially, Zarathustra is without nausea:
Yes, I recognize Zarathustra. His eyes are clear, and disgust does not
lurk around his mouth. Does he not move along like a dancer? How
changed Zarathustra is! Zarathustra has become—a child, an
awakened-one: what do you want now with the sleepers? You lived
in solitude as in the sea, and die sea bore you up. Alas, do you want
to go ashore? Alas, do you again want to drag your body yourself?2
At the end of the narrative, Zarathustra is again recognized as the
man without nausea. However, he is also recognized as the one who has
conquered nausea. "This is the man without nausea, this is Zarathustra
himself, the overcomer of the great nausea"3 Indeed, nausea represents the

2

Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §2.

3 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:8.
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turning point in Zarathustra, after which the entire tone of the work
changes. After Zarathustra experiences nausea, the text changes from linear
im ager/ such as going-over and downgoing, to metaphors of circularity as
seen in the movements of the animals and the return of the same. The
overcoming of nausea is a therefore undoubtedly a central element in
Zarathustra, and one that has been largely ignored. Nietzsche discusses
nausea in other works, but not nearly to the extent that he does in
Zarathustra. Nevertheless, the idea of nausea figures centrally both in
Nietzsche's critical and positive thought, as will be demonstrated.
For Nietzsche, nausea has two interrelated causes. The first cause of
nausea is particularly Nietzschean, and arises from contempt for those who
have not allowed themselves to realize their existential and ontological
condition. These masses live according to myth and dogma, too frightened
to allow themselves to experience the painful and potentially destructive
experience of self-reflection and existential nausea. These people thus lead
lives of self-satisfied mediocrity, and are referred to by Nietzsche as
"superfluous." However, even more nauseating to the exceptional
individual is the realization that the superfluous man is ontologically equal
to himself within the context of the meaningless universe. Thus, "social
nausea" is essentially reactive, caused by external social factors that are not
necessarily internalized into the individual consciousness.
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The second cause of nausea is similar to that discussed by the
existentialists, particularly Sartre. Existential nausea, or the "Great Nausea,"
is the abject horror that arises from contemplation of the meaningless of
existence. This occurs at a specific moment in time in which the individual
is open to the realization of this deeply disturbing ontological and
existential possibility. This specific existential mood is fostered by the first,
socially-actuated nausea which allows the individual to separate from the
herd and become open to new existential possibilities. However, existential
nausea is much more personal, arising out of contemplation of the
individual's own finitude, not reflection upon the abstract concept of death.
Because of its innateness, existential nausea is not reactive but rather active,
spurring the individual toward the possibility of self-creation.
L
In keeping with Nietzsche's presentation of the two varieties of
nausea, it is proper to examine social nausea first Nietzsche's contempt for
the mundane is well known. However, the extent of his revulsion at
modem society cannot be overestimated. Nietzsche's social nausea is more
nuanced than simple disappointment at the mediocrity of modem society; it
extends to an ontological level Nietzsche is nauseated by die fact that the
lowest of the rabble is ontologically equal to those with the greatest nobility
of spirit
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I had seen them both naked, the greatest man and the smallest man:
all too similar to one another, even the greatest all too human! The
greatest too small!—that was my disgust at man! And eternal
recurrence even for the smallest! That was my disgust at all
existence! Alas! Nausea! Nausea! Nausea!4
This type of nausea is presented as a great challenge to Zarathustra.
His realization of the contemptibleness of humanity causes him to ruminate
on the status of the masses in relation to his own existence. In essence,
Zarathustra must determine the existential status of the exceptional
individual in relation to that of the masses. This takes the form of an
analysis of collective existence as a type of morass in which individuals lose
their identities in contact with die masses:
But once I asked, and my question almost stifled me: What; does life
have need of the rabble, too? Are poisoned wells necessary, and
stinking fires and dirty dreams and maggots in the bread of life? Not
my hate but my nausea hungrily devoured my life! Alas, I often
grew weary of the spirit when I found the rabble, too, had been gifted
with spirit! And I turned my back upon the rulers when I saw what
they now called ruling: bartering and haggling for power—with the
rabble!5
Zarathustra's disgust is centered on the pettiness of humanity.6
Individuals are no longer concerned with the betterment of themselves or

4 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:13.2. Hollingdale renders this as "disgust"
5 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL6.
6 "Boundless and constantly recurring is Nietzsche's sorrow over men as they really are:
"What arouses our repugnance today?. . . That such vermin as human beings can
predominate and multiply" . .. Not one of them is a complete being: Tt is always the same:
fragments and limbs and revolting monstrosities—but no men!' They ruin everything with
their talk and betray everything.. .. The paroxysm of disgust with man receives symbolic
expression in the frightful sentence: Tt is doubtful that a world-traveler has anywhere in the
world discovered an uglier region than the human face.'" Jaspers, Nietzsche, 125.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

159
the discovery of an authentic selfhood. Rather, individuals are concerned
almost totally with their acceptance by the mob. Political power is similarly
centered on this lowest common denominator. Social nausea is therefore a
further confirmation of Nietzsche's earlier critique of the state and mass
culture, but the emphasis is now shifted to die reaction of the exceptional
individual to these normalizing mechanisms. This is why the rule of the
mob is especially nauseating to Zarathustra, as it represents the triumph of
the reactive forces at the expense of the active individual:
For today the petty people have become lord and master they all
preach submission and acquiescence and prudence and diligence and
consideration and the long et cetera of petty virtues. What is
womanish, what stems from slavishness and especially from the
mob's hotchpotch: that now wants to become master of mankind's
entire destiny—oh, nausea! Nausea! Nausea!7
This nausea at the masses causes a great sense of hopelessness in
Zarathustra, he realizes that society and the Ultimate Men who populate it
are unredeemable. The mob does not seek personal growth; it longs only for
solace and flattery. "The great nausea at man—it choked me and had crept
into my throat and what the prophet prophesied: 'it is all one, nothing is
worthwhile, knowledge chokes.'"8 Zarathustra realizes that the masses
ultimately pollute everything and corrupt the individual with their
Dekadenz.

7 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:133.
8Nietzsche, Zarathustra, QL13.2.
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I once vowed to renounce all nausea; then you transformed my
kindred and neighbors into abscesses. Alas, where did my noblest
vow flee then? Once, as a blind man, I walked on happy paths; then
you threw filth in the blind man's path: and now the old footpath
disgusts him. And when I achieved my most difficult task and
celebrated the victory of my overcomings: then you made those
whom I loved cry out that I hurt them most Truly, all that was your
doing: you embittered my finest honey and die industry of my finest
bees.9
Nietzsche emphasizes that nausea cannot be overcome through mere
contemplation, "and truly, if man should gain the whole world and learn
this one thing, rumination: what would it profit him! He would not be free
from his affliction. . . nausea. Who today has not his heart, mouth, and eyes
filled with nausea?"10 Nausea must be confronted for what it is and acted
upon. Through this confrontation with social nausea, it is realized that the
features of humanity that inspire disgust are essential traits of collective
human existence.11 Collective existence leads inexorably to the type of
sedated existence typified by the rule of the mob: "Much about your good
people nauseates me, and it is not their evil I mean

Truly, I wish their

9 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:11.
10Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:8.
11“Ressentim ent, bad conscience and nihilism are not psychological traits but the
foundation of humanity in man. They are the principle of human being as such. Man,'skin
disease' of the Earth, reaction of the Earth.. .. It is in this sense that Zarathustra speaks of
his 'great contempt' for man and his 'great disgust'. Another sensibility, another
becoming—would they still be man's?" Deleuze, N ietzsche and Philosophy, 64-65.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

161
madness were called truth or loyalty or justice: but they possess their virtue
in order to live long and in a miserable ease."12
Mass society prevents the existential analysis necessary for personal
growth through a retreat into transcendental fantasy. Nietzsche argues
against this escapism into metaphysical consolation brought about by
feelings of hopelessness at the realization of meaninglessness. "For truly,
there is also a wisdom that blossoms in darkness, a night-shade wisdom,
which is always sighing: 'all is vain!'. . . such is the nature of cowardly
souls."13 This tendency causes those who seek insight beyond the herd to
lapse into guilt or despair.
And I saw a great sadness come over mankind. The best grew weary
of their works. A teaching went forth, a belief ran beside ifc
Everything is empty, everything is one, everything is past!. . . We
have harvested, it is true; but why did all our fruits turn rotten and
brown? What fell from the wicked moon last night? All our work
has been in vain, our wine has become poison, an evil eye has
scorched our fields and our hearts. . . we have grown too weary even
to die; now we are still awake and we live on—in sepulchres!14
Within the realm of the mob, those who seek personal growth or
question the principles underlying mass culture are in some way
12Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:6.
13Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, HI:10.
14Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:19. Nietzsche is explicitly responding to Ecclesiastes 1:2-11,
"Vanity of vanities. . . AH is vanity! What do people gain from all the toil at which they toil
under the sun?. . . The sun rises and the sun goes down, and hurries to the place where it
rises
All streams run to the sea, but the sea is not full
What has been is what will
be, and what has been done is what will be done; there is nothing new under the sun___
The people of long ago are not remembered, nor will there be any remembrance of people
yet to come by those who come after them." Properly confronted, this angstis liberating.
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condemned. Because of the institutionalized belief in metaphysics or even
in progress, it is essentially impossible to move beyond bad conscience and
mob existence:
Today I saw a sublime man, a penitent of the spirit oh, how my soul
laughed at his ugliness!. . . As yet he has not learned of laughter and
beauty. This huntsman returned gloomily from the forest of
knowledge.. . . There is still contempt in his eye, and disgust lurks
about his mouth. He rests now, to be sure, but he has never yet lain
down in the sunlight15
However, mere disgust at humanity is not enough; it is necessary to
confront the source of this loathing, both within the society and one's own
self, in order to progress beyond disgust toward a self worthy of
affirmation. "I love the great despisers. Man, however, is something that
must be overcome."16 Although many may realize the necessity of this, few
have the fortitude to actually complete the process of overcoming. "To be
sure, there are sour apples whose fate is to wait until the last day of autumn:
and they become at the same time ripe, yellow, and shriveled

It is

cowardice that keeps him fastened to his branch."17 In Beyond Good and
Evil, Nietzsche further emphasizes the nausea arising from the denigration
of man through modern idealistic dogma, a manifestation of this cowardice:

15Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:13.
16Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:7.
17Nietzsche, Zarathustra, L21-
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The comprehensive denigration of man down to what today appears
to the socialist idiots and flatheads as their "man of the future"—as
their ideal—this denigration and diminution of man into the perfect
herd animal (or, as they say, to the man of the "free society"), this
animalization of the man into the dwarf animal of equal rights and
claims, is possible, there is no doubt of it Anyone who has once
thought through this possibility to the end knows one kind of nausea
that other men do not know—but perhaps also a new task!18
The type of escapism fostered by mass culture prevents the
individual from confronting the really hard questions of existence, which
might lead to the realization of the fictional character of such institutions.
However, once nausea is confronted, the individual is open to question
society and perceive it without the interference of inherited presuppositions.
Then, the individual can reevaluate himself:
The hour when you say: "what good is my happiness? It is poverty
and dirt and a miserable escape. But my happiness should justify
existence itself." The hour when you say: "what good is my reason?
Does it long for knowledge as the lion for its food?" It is poverty and
dirt and a miserable escape!" The hour when you say: "What good is
my virtue? It has not yet driven me mad! How tired I am of my
good and evil! It is all poverty and dirt and miserable escape!" The
hour when you say: "What good is my justice? I do not see that I am
fire and hot coals. But the just man is fire and hot coals!" The hour
when you say: "What good is my pity? Is not pity the cross upon
which he who loves man is nailed? But my pity is no crucifixion!"...
In truth, man is a polluted river. One must be a sea to receive this
polluted river and not become defiled. Behold, I teach you the
Obermensch. he is this sea, in him your great contempt can go under.
What is the greatest thing you can experience? It is the hour of the
great contempt The hour in which even your happiness becomes
loathsome, and your reason and virtue as well.19
18 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, V£03.
19 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3. This is the calling for the great nausea and thus the
separation from the herd.
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This "hour of the great contempt^ is the culmination of social nausea.
Once the individual realizes that all of the desires implanted by society are
meaningless it is possible to abandon societal expectations and look within.
It is only then that the individual is able to begin contemplation of the self in
an authentic non-foundational context Thus social nausea leads to the
desire to separate from the herd. Although social nausea is primarily
reactive, it is through the culmination of contempt that social nausea is
capable of becoming creative and therefore constructive. "There is wisdom
in the fact that much in the world smells ill: nausea itself creates wings and
water-divining powers! Even in the best there is something to excite nausea;
and even the best is something that must be overcome!"20
Social nausea therefore creates a substrate for the individual to react
against and to inspire further action. The revolutionary spirit is alive in this
concept, albeit on an individual basis. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche argues that
the experience of nausea in Zarathustra demonstrates "what alone 'man' can
be for him—not an object of love or, worse, pity—Zarathustra has mastered
the great nausea over man, too: man is for him an un-form, a material, an
ugly stone that needs a sculptor."21 Social nausea is therefore only reactive
in the sense that it causes the initial rupture with society and realigns die

20Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.14.
21 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, "Zarathustra", §8.
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individual's expectations away from societal objectives. Indeed, the very
prospect of social intercourse becomes deeply disturbing:
Now we are avoiding the mob, all these ranters and scribblingbluebottles, the stench of shopkeepers, the struggles of ambition, the
foul breath: faugh, to live among the mob, faugh, to pretend to be the
first among the mob! Nausea! Nausea! Nausea!22
Social nausea is constructive in that it creates a void that must be
addressed by the individual. Nausea destroys the superstructure that has
grown up to support the myth of stability and transcendence. Social nausea
sets the stage for a much more complete sense of nausea that calls into
question the entirety of the individual's previous interpretation of reality:
To all of you, whatever honors you may bestow upon yourselves
with words, whether you call yourselves “the tree spirits'' or "the
truthful" or "the penitents of the spirit" or the "unfettered" or "the
great desirers", to all of you, like me, suffer from the great nausea, for
whom the old God has died and no new God lies in cradles and
swaddling clothes—to all of you is my evil spirit and sorcery-devil
well-disposed.23
Social nausea is therefore important from several Nietzschean
perspectives. In order for the individual to begin the process of selfcreation, it is necessary to abandon traditional ways of interpreting
existence. As Nietzsche is all too aware, these interpretive schemes, and the
comfort they provide, are exceptionally difficult for the individual to escape.
It is only during the most painful episodes of human existence, such as the

22Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV3.
23 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV :142.
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confrontation with personal mortality and by extension the void, that it is
possible to see these myths for what they are: comforting stories. Without
social nausea and the release from societal myths, it is impossible to move to
the more comprehensive level of nausea, existential nausea.
IL
Existential nausea is much more disturbing than social nausea, as it
calls into question the basis for individual existence on the most personal
level. Nietzsche hopes that this questioning of the individual's existential
status can lead to a transmutation of the self to a higher leveL Nietzsche
argues this point consistently in his work; indeed the concept of existential
nausea is foreshadowed by Nietzsche's description of the Dionysian man in
The Birth o f Tragedy.
In this sense the Dionysian man resembles Hamlet both have once
looked truly into the essence of things, they have gained knowledge,
and nausea inhibits action; for their action could not change anything
in the eternal nature of things; they feel it to be ridiculous or
humiliating that they should be asked to set right a world that is out
of balance. Knowledge kills action; action requires the veil of illusion
. . . true knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth, outweighs any
motive for action.24
By embracing the Dionysian ethic of the eternal flux of existence, the
ancient Greeks were able to integrate a healthier ideal into their tragic model
of life. The Dionysian mythology was explicitly structured to support the

24 Nietzsche, The Birth o f Tragedy, VHL7. Nietzsche then argues that the only possibility
for Dionysian man to transcend this impasse is through the creative power of art.
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conclusion that life was meaningless outside of individual action.25
Conversely, modernity explicitly denies the ascendancy of chance, leading
to a static worldview incapable of dealing with die vicissitudes of life.26 It is
only through the destruction of the modem worldview that Nietzsche hopes
to free us from the essentially unhealthy ideology of progress that has
become melded to the modem mindset Through the separation from
society and its psychological imperatives, the first stage of nausea has freed
the individual from the institutional manifestations of bad conscience and
transcendental solace.
In this sense, nausea represents the moment at which the individual
realizes the shortcomings of the myths built up over time by others and then
adopted by the self to filter out the horror of meaninglessness. The
destruction of the idea of a divine plan and its secular counterpart the
human community is necessary before the individual is able to move
forward. However, it is then necessary for the individual to free himself
from a far more embedded myth: the illusion of the innate rationality of die
25"Ariadne, the Labyrinth, the Minotaur, Theseus, and Dionysus—this whole area of
mythology is repeatedly alluded to with all its mysterious ambiguity when he wishes to
suggest the last secret of the truth: that the truth is death, or that it is something else
desired with the passion for truth that will, in turn, end in death." Jaspers, N ietzsche, 225.
26"Nihilism, the experience of the exhaustion of meaning, amounts to a great weariness, a
'great disgust,' on the part of man, and directed at him as weU. Nothing is worth much
anymore, everything comes down to the same thing, everything is equalized. Everything is
the same and equivalent: the true and the false, the good and the bad. Everything is
outdated, used up, old, dilapidated, dying: an undefined agony of meaning, and unending
twilight: not a definite annihilation of significations, but their indefinite collapse." Haar,
N ietzsche and M etaphysics, 11.
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universe.27 Underlying theological and secular accounts of existence is the
idea that the universe in some way makes sense. The idea of the ordered
cosmos must be accepted for what it is: a projection of the fear of lack of
control onto a chaotic and sometimes hostile universe. This fear of
meaninglessness and death is certainly not unnatural, as Tillich states,
"everything finite is innately anxious that its substance will be lost"28
Nietzsche hopes to turn this anxiety toward a constructive purpose.
First it is necessary for the individual to entertain the notion that the
universe is indeed meaningless, and that there is no external ordering
outside of the actions of the concrete will. As Camus states, "only power
without purpose, only Heraclitus' 'chance/ is eternal."29 Paradoxically,
Nietzsche argues that the realization of the meaninglessness of existence and
its acceptance leads to a greater sense of individual freedom. Without
external constraints, it is possible to seek new permutations of selfhood.

27"When one gives up the moral universal that makes its demands with logically inflexible
unconditionality, no return is possible. One is threatened by the possibility of sinking into a
limitless void. The loss of the resistance afforded by immutable moral laws may as easily
be followed by abandonment to caprice and accident as by emergence from the source of an
authentic and historically unique possibility." Jaspers, Nietzsche, 155.
28Paul Tillich, System atic Theology, Vol. 1 (London: Nisbit, 1953), 219.
29Albert Camus, The Rebel:A n Essay on Man in R evolt bans. Anthony Bower (New York:
Vintage, 1991), 73.
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Existential nausea is therefore not reactive, it is instead the impetus to
action. "My abyss speaks, I have turned my ultimate depth into the light!"30
Through confrontation with the abyss of meaninglessness, the
individual is able to move beyond contempt and despair towards
constructive action.31 Thus, nausea does not represent destruction. If one
can embrace the void, the opportunity opens for self-overcoming.
Existential nausea represents the complete stripping away of all previous
orderings of the consciousness to reveal its underlying structure: the
permutations of the will-to-power, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
Only through the confrontation with and overcoming of existential nausea
can the individual finally obtain the innocence necessary to begin the
process of self-creation free from external interference. As Nietzsche writes:
"the highest must arise to its height from the deepest"32 Thus, the reaction
to nausea that affirms life is as natural as the nausea which arose from
contemplating its wretchedness. Nietzsche praises nausea as a positive
good: "O my soul, I taught you the great contempt that comes not as the

30 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:13.1-2.
31 "When one has overcome, when one has come to face the dwarfing fear of the aby», one
can dance around it, one can laugh at it Then one looks deep into life, then it becomes
possible to embrace the end of, the edge of life—superficial now out o/profundity—
absorbing the abyss that looks into one and, so transfigured by the lightness of light by the
gold of existence, one is 'a transformed being, surrounded with light laughing. Never yet
on earth had any man laughed as he laughed!' This is 'not human' but Dionysian
laughter." Babich, N ietzsche's Philosophy o fScience, 293.
32 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1.
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gnawing of a worm, the great loving contempt which loves most where it
despises most"33 Magnus notes:
" . . . there is nothing in the nature of things which justifies nausea,
justifies the estimate that life is a wretched stafce-of-affairs, anymore
than there is anything in the nature of things which justifies joy,
exultation, and the estimate that life is consummate celebration."34
This attitude that nausea is a constructive reaction to life is dependent
upon the courage of the individual. This attitude is aggressive in its self
valuation, even as it destroys external ordering. "For courage is the best
destroyer—courage that attacks, for in every attack there is a triumphant
shout"35 Mere acknowledgment the abyss is insufficient; one must gaze
into it with full recognition of the existential implications. The horror of the
stripping away of metaphysical consolation is enough to destroy even the
most dauntless individual; indeed this is what fostered the diverse systems
of metaphysical consolation that have been institutionalized over the
millennia. As Nietzsche states, "he who sees the abyss, but with eagle's
eyes—he who grasps the abyss with an eagle's claws: he possesses
courage."36

33 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:14.
34 Magnus, N ietzsche's ExistentialIm perative, 174.
35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:2.1.
36 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.4.
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The individual must make the reality of the abyss a part of die self, in
order to prevent re-concretization of newly formed insights. Through
nausea the great myths of traditional metanarratives are destroyed, but they
are not replaced with anything capable of taking their place. Nausea,
therefore, is the internalization of the abyss. Through nausea, the individual
is separated fully from not only previous ordering but from die notion of the
possibility of external ordering. After gazing into the abyss, there is no
possibility for redemption apart from internal ordering of consciousness.
Once this step is taken, there can be no return. As Nietzsche writes,
"courage also destroys giddiness at abysses: and where does man not stand
at an abyss? Is seeing itself not—an abyss?"37
Taken together, these forms of nausea lead to the separation of the
"self' from the "other." Nausea represents a fundamental turning point in
an individual's life. People who have experienced the profound shock of
existential nausea may re-emerge into the comfort of familiar systems of
existential consolation. The other choice concerns Nietzsche. This is to
confront the void and search for a new justification for existence based upon
the creative self. This latter choice is ultimately more dangerous, but to
Nietzsche much more rewarding. Nietzsche concludes that finitude is the

37Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:2.1.
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great demarcation for individuality, and therefore nausea is the herald of
self-overcoming.38
The experience of nausea is inextricably necessary for selfovercoming in the Nietzschean sense. The discussion of self-overcoming is
dependant upon a specific understanding of what Nietzsche means by this
problematic project It is instructive to examine the first instance in
Zarathustra in which Nietzsche discusses the overcoming of man: "Ich
lehre euch den Obermenschen. DerMensch istEtwas, das iiberwunden
werden so/1"39 This is generally translated as "I teach you the overman.
Man is something that should be overcome."40
Employing a somewhat different translation, it is possible to get a
sense of the pathos of distance that Nietzsche is emphasizing: "mankind is

38"And, generally speaking, the experience of individuality in modem culture is bound up
with that of death: from Httlderlein's Empedocles to Nietzsche's Zarathustra, and on to
Freudian man, an obstinate relation to death prescribes to the universal its singular face,
and lends to each individual the power of being heard forever; the individual owes to death
a meaning that does not cease with him. The division that it traces and the finitude whose
mark it imposes link, paradoxically, the universality of language and the precarious,
irreplaceable form of the individual. The sense-perceptible, which cannot be exhausted by
description, and which so many centuries have wished to dissipate, finds at last in death
the law of its discourse; it is death that fixes the stone that we can touch, the return of time,
the fine, innocent earth beneath the grass of words. In a space articulated by language, it
reveals the profusion of bodies and their simple order." Michel Foucault, The Birth o fthe
C linic An Archaeology o fM edicalPerception, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York:
Vintage, 1994), 197.
39Zarathustra, Prologue §3.
40Translated by HoDingdale, (London: Penguin, 1961). Kaufmarm renders the passage
"man is something that shall be overcome," thus blunting the imperative tone of the
passage even more so than Hollingdale, and implying a teleology.
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something that m ust be overcome."41 hi this sense, Nietzsche is
illuminating the need to overcome those parts of the individual self that are
grounded in "mankind." As Jaspers notes, "Nietzsche's longing for the
genuine man, while giving rise to his contempt is nevertheless the force that
moves and consumes him."42 Thus, it is through nausea and the collapse of
everyday meaning that the transmuted self is possible. This overcoming of
existential nausea is only possible by confronting and accepting the
individual's own finite existence, thus making death no more than the
crowning achievement of a well-constructed life.
I shall show you the consummating death, which shall be a spur and
a promise to living. The man consummating his life dies his death
triumphantly, surrounded by men filled with hope and making
solemn vows. Thus one should learn to die; and there should be no
festivals at which such a dying man does not consecrate the oaths of
the living!43
When the individual recognizes that death is not the passage to the
next life or a socially-redeeming sacrifice, death becomes the limit of
perception against which one can project a clearly-delimited endpoint for
self-creation. Properly understood, therefore, the realization of die
meaninglessness of existence is an invitation to an unheard of existential

41Translation and italics mine.
42Jaspers, Nietzsche, 126.
43Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:21.
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freedom. "Free for death and free in death, one who solemnly says No
when there is no longer time for Yes: thus he understands life and death."44
Nausea represents the birth pangs of the Ubermertsch. It is a
necessary, and dangerous, passage the individual must journey through in
order to become the child as discussed in the "Three Metamorphoses" and
create himself. The great nausea is no less than the embracing of the void,
something not to be feared but to be welcomed as the next stage for
individual existence. Zarathustra cries, "Ah! You are coming—I hear you!
My abyss speaks, I have turned my ultimate depth into the light! Ah! Come
here! Give me your hand. . . nausea, nausea, nausea—woe is me!"45
Although nausea begins as a reactive impulse against the
loathsomeness of society and the masses, it ultimately becomes the
affirmation of individual existence. Nausea is capable of destroying the
impediments to individual self-creation, but it does not provide a structure
or any guidance to re-order the consciousness. Nietzsche is acutely aware of
the problems inherent in positive theory, and does not want to present a
scheme for ordering the consciousness that might degenerate into dogma.
Therefore, he articulates an alternative that is both individually-actuated
and not concretizable. This leads to the formation of an imperative for

44 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:21.
45Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:13.1-2.
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action that ultimately arises from Nietzsche's emphasis upon the primacy of
individual interpretation of existence: eternal recurrence.

m.
Nausea is not caused by die realization of the eternal recurrence: the
concept of the eternal return instead arises from the vacuum left by the
collapse of everyday systems of consolation.46 The articulation of the eternal
recurrence is a response to die realization of the inherent meaninglessness of
existence. Indeed, the overcoming of nausea and the realization of the
eternal recurrence is the principal precondition for the aesthetic ethics
capable of producing the Obennensch. This section will discuss the political
implication of the eternal recurrence for Nietzsche's project of individual
creation.
Importantly, Zarathustra does not come to the realization of the
eternal recurrence on his own. The eternal recurrence is instead articulated
first by his animal companions, the eagle and the serpent This has caused
some to interpret the eternal recurrence as not arising from within the self,
but rather as an external transcendental construct or metaphysical

46"Zarathustra cannot articulate recurrence because he is overcome by nausea, to be sure.
But remember Nietzsche's point that estimates of life are, in a very important sense, clues to
the estimator, insights into the being of the assessor. So if the thought of eternal recurrence
nauseates, as it does Zarathustra, that is because Zarathustra cannot will the eternal
recurrence of the moment without devaluing it, and hence life, in the extreme. That
Zarathustra must overcome his nausea is evidence of his decadence—recall Nietzsche's
pithy observation that to have to fight instinct is itself a symptom of decadence." Magnus,
N ietzsche's E xistentialImperative, 173.
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cosmology.47 However, Nietzsche's presentation of the animals as the
heralds of this knowledge is a further outgrowth of his interpretive
philosophy. Nietzsche constructs the narrative in this way for rhetorical
effect and to separate the reader from the text As Ansell-Pearson notes:
It is thus not Zarathustra but his animals who relate the final version
of doctrine of eternal return and who inform him that his downgoing is over and has reached its end. The reason for this, I would
argue, is that Zarathustra cannot himself declare that his down-going
is at an end because, in order for him to become what he is, we must
become those that we are too. In other words, his testing and
recognition is dependant on our testing and recognition.48
The animals do not represent exterior forces or entities. Rather, the
animals represent parts of Zarathustra's consciousness, analogous to the
unconscious.49 In this interpretation, die animals represent knowledge that
has been repressed by the conscious mind, which Nietzsche has argued is
largely a social creation.50 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the

47Heidegger is the most significant of these interpreters. Please see the appendix for an
extended discussion.
48 Ansell-Pearson, N ietzsche Contra Rousseau, 183.
49 " ... they symbolize the re-united powers which are to open the way to the New Agp."
Heinrich Zimmer, M yths and Symbols in Indian A it and C ivilization, ed. Joseph Campbell
(New York: Pantheon, 1963).
50"From the perspective of the principle which conditions it, the eternal return depends
upon a transmutation but, from the perspective of its unconditioned principle,
transmutation depends more profoundly on the eternal return
This is why Zarathustra
is always in an inferior position in relation to the eternal return and the Overman. He is the
cause of the eternal return, but a cause which delays producing its effect. A prophet who
hesitates to deliver his message, who knows the vertigo and the temptation of the negative,
who must be encouraged by his animals. Father of the Overman, but a father whose
products are ripe before he is ripe for his products, a lion who still lacks a final
metamorphosis, hi fact the eternal return and the Overman are at the crossing of two
genealogies, of two unequal genetic lines." Deleuze, N ietzsche and Philosophy, 192.
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animals are never present when other characters are present in the narrative.
The animals only appear when Zarathustra is alone, engaged in an internal
dialogue. When there are no other people around, either as objects of bad
conscience or seeking to impose their will, Zarathustra is able to listen to his
own instinctual knowledge that has been blocked by the repressive
metanarratives of society.
Thus, because we often ignore these parts of our consciousness in the
presence of others, it is only when the individual is stripped of the "all-toohuman" parts of the consciousness that the repressed features again appear,
represented by the animals. This cannot occur in die presence of others, in
Heideggerian terms, the chattering of das Man shuts out the internal voice.
51 Zarathustra himself is uneasy about hearing this repressed voice: "Thus I
spoke, and I spoke more and more softly: for I was afraid of my own
thoughts and reservations."52 The animals elaborate the eternal recurrence
as the expression of perpetual becoming; the validation of dance, play, and
masks, which Nietzsche argues are the very operation of the consciousness.

51 "In and through the eternal return negation as a quality of the will to power transmutes
itself into affirmation, it becomes an affirmation of negation itself, it becomes a power of
affirming, an affirmative power. This is what Nietzsche presents as Zarathustra's cure and
Dionysus' secret "Nihilism vanquished itself' thanks to the eternal return
It is no
linger a question of the simple thought of the eternal return eliminating from willing
everything that falls outside this thought but rather, of the eternal return making something
come into being which cannot do so without changing nature. It is no longer a question of
selective thought but of selective being; for the eternal return is being and being is
selection." Deleuze, N ietzsche and Philosophy, 71.
52Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:22.
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"Oh Zarathustra," said the animals then, "all things themselves dance
for those that think as we do: they come and offer their hand and
laugh and flee—and return. Everything goes, everything returns; the
wheel of existence rolls eternally. Everything dies, everything
blossoms anew; the year of existence runs eternally.. . . Existence
begins in every instant; the ball There rolls around every Here. The
middle is everywhere. The path of eternity is crooked."53
The awakening to the eternal recurrence is not therefore the
elaboration of a new cosmological scheme, it is even more profound. The
eternal recurrence is instead an anthropomorphic explanation of existence,
the highest expression of philosophical anthropology. As Magnus states:
The doctrine of eternal recurrence, in its principal sense, is offered as
Nietzsche's principle illustration of the attitude of Obermenschheit
It is the being-in-the-world of the Obermensch. I do not mean to say
that it is one possible attitude among many. It is the attitude
sim plidter Nietzsche wishes to portray as necessary to overcome
passive nihilism.54
The eternal recurrence is a validation of existence as it is perceived by
the concrete human mind, with all of its visionary and disconnected
elements. Through the embracing of the eternal recurrence, the individual is
disconnected from previous temporal perception, time ceases to have an
ontological or existential meaning:
What has happened to me? Listen! Has time flown away? Do I not
fall? Have I not fallen—listen! Into the well of eternity? What is
happening to me? Still! It is stinging me—alas—in the heart?. . .
When will you drink this drop of dew that has fallen upon all earthly
things—when will you drink this strange soul—when, well of

93 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:132.
54 Magnus, N ietzsche's ExistentialIm perative, 140.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

179
eternity! Serene and terrible noontide abyss! When will you drink
my soul back into yourself?55
The key metaphor within the "doctrine" of the eternal recurrence is
not the recurrence itself, but rather the concept of the "Moment"56 Through
the destruction of the traditional narrative of temporality, Nietzsche
articulates a new narrative of temporality centered solely upon the Moment
There is no other temporal category. "Behold this moment!. . . From this
gateway Moment a long, eternal lane runs back, an eternity lies behind u s...
. Must not all things that can happen have already happened, been done,
run past?"57
The eternal recurrence is therefore not of every concrete action,
choice, and event; but rather of this one Moment the eternal repetition of
the Now. It is a mistake of bad conscience to assign values to the past or
future, these are invalid temporal categories that distract the individual
from the only unit of time that exists: the Now.

55 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:10.
56"The one thing that casts no shadow is the moment, and it is the moment that is to be
affirmed in life, in what is as it is because it is, in the thought of the Eternal Return. In this
way, Nietzsche could explain that Zarathustra's ideal was an individual who saw flux and
death and birth and life—all as realities, as many realities, as the Real The only human
redemption possible must be attained through this aesthetic sight of the Real. This vision
teaches how one is to go under, and how one overcomes oneself, because it teaches the
ineluctability (it teaches the fierce creator's or artist's joy) of death in life. Yet. . . it would
be wrong to claim that the redemptive world- and life-affirming power of this thought is
meant for everyone." Babich, N ietzsche's Philosophy o fScience* 296.
57Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:2:2.
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And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this
moment draws after it all future things? Therefore—draws itself too?
For all things that can run m ust also run once again forward along
this long lane. . . must we not all have been here before. . . and must
we not return and run down that other lane out before us, down that
long, terrible lane—must we not return eternally?58
All things reoccur because all things are within the Moment This
assertion destroys the idea of Being. Everything is in flux, there is no such
thing as stable existence. Because time has no meaning outside of
perception, and the Moment is the only unit of time that can be concretely
perceived, past and future are illusion. The Moment as it eternally
reoccurs, must be eternally reinterpreted by the individual. This constant
interpretation leads to continuous change. There is no being, only
becoming. "Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally
and we ourselves with them

You teach that there is a great year of

Becoming, a colossus of a year this year must, like an hour-glass, turn itself
over again and again."59
Nietzsche's analysis of time is open to criticism if it is taken to be a
concrete view of temporality. Many Nietzsche interpreters, Heidegger and
Jaspers included, have taken the view that Nietzsche's espousal of the
eternal recurrence is a back-door attempt to introduce metaphysical or
transcendental elements into an essentially materialist philosophy.

58Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:2:2
59Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:13.2
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However, Nietzsche's concept of the eternal recurrence is not presented as
an actual model of the behavior of time.60 Nietzsche presents the eternal
recurrence in a metaphorical manner, likening it directly to die ancient
concept of the eternal chain of Being. The eternal recurrence is meant as an
illustrative device to induce a sense of reverence at each passing moment,
and to emphasize the importance of the present over the projections of past
and future.61
However, Nietzsche's concept of the eternal recurrence is problematic
as it clouds the distinction between Being and Becoming. If all that exists is
the Moment, then it is difficult to imply that becoming is predominant, as an
eternal Now implies a sense of stability or even stagnation. Further, without
projecting the self into the future or reflecting upon the past it is difficult to
conceive of the possibility of a project of self-overcoming. If all that exists is
the now, what is to be overcome?
These critiques ignore one of the essential precepts of Nietzsche's
philosophy. Nietzsche is not concerned with the distinction between Being
and Becoming because Nietzsche views it as a false dichotomy. Being is a

60"The analogy here is with Kant In this instance we are admonished to behave as i f
recurrence were true." Magnus, N ietzsche's ExistentialImperative, 140.
61" . . . Nietzsche appears to be committed to a form of naturalism whose basis is the belief
that humans are naAraZFykronophobic. We are kronophobes, despisere of time." Magnus,
N ietzsche's ExistentialImperative, 189. The elaboration of the eternal return by Nietzsche
is his constructive attempt to transcend this deep-seated antipathy towards the passing of
time. Heidegger argues that this antipathy is the underlying cause of ressentunent; but this
is incorrect See the appendix for an extended discussion.
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static concept which ignores the fundamental flux of existence. Indeed, the
category "Being" arose as a psychological necessity akin to the will-to-truth.
Nietzsche destroys traditional temporal categories because he wants to
emphasize the contingent nature of existence inherent in the concept of
becoming. In this sense, the metaphors of the eternal recurrence and
Becoming represent an active approach towards the passing of time rather
than the essentially reactive, static approach of teleology and the paean to
Being.
IV.
By centering his positive philosophy within the Moment, Nietzsche
makes an important and radical philosophical leap. Existence has no
meaning, no independent ontological status. Only the individual concrete
consciousness has any ontological status, as it perceives within the Moment
In this sense, the world is indeed interpretation, and it is completely so.
This is why it is only when Zarathustra is alone that he can realize the
eternal recurrence. This type of ontological leap simply cannot be made
within a societal context it must be willed through a process of selfovercoming, the first stage of which is die overcoming of nausea. Thus, the
announcement of the eternal return by the animals amounts to the final
acceptance of the nagging internal truth that most people repress. The
concrete individual will is all that exists; die world, society, history, even
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other people are all a sham.62 They all depend upon the individual's
perception in the Moment It is necessary to overcome all resistance to this
fundamental reality. As Ansell-Pearson argues:
This point on the eternal return can only be appreciated if it is
recognized that what is willed in the experience of return is no the
literal contents on the moment but the very momentariness of the
moment, that is, time's desire and time's perishing. This notion of the
"same" in the thought of the eternal return provides the criterion for
judging whether one's actions are motivated by innocence and
forgetfulness or by guilt and revenge. As a thought-experiment, the
eternal return asks us how well-disposed towards life we would have
to feel in order to desire nothing more passionately and intensely
than its eternal confirmation and seal.63
This knowledge is exceptionally dangerous. The ethical implications
of the recognition of the full implications of the eternal return are
momentous. In the Genealogy o f Morality, Nietzsche identifies the
overcoming of the great nausea as a pivotal event for humanity, through
which humanity may will its own destruction:
What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any
other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but
profound nausea; also not great fear but great pity. Suppose these
two were to some day unite, they would inevitably give rise to the
uncanniest monsters: the "last will" of man, his will to nothingness,
nihilism.64

62"Zarathustra invited human beings to reflect on good and evil so that they come to know
and will that which has formed them, instead of accepting it as a blind fate and a dreadful
chance over which they have no control. They must be taught to overcome even that which
they feel mot impotent in the face of, and which they can only rage in anger and frustration
against: the past" Ansell-Pearson, N ietzsche Contra Rousseau, 172.
63 Ansell-Pearson, N ietzsche Contra Rousseau, 173.
64Nietzsche, Genealogy o fM orality, 111:14.
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Nietzsche's implication is that this knowledge is too dangerous for
the whole of humanity, it can only be appreciated by the individual who has
conquered nausea. By embracing this instinctual knowledge there is a
foundation upon which it is possible to create a new self through a process
which is inner-directed and not based in collective narratives. As Bemd
Magnus has argued, the eternal recurrence offers a metaphor for the
abandonment of the illusion of progress and the embracing of a new
existential imperative. The new task at hand is the struggle to order the
disparate elements of the consciousness illuminated through the
confrontation with nausea into a dynamic, integrated self.
The first step along this journey is to embrace the eternal recurrence
as a guide for action. It is necessary to live properly in the Moment, as it is
indeed the fullness of time. The embracing of the Moment destroys the
need for metaphysical consolation and provides the existential courage
necessary to live in a meaningless universe. "Courage, however, is the best
destroyer, courage that attacks: it destroys even death, for it says: 'Was that
life? Well then! Once more!' But there is a great triumphant shout in such a
saying. He who has ears to hear, let him hear."65
The governing psychological imperative behind die attitude of the
Obermensch is the inclination towards life as expressed in the doctrine of

65 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:2.1.
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the eternal return. The recurrence of everything, including the smallest
things, seems at first impossible for Zarathustra to accept The return is
exactly the same—not that the best part returns or that all except the worst
returns, but all returns—this is difficult for Zarathustra to acknowledge.
The recurrence of the men farthest removed from the overman especially
troubles Zarathustra, and he becomes nauseous. "All too small, even the
greatest man!—that was my disgust at man! And the eternal return of the
smallest man!—that was my disgust at all existence!"66 How is man to be
overcome if he returns eternally? Nevertheless, Zarathustra eventually
accepts the doctrine of eternal return of these small men without nausea,
seeing the promise of affirmation of one's life. "But joys all want eternity—
Want deep profound eternity."67
The doctrine of eternal recurrence offers an interesting perspective on
the idea of progress. In a cyclical existence, no final forms can be attained or
retained, everything is in a state of flux "O my soul, I have taught you to
say 'today' as 'one upon a time' and 'formerly,' and to dance your measure
over every Here and There and Yonder."68 The perspective offered by the
eternal return teaches that there is no need for regret or anxiety; die moment
is all that is meaningful. "Oh, how could I not be ardent for eternity, for die
66 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 01:13.2.
67Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 01:15.3.
68 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 01:14.
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marriage ring of rings—the ring of the return? . . . For I love you, O
eternity!"69
In this view, eternal recurrence is a metaphor, intending to urge the
reader to live his life as if it will repeat eternally. There is textual evidence
to support this interpretation. "Courage, however, is the best slayer,
courage which attacks: it slays even death itself; for it says:' Was that life?
Well! Once more.'"70 In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche refers to the eternal return as
the "highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable."71 In The Science
o f Joy, Nietzsche offers an especially revealing example of how the eternal
return could be employed as a principle of affirmation.
What, if some day or night a demon were t o . . . say to you: "This life
as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more
and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in i t . . .
The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and
again, and you with it, speck of dust!" Would you not throw yourself
down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus?
Or have you one experienced a tremendous moment when you
would have answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard
anything more divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it
would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in
each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and
innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the
greatest weight Or how well disposed would you have to become to
yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate
eternal confirmation and seal?72

69 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 01:163.
70 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 01:2.1.
71 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 751.
72Friedrich Nietzsche, The Science o fJoy, § 341.
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The imperative of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence therefore is to
carefully examine one's actions and abandon ideas of progress. The eternal
return is a doctrine of immanence, not transcendence. The commandment
of Nietzsche's imperative is to seize the moment and take joy in existence.
Thus, the doctrine of eternal return is a central, guiding metaphor of
Nietzsche's politics of the self. Rather than concern for humanity as a whole
or the contemplation of "the good" of the community, Nietzsche's
Obermensch is concerned with his own life and the perfection of it As
Deleuze notes:
As an ethical thought the eternal return is the new formulation of the
practical synthesis: whateveryou will, w ill it in such a way thatyou
also w ill its eternal return . . . Laziness, stupidity, baseness,
cowardice or spitefulness that would will its own eternal return
would no longer be the same laziness, stupidity, etc. How does
eternal return perform the selection here? It is the thought of the
eternal return that selects. It makes willing something whole. The
thought of the eternal return eliminates from willing everything
which falls outside the eternal return, it makes willing a creation, it
brings about the equation "willing = creating".73
Through the embracing of the Moment and the eternal recurrence,
Zarathustra's original social nausea is addressed. Although the rabble are
ontologically equal to the exceptional individual, they are not existentially
equal. The essential difference is action. The exceptional individual,
spurred by nausea, becomes a creative force separated from ressentiment

73Deleuze, N ietzsche and Philosophy, 68-69.
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and societal bad conscience. Nausea has redeemed the individual by
separating him from the masses and preparing him for the project of
transmutation. The exceptional individual is no longer "all-too-human," but
the process of overcoming has only begun. "I am a railing beside the
stream: he who can grasp me, let him grasp me! I am not, however, your
crutch."74

74 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:6.
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C hapter V I
T h e Ethics o f A bsurdity

It follows from Nietzsche's argument thus far that once nausea has
been confronted and the nature of the universe is called into question there
can be no possibility of either teaching or even sharing in the quest for self.
Rather, there is a need to concentrate upon the individual self outside of any
collective context Unlike Nietzsche's analysis of nausea, the discussion of
self-overcoming and self-creation occurs in several places within the
narrative, generally arising after criticism of collective existence.
Nietzsche seems to have a relatively coherent theory of the authentic
individual selfhood, however this project is far from clearly defined.
Zarathustra himself asks in desperation, "for what, then, is it—high time?"1
Without doubt it is a project arising from within the self; an individual
imperative:
Thus in symbols everything called to me: "it is time!" But I—did not
hear: until at last my abyss stirred and my thought bit m e Alas,
abysmal thought that is my thought! When shall I find the strength
to hear you boring and no longer tremble? My heart rises to my
throat when I hear you boring! Even your silence threatens to choke
me, you abysmal, silent thought!2
Nietzsche does not delineate a formula for self-overcoming, this
would be nothing more than the creation of a new dogma to supplant the

1Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:18.
2Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:3.
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old. However, Nietzsche offers several important points concerning the
problems underlying the project of self-overcoming that must be addressed
by individuals.
First, it is necessary to recognize that individuals begin as sociallycreated beings. "Peoples were the creators at first; only later were
individuals creators. Indeed, the individual himself is still the latest
creation."3 For Nietzsche, the herd creature is not properly an individual,
rather part of a group identity. As seen in his discussion of nausea, it is only
through the confrontation with finitude that the individual is created, and
even then this process is far from certain. Society actively seeks to repress
individuation, as this necessarily frustrates group identities and threatens
the stability of the herd: "Joy in the herd is older than joy in the Ego: and as
long as the good conscience is called herd, only the bad conscience says: "I".
Truly, the cunning, loveless Ego. . . that is not the origin of the herd, but die
herd's destruction."4
Nietzsche argues that these herd creatures are not true individuals;
indeed this social creature is not properly human: "is there not still
lacking—humanity itself?"5 Individuals within the social matrix have
repressed their will-to-power to such an extent that they have become the
3 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
4 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
5 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
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perfect expressions of bad conscience and self-loathing. Unable to express
their own inclinations and overcome themselves, they fall too easily into the
traps examined earlier
These are the dreadful creatures who carry a beast of prey around
within them, and have no choice except lusts or self-mortification___
They have not yet even become men, these dreadful creatures.. . .
These are the consumptives of the soul: they are hardly bom before
they begin to die and to long for doctrines of weariness and
renunciation.6
It is the pitiful state of humanity that causes Nietzsche to condemn
mass society in the strongest possible terms: "the earth. . . has a skin: and
this skin has diseases. One of these diseases, for example, is called 'Man'."7
Nietzsche's main complaint is that people within collective existence
become intellectually lazy and refuse to ask questions concerning their own
existential and ontological status. Without provocation, it never even occurs
to herd individuals to ask whether they have achieved their potential:
Have you ever spoken thus? Have you ever cried thus? Ah, had I
only heard you crying thus! It is not your sin, but your moderation
that cries to heaven, your very meanness in sinning cries to heaven!
Where is the lightning to lick you with its tongue? Where is the
madness, with which you should be cleansed? Behold, I teach you
the Ubermensch he is this lightning, he is this madness!8

6Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:9.
7 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:18.
8Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3. Lightning and madness are metaphors for Dionysian
ecstasy.
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Nietzsche's positive theory as contained in Zarathustra is an attempt
to delineate the conditions necessary for this transformation of herd creature
to self-creating individual. Nietzsche, however, does not articulate this in
terms of a political theory of collective existence. It is also clear that
Nietzsche does not call for a new ethics in the classical sense of a method of
living with others. Indeed, he explicitly recognizes that all ethical systems
are no more than sets of rationalizations for the mediocrity of mass culture.
Nietzsche's call is to the individual to create a new aesthetic ethics
based upon resistance to these social norms and centering upon self
overcoming. Nietzsche's aesthetic ethics is therefore necessarily
revolutionary and individualistic. In order for this process to begin,
Nietzsche argues that it is necessary to retreat into solitude so as to
overcome the socially-created elements within the self.
L
This call to solitude is not easily accepted by the collective.9 For a
society grounded in normalization and group identity, separation represents
the ultimate rebellion against authority. "He who seeks may easily get lost

9 Indeed, Nietzsche emphasizes in his reevaluation of Zarathustra that the tum to solitude
is the most important theme of this work. "My whole Zarathustra is a dithyramb on
solitude or, if I have been understood, on cleanliness.—Fortunately not on pure
foolishness—Those who have eyes for colors will compare it to a diamonds—Nausea over
man, over the 'rabble/ was always my greatest danger.—Do you want to hear the words in
which Zarathustra speaks of the redem ption from nausea?" Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 1:8.
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himself. It is a crime to go apart and be alone"—thus speaks the herd."10
Indeed, group identities are so ingrained that the individual who actively
seeks to separate from the herd experiences feelings of guilt "The voice of
the herd will still ring within you. And when you say: 'We have no longer
the same conscience, you and I', it will be a lament and a grief. For see, it is
still this same conscience that causes your grief: and the last glimmer of this
conscience still glows in your affliction."11 However, once nausea is
confronted the act of separation becomes a necessity, as the individual
realizes that adhering to a morality and political state that causes the self to
wither away is in the individual's worst interest12
The individual must begin the process of self-exploration, necessarily
a dangerous task. Because of the inevitable power relations that form in any
collective context Nietzsche emphasizes that this project can only begin in
solitude. Furthermore, Nietzsche emphasizes that it is only in solitude that
nausea can ultimately be overcome without backsliding into metaphysical
solace. "How did I free myself from nausea?. . . Did my nausea itself create
wings and water-divining powers for me? Truly, I had to fly to the most

10Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
11 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
12"Instinctively to choose what is harmful for oneself, to feel attracted by 'disinterested'
motives, that is virtually the formula of Dekadenz.” Nietzsche, The Tw ilighto fthe Idols,
9:35.
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extreme height to find again the fountain of delight!. . . And here there is
life at which no rabble drinks with me!"13
The separation of the individual from society is therefore the first
step towards self-overcoming. It is the socially-created parts of die self that
must be overcome first, as these are inculcated from the cradle and
reinforced by the institutions of collective existence. Because of this, the
individual is unknown even to himself:
And truly, to learn to love oneself is no commandment for today or
tomorrow. Rather is this art the finest subtlest; ultimate, and most
patient of all. For all his possessions are well concealed from the
possessor; and of all treasure pits, one's own is the last to be dug---Almost in the cradle we are presented with heavy words and values:
this dowry calls itself "good" and "evil". For its sake we are forgiven
for being alive.14
It is necessary for the individual to seek solitude to differentiate the
elements of the consciousness that are socially-created repressive
mechanisms from the healthy instincts and drives that constitute the
genuine self. In essence, the individual must deconstruct the self to reveal
the multiple and conflicting identities that constitute die consciousness.
Nietzsche emphasizes that this process is not a reactive one, but is instead a
creative process arising from die vacuum left by the overcoming of nausea
and the need for a self-actuated identity.

13 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:6.
14Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:11.
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You must be ready to bum yourself in your own flame: how could
you become new, if you had not first become ashes? Solitary man,
you are going the way of your creator you want to create yourself a
god from your seven devils! Solitary man, you are going the way of
the lover you love yourself and for that reason you despise yourself
as only lovers can despise. The lover wants to create, because he
despises!15
Nietzsche argues that the movement into solitude represents no less
than the return to the care for the self. In Zarathustra, Nietzsche treats
solitude as a companion, which was abandoned and must be regained. The
return to solitude is an existential necessity for the exceptional individual.
O solitude! Solitude, my home. . . . Now shake your finger at me as
mothers do, now smile at me as mothers smile, now say. . . "Who
departing cried: I have sat too long with Solitude, I have unlearned
how to be silent! You have surely learned that—now? O
Zarathustra, I know all: and that you were lonelier among the crowd,
you solitary, than you ever were with me . . . loneliness is one thing,
solitude another."16
Unlike the noise found in collective existence, solitude and reflection
upon the self allows for uncontaminated insight "Solitude, my home! How
blissfully and tenderly does your voice speak to me! We do not question
one another, we do not complain to one another, we go together through
open doors. For with you all is open and dear; and here even the hours run
on lighter feet"17 Paradoxically, Nietzsche's greatest ethical imperative is
that in order for the individual to reach his potential, it is necessary to be
15Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
16Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IH9.
17Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1%
existentially self-sufficient "Go apart and be alone with your love and your
creating."18
Solitude and self-reflection lead to the only valid philosophical
insight available: the internal manifestations of the will-to-power as it is
constantly interpreted by and within the individual self. The internal
conversation of these manifestations lead to a healthy understanding of
individual existence in all of its mutability. Nietzsche emphasizes that this
type of knowledge can only be gained outside of a collective context "Here
[in solitude], the words and word-chests of all existence spring open to me:
all existence here wants to become words, all becoming here wants to learn
speech horn me. Down there, however—all speech is in vain! There best
wisdom is to forget and pass by."19 Solitude therefore represents the best
environment for the individual to seek knowledge of the self. "So let us live
above them like strong winds, neighbors of eagles . . . neighbors of the sun:
that is how strong winds live."20
Solitude calls for a great degree of self-direction, and is not to be
undertaken by the faint of heart "I make for my own goal, I go my way; I

18Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
19 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:9.
2° Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:6.
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shall leap over the hesitating and the indolent"21 The individual must have
a deep commitment to self-overcoming, as it necessarily entails isolation and
suffering. "But do you want to go the way to your affliction, which is the
way to yourself? If so, show me your strength for it and your right to it!
Are you a new strength and a new right? A first motion? A self-propelling
wheel? Can you also compel stars to revolve around you?"22
The exigencies of solitude dictate a new ethics centered on the self.
Indeed, Nietzsche argues that the care for the self is to be the new goal for
human life, beyond any other concerns. "Ah, my friends! That your Self be
in the action, as the mother is in the child: let that be your maxim of
virtue!"23 However it begins, self-overcoming is a protean task, without
prototype. It is also necessarily a process, not an event As Nietzsche writes,
"this, however, is my teaching: He who wants to learn to fly one day must
first learn to stand and to walk and to run and to climb and to dance—you
cannot learn to fly by flying."24 Self-overcoming is not a process that can be
defined or described as it arises from essentially unique internal experiences
and the individual manifestations of the will-to-power. However, Nietzsche

21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §9.
22Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
23 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:5.
24

Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:11.
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consistently argues that the diverse paths to self-overcoming can only be
realized apart from others, who merely cloud perspectives:
I came to my truth by diverse paths and in diverse ways: it was not
upon a single ladder that I climbed to the height where my eyes
survey my distances. And I have asked the way only unwillingly—
that has always offended my taste! I have rather questioned and
attempted the ways themselves. All my progress has been an
attempting and a questioning—and truly, one has to leam how to
answer such questioning!25
The return to solitude, therefore, represents the full-circle of
Zarathustra's journey. With nausea confronted and solitude regained, the
process of self-overcoming can now begin in earnest Nietzsche's language
echoes that of the beginning of the narrative, in which Zarathusfra goes
down to men. After the confrontation with nausea, Zarathustra realizes that
he must do down into himself. "I stand before my highest mountain and
my longest wandering: therefore I must first descend deeper than I have
ever descended—deeper into pain than I have ever descended, down to its
blackest stream!"26 This type of self-examination is inimical to social
existence, which seeks to impose socially-sanctioned identities on
individuals and suppresses the desire to question and explore. The
individual must revalue his interpretation of existence to affirm the self

25 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:11.
26Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1. hi order to progress further, Zarathustra must delve further
into his unconscious self.
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rather than to repress individual identity. This calls for a degree of focus
that can only occur outside of the distraction of others:
One must learn to love oneself with a sound and healthy love, so that
one may endure it with oneself and not go roaming about—thus do I
teach. Such roaming about calls itself "love of one's neighbor": these
words have been up to now the best for lying and dissembling, and
especially for those who were oppressive to everybody.27
Nietzsche does not deny the difficulty of separation and the pain of
self-examination. Indeed, Zarathustra affirms that the critique of the self is
much more excruciating than the critiques of collective existence.
Nevertheless, the exceptional individual must embrace this pain as leading
to the possibility of the transmuted self that is the ultimate goal of self
overcoming. "Alas, I have to climb my most difficult path! Alas, I have
started upon my loneliest wandering! But a man of my sort does not avoid
such an hour the hour that says to him: 'Only now so you tread your path
of greatness! Summit and abyss—they are now united in one!"'28
Nietzsche's description of the return to solitude emphasizes patience.
The individual, long oppressed by external forces, must await the return of
ffie authentic self. 'Truly, I too have learned to wait, I have learned it from
the very heart, but only to wait for myself. And above all I have learned to
stand and to walk and to run and to jump and to climb and to dance."29

27Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:11.
28Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1.
29Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IILll.
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Essentially, the return to solitude is the return to the self, finally free of
collective identities and external mechanisms of repression. "It is returning,
at last it is coming home to me—my own Self and those parts of it that have
long been abroad and scattered among all things and accidents

I stand

now before my last summit and before the deed that has been deferred the
longest"30
Is this not the type of solipsism of which Nietzsche is always
accused? Nietzsche has Zarathustra return to his cave, a reversal of Plato's
cave myth and an implicit critique of Plato's Republic. For Zarathustra,
truth is found inside of the cave, not outside. Furthermore, the philosopher
does not return into the cave to educate others to the truth; he flees others in
order to avoid their pollution of his own truth. Zarathustra reflects upon his
time with men in terms of disgust "I sat among them disguised, ready to
misunderstand m yselfso that I might endure them, and glad to tell myself:
'You fool, you do not know men'."31 For Nietzsche, one should not come to
know men; this is an avoidance of the task at hand. The rabble, not
possessing their own authentic identities, represent only a semblance of
humanity. As such, the seeking individual is forced to mask himself against
the ressentimentof die masses. "And do I not have to hide myself, like one

30 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1.
31 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ni:9.
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who has swallowed gold, so that my soul shall not be slit open? Do I not
have to wear stilts, so that they may not notice m.y long legs—all these
envious and injurious people around me?"32
It is telling that Nietzsche consistently uses the language of ascent
when referring to solitude, as the removal of the Other is the beginning of
self-overcoming and the creation of an authentic selfhood. "When I am
aloft, I always find myself alone. No one speaks to me, the frost of solitude
makes me tremble."33 The descent to men represents Zarathustra's error,
which is redeemed through his return to solitude. Nietzsche concludes that
it is only in solitude that the individual can begin the process of organizing
the self along the lines of the will-to-power. However, it is necessary to
examine the individual's motive for seeking solitude. It must not be a
retreat, but rather an active and positive decision. "For one person, solitude
is the escape of an invalid; for another, solitude is escape from the
invalids."34 However this process of self-overcoming begins, Nietzsche is
imperative that it must take place. "There are diverse paths and ways to
overcoming: just look to it!"35 The reason that it is so imperative that the
individual seek solitude is to become free of the noise of others, so as to
32Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:6.
33 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
34 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IIL6.
35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

202
listen to the voices of the self: "Life wants to raise itself on high with pillars
and steps; it wants to gaze into the far distance and out upon joyful
splendor—that is why it needs height. . . Life wants to climb and in
climbing overcome itself."36
IL
Through the call to solitude, Nietzsche urges that the individual must
revalue the will-to-truth as the will-to-self. Both of these are manifestations
of the will-to-power, but they are antithetical. The will-to-truth is a
repressive societal impulse, while the will-to-self is a validation of the
individual self as the signifier of authentic identity. Nietzsche argues that
the view of the self as a discrete subject is a dangerous philosophical error
that arises from an interpretation of the individual consciousness distorted
by a prejudice towards consistency. The will-to-truth, representative of the
impulse to concretize reality, has extended to the analysis of the individual,
implying a stability to the human psyche. However, Nietzsche's concept of
the will runs counter to this traditional view. Haar notes:
What the individual calls his "will" is a plurality of instincts and
impulses in constant battle with one another to gain the upper hand.
.. what language designates by the word "will" is in reality only a
complex and belated feeling, which accompanies the victory of one
impulse over others, or the translation into conscious terms of the
temporary state of equilibrium that has obtained among the
competing impulses.37
36 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:7.
37Haar, N ietzsche and M etaphysics, 6-7.
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The will, as the primary constituent of the human self, cannot be
understood as an element of a stable consciousness. This is because die will
is active; it is constantly extended to both the internal and external realms.
As such, it defies the stability imputed to it by traditional philosophical and
psychological theories. The will is not quantifiable; it is the essence of
change. For Nietzsche, therefore, freedom is understood as the act of
willing.
All feeling suffers in me and is in prison: but my willing always
comes to me as my liberator and bringer of joy. Willing liberates: that
is the true doctrine of will and freedom
In knowing and
understanding, too, I feel only my will's delight in begetting and
becoming; and if there be innocence in my knowledge it is because
will to begetting is in it38
The will is the essence of activity and the opposite of reaction.
"Willing liberates: for willing is creating: thus I teach. And you should learn
only for creating!"39 Freedom is therefore creation, understood as an act of
will. The very essence of creation is change, and the self must necessarily be
understood as under perpetual transformation. In this sense, it is
impossible to speak of the self as a discrete subject or identifiable identity.
Self-overcoming, in its most fundamental sense, is the recognition
that there is no self, rather what we falsely identify as the discrete self is a

38 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
39Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:12.16.
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constant flux of impulses, perspectives, and interpretations. The desire for
stability within the self is the last vestige and die most fundamental
manifestation of the impulse toward concretization, as has become
evidenced by the victory of the will-to-truth. Nietzsche calls for selfovercoming in the sense of the return to a healthy interpretation as the self
as the site for creation through the exercise of the will-to-power.40
Individuals liberated from the tyranny of morality and custom
through the realization of solitude must resist the impulse to stability The
will is necessarily mutable, and this fickleness must be accepted and
embraced. Indeed, the desire to concretize the self as a fixed identity is the
symptom of a reactive herd mentality. Morrison notes, "the real battle for
power is within the individual. As Nietzsche says man is a war, which is a
'war within oneself, and the basic weapons in this war are "self-control

40"Selbstilberwingdung or 'self-overcoming' is related to Nietzsche's other notions of
Sublimierung or 'sublimation', Vergeistigung or 'spiritualization' and SeibstaufhebungA ufhebung being a term that defies translation by a single English word: as Kaufmarm
observes, Nietzsche uses it with its Hegelian sense in mind of a dialectical process involving
' a simultaneous preserving, canceling, and lifting up.' However, in Nietzsche's usage the
lifting-up is not necessarily to something higher. Unlike Hegel's Geist, whose dialectical
movement is progressive and hierarchical, Nietzsche's basic force, the will to power—at
least when human consciousness enters the process—can degenerate: man has evolved
from the ape, but may also degenerate back into the ape." "Nietzsche says that the 'ta sk o f
wakefulness itse lf, and that to this end the practices of self-observation and 'Learning to
sed would be necessary foundations
What Nietzsche calls his 'immediate urgent task',
is the task of applying self-observation as a means of developing a measured and sustained
critical awareness of what is actually happening within and without, as well as being a
means of restraining and overcoming the unruly passion, such as 'w rath. .. choler...
revengefulness. .. lusts', in order to 'prevent their becoming devastating torrents.' It is
only then that one can 'sowthe seeds of good spiritual works in the soil of the subdued
passions.'" Morrison, N ietzsche and Buddhism, 157-158.
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[and] self-outwitting."'41 Self-overcoming thus entails a recognition of the
plurality of the consciousness and the futility of either finding or creating a
stable ego.
The existence of disparate elements within the self has been
recognized since Plato. However, the method by which these elements are
ordered or integrated has greatly differed. The ancient view of the self,
typified by Plato and Aristotle, emphasized the existence of rational and
irrational elements within the soul. These elements were organized by the
faculty of reason. The Christian model emphasized the incomplete nature of
the self, and relied upon the intervention of the divine to order the self
correctly and prevent the rule of sinful impulses. The Enlightenment
attempted to synthesize these models into a model of reasoned self-interest
in which humans were seen as flawed in their selfish behavior, but
ultimately capable of redemption through the correct application of reason
and positive law.
All of these schemes call for the destruction of the individual will
through the release of the self to either divine will or perfect reason. The self
is seen as somehow flawed as it resists stability and defies order. For
Nietzsche, the denial of the unstable nature of the self is actually a denial of
the only stable element of human nature: change. This leads to repression of

41 Morrison, Nietzsche and Buddhism, 171.
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perfectly natural elements of the consciousness that are inimical to order
and reason. The "irrational" parts of the self are repressed rather than being
confronted and understood for what they are. In addition, the will is seen as
suspect as it is not innately rational and proceeds under the auspices of self
actuation rather than on behalf of reason or divine imperatives. Because the
self is surrendered to the control of an outside signifier, this is not an
authentic interpretation of selfhood. "Good men never tell the truth, to be
good in that way is a sickness of spirit They yield, these good men, they
acquiesce, their hearts imitate, they obey from the heart but he who obeys
does not listen to himself.”*2 An authentic perspective of the self does not
give in to these external signifiers to alleviate the anxiety that arises from the
realization of the unstable self. It is necessary to resist the urge to concretize
the self and to recognize this impulse for the escapism that it represents:
Genuine—that is what I call him who goes into godforsaken deserts
and has broken his venerating heart In the yellow sand and burned
by the sun, perhaps he blinks thirstily at the islands filled with
springs where living creatures rest beneath shady trees. But his thirst
does not persuade him to become like these comfortable creatures: for
where there are oases there are also idols.43
For Nietzsche, elements are not automatically privileged, but are
ranked through experimentation and the aesthetic sense. The creation of

42 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:12.7.
43Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

207
the self is the ultimate expression of action, and it is to be undertaken from a
position of strength. As Morrison notes:
Nietzsche concludes that: "the wish to preserve oneself is a condition
of distress" and those motivated by such are, according to his
premise, the "weak" not the "strong". Nietzsche's "strong"—the
"lucky hits", "geniuses", etc.—are always singular and rare and
embody a fuller expression of his notion of life than those who
surround them. They are the "sovereign individuals. . . liberated. . .
from the morality of custom" [i.e. the group's mores], who are
"autonomous" and "independents and who "aspire after a secret
citadel where [they are]. . . set free from the crowd, the many, the
majority". For them life itself is art they are both artist and the work
of art «
The parts of the consciousness are ultimately ordered through the
will; However in keeping with this aesthetic sense this ordering is not
necessarily consistent "Every soul is a world of its ow n. . . appearance lies
most beautifully among the most alike; for the smallest gap is the most
difficult to bridge. For me —how could there be an outside-of-me? There is
no outside!"45 Nietzsche therefore offers the view that the individual
consciousness is the site of "reality," not an independent reason or a
concrete world. Nietzsche argues that all of reality is interpretation,
including the internal self. Therefore, one cannot become complacent with
the self; it must be remade constantly or the individual will succumb to
stagnation and Dekadenz,

44 Morrison, N ietzsche and Buddhism, 85.
45Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:13.2
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But you behave in all things in too familiar a way with the spirit; and
you have made of wisdom a poorhouse and hospital for bad poets.
You are no eagles: so neither do you know the spirit's joy in terror.
And he who is not a bird shall not make his home above abysses.46
Zarathustra withdraws from humanity in order to accomplish this
reevaluation and reinterpretation of the self. Away from distractions that
tend to pigeonhole the individual, it is possible to analyze the most essential
characteristic of the creative personality, the will. "So that no one might see
down into my profundity and ultimate w ill—that is why I devised my long,
luminous silence."47 Nietzsche's ethical project is centered upon redeeming
the will from a reactive enslavement to custom and morality into an
affirmative will arising from an aesthetic ethos of creation. "To redeem that
past of mankind and to transform every 'it was', until the will says: 'But I
willed it thus! So shall I will i f —this did I call redemption."48
The creative individual must realign the will according to the goal of
self-overcoming and self-interpretation, entailing a great deal of psychic
pain. "This is the will of those of noble soul: they desire nothing gratis, least
of all life. He who is of the mob wants to live gratis; we others, however, to
whom life has given itself—we are always considering what we can give life

46 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:8.
47 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:6.
48 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:123.
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in return1."*9 This partially arises from the fact that the self must be
continuously overcome, there is no end to this project The desire for an
endpoint to self-overcoming is a symptom of Dekadenz. "Oh my Will! My
essential, my necessity, dispeller of need! Preserve me from all petty
victories!"50 It is necessary for the individual to acknowledge the ultimate
impossibility of complete self-overcoming. This allows the individual to
escape the trap of ressentiment against the self through regret and grief over
lost time:
Willing liberates: but what is it that fastens in fetters even the
liberator? "It was": that is what the will's teeth-gnashing and most
lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been
done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past The will cannot
will backwards; that it cannot break time and time's desire—that is
the will's most lonely affliction.51
Nietzsche argues that will-to-power is the essential characteristic of
all living existence. "Only where life is, there is also will: not will-to-life, but
. . . will-to-power! The living creature values many things higher than life
itself; yet out of this evaluation itself speaks—the will-to-power!"52
However, individuals are ranked by Nietzsche according to the purpose for
which they employ the will, and to what conscious effect It is true that the

49 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:123.
30 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1230.
51 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:20.
52 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
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individual is largely a prisoner of factors beyond its control; it is sociallycreated and historically defined. Nietzsche is not naive enough to argue
that all societal mechanisms can be overcome. However, the individual is
able to become conscious of the primacy of the will and act accordingly.
I know how to speak the parable of the highest things only in the
dance—and now my greatest parable has remained in my limbs
unspoken! My highest hope has remained unspoken and
unachieved! And all the visions and consolations of my youth are
dead! How did I endure it? How did I recover from such wounds,
how did I overcome them? How did my soul arise again from these
graves? Yes, something invulnerable, unburiable is within me,
something that rends rocks: it is called m y Will. Silently it steps
unchanging through the years. It shall go its course upon my feet,
my old Will; hard of heart and invulnerable is its temper.53
The primacy of the will is therefore the most fundamental necessity
for self-overcoming. Through the emphasis upon the individual will,
Nietzsche argues that the individual will be able to resist normalizing
mechanisms, as these are recognized as external and contrived. "Yes, you
are still my destroyer of graves: Hail, my Will! And only where there are
graves are there resurrections."54 In this sense, the will acts as a counteragent to repression and offers a healthier mode for interpreting the world:
Will to the conceivability of being: that is what /call your will! You
first want to make all being conceivable: for, with a healthy mistrust,
you doubt whether it is in fact conceivable. But it must bend and
accommodate itself to you! Thus will your will have it It must
become smooth and subject to your mind as the mind's mirror and
reflection. That is your entire will, you wisest men; it is a will-to53 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:11.
54 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

211
power; and that is so even when you talk of good and evil and of the
assessment of values.55
One of the most destructive impulses in humanity is the desire for
comfort and freedom from doubt related to the desire for stability. The
exceptional individual, consciously willing self-overcoming, must move
beyond this impulse towards confrontation with discomfort and tragedy.
"For enjoyment and innocence are the most modest things: neither want to
be looked for. Once should ha ve them—but one should look rather for guilt
and pain!"56 Through the realignment of the self around the will-to-power,
the principle of multiplicity is affirmed. This sets the stage for the
transmutation of the self from the contemplation of its essential fluidity.
"Truly, like the sun do I love life and all deep seas. And this /call
knowledge: all that is deep shall rise up—to my height!"57
Self-overcoming under the auspices of the will-to-power is without
doubt a radical departure from traditional theories of selfhood. Nietzsche
can be criticized for advocating this radical project without providing any
clear-cut directives or even the semblance of a goal. However, Nietzsche
goes on to propose a theory of self-creation that reemphasizes the essential
fluidity of die self while offering an interpretive frame to guide die

55 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
56 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:125.
57 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:15.
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individual. Following Nietzsche's interpretive philosophy, this theory
centers on the aesthetic manifestation of the will-to-power. "Have you
never seen a sail faring over the sea, rounded and swelling and shuddering
before the impetuosity of the wind? Like a sail, shuddering before the
impetuosity of the spirit, my wisdom fares over the sea—my untamed
wisdom!"58

m.
Because creation is inherent in both self-overcoming and self
creation, the authentic self is an aesthetic interpretation of the will-to-power
as manifested in the individual. Since the will-to-power is the most
fundamental facet of human existence, Nietzsche's theory of the self calls for
an active reinterpretation of the competing drives within the self while
maintaining its plurality. Schutte notes:
Nietzsche's idea of self-overcoming is aesthetic rather than moral. It
sees the drive for perfection as a drive toward integration and
wholeness, not as a moralistic and judgmental effort to be perfect in
order to accumulate rewards for oneself or to acquire power for
oneself to reward or punish others.59
The complicated notion of the self as an autocreated work of art will
be the subject of the next chapter. However, it is first necessary to connect
Nietzsche's concept of the will-to-power with aesthetic interpretation. First,
Nietzsche praises all forms of artistic expression as creative acts of will. The
58 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL8.
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will channels formlessness into a precisely willed constellation which is the
active expression of the consciousness. Camus argues: "Nietzsche's message
is summed up in the word creation, with the ambiguous meaning it has
assumed

The transmutation of values consists only in replacing critical

values by creative values."60 As such, artistic expression is a direct
manifestation of the will-to-power. The product of art, and indeed of any
creative action, is therefore a manifestation of the will-to-power. Nietzsche
writes: "Where is beauty? Where I have to wiZ/with all my will; where I
want to love and perish, that an image may not remain merely an image."61
Secondly, Nietzsche views artistic creation as indicative of the
struggle fundamental to all existence. The act of creation is one that is
necessarily destructive. "A change in values—that means a change in the
creators of values. He who has to be a creator always has to destroy."62
Creation is essentially revaluation, the universe is reinterpreted according to
the individual's expression of will. "Evaluation is creation: hear it, you
creative men! Valuating is itself the value and jewel of all valued things.
Only through evaluation is there value: and without evaluation the nut of

59Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism : N ietzsche w ithoutMasks, 34.
60 Albeit Camus, The Rebel:An Essay on Man in R evolt 74.
61 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:15.
62 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
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existence would be hollow."63 Because of the destructiveness inherent in
creation, it is a dangerous act; but as Nietzsche argues, "all creators,
however, are hard."64 All of existence is therefore a continuous struggle of
interpretation and reinterpretation of the will-to-power.
There is battle and inequality and war for power and predominance
even in beauty
How divinely vault and arch here oppose one
another in the struggle: how they strive against one another with
light and shadow, these divinely-striving things.65
Therefore, the act of self-interpretation is the ultimate expression of
the will-to-power. This necessarily entails the readiness to destroy parts of
the self. However, this is not nihilism or the escapism inherent in
"afterworldly" religions and philosophies. The ego is not to be annihilated,
but to be constantly reformed according to the exigencies of the will.
"Loving and perishing: these have gone together from eternity. Will to love:
that means to be willing to die, too. Thus I speak to cowards!"66 The
reinterpretation of the self is therefore an affirmative act, as it acknowledges
the centrality of the will-to-power. Deleuze notes: "Affirmation remains as
the sole quality of the will to power, action as die sole quality of force,

63 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:15.
64 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:3.
46 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:7.
66 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:15.
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becoming-active as the creative identity of power and willing."67 Nietzsche
emphasizes that it is only through creation that life is imbued with meaning:
"Creation—that is the great redemption from suffering, and life's easement
But that the creator may exist that itself requires suffering and much
transformation. . . thus you are advocates and justifiers of all
transitoriness."68 Deleuze notes:
Being is not the object of affirmation, any more than it is an element
which would present itself, which would give itself over to
affirmation. Affirmation is not the power of being, on the contrary.
Affirmation itself is being, being is solely affirmation in all its power.
. . . Being and nothingness are m erely tire abstract expression of
affirmation and negation as qualities o f the w ill to power.69
By centering upon the self, Nietzsche further dissipates the hold of
external moral and ethical standards and sets the stage for a comprehensive
revaluation of selfhood. "When you are willers of a single will, and you call
this dispeller of need your essence and necessity: that is when your virtue
has its beginning."70 Because these external signifiers repress the expression
of the will, the self is unable to satisfy the imperative of the will-to-power.
The creative Self created for itself esteem and disesteem, it created for
itself joy and sorrow. The creative body created spirit for itself, as a
hand of its will. Even in your folly and contempt, you despisers of
67Deleuze, N ietzsche and Philosophy, 196.
68 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
69 Deleuze, N ietzsche and Philosophy, 186.
70 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:221. Thus, integration of the self is the new virtue, the new
ruling principle of the self: unifying the symbols of the sun and the serpent. This leads to
the discussion of "noon."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

216
the body, you serve your Self. I tell you: your Self itself wants to die
and turn away from life. Your Self can no longer perform that act
which it most desires to perform: to create beyond itself.71
However, it is impossible to overcome the socially-created portions of
the self easily. It is one thing for Nietzsche to criticize the inauthentic
expression of the will-to-power; it is a completely different matter to
elaborate the process for self-overcoming. As it has been demonstrated,
Nietzsche only hints at the specifics of the process for self-overcoming in the
most general terms. It is possible to criticize Nietzsche for this, perhaps
even stating that he has no concrete notion of how the self is to be overcome;
perhaps this entire project is rhetorical. However, Nietzsche does offer
some very concrete advice for self-overcoming, couched in his admiration
for creative action and respect for multiplicity. It is not however, in the
manner of a positive political or psychological theory.
Rather, Nietzsche's ethical stance is highly subjective and
transgressional. Traditional ethics, insofar as it is an encoded and fixed
system that operates independently of the individual, is nothing less than
the repudiation of the validity of individual existence and experience. As
Haar notes:
From a genealogical point of view, it appears that ethical systems can
only be defined univocally, in purely negative and pejorative terms:
moral consciousness and its ideals are analyzed and unmasked as
71 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:4. The despisers of the body, by betraying their own creative
self in favor of the "ego," have sealed their mediocrity.
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inventions of ressentunent But what does ressentim ent mean if not
hatred, condemnation, depreciation of "life"? In other words, ethical
systems derive from a weak and impotent Will to Power reacting
against the most affirmative impulses and favoring negation and
destruction. . . it serves the purpose of a defensive wall, of a
systematic protection against the unrelenting impulses of sex, egoism
(every ethic being a disdain for the self, a rejection of the self
EnsteJbstung), aggression, cruelty, etc. 72
Nietzsche seeks to revalue the idea of ethics to one that is reflective of
his emphasis upon the condition of the individual ego. Indeed, this project
is foreshadowed in the prologue to Zarathustra: "Mankind is something
that must be overcome

All creatures hitherto have created something

beyond themselves: and do you want to be the ebb of this great tide, and
return to the animals rather than overcome man?"73
The ethical actor in the Nietzschean sense is one who takes as the
object of ethical action his own self. Because of the lack of a template, this
can only take the form of experimentation. The individual, the searching
experimenter, must resist social norms and transgress against custom.74
Everything is called into question, although this does not mean that
everything is bad or must be discarded. Rather, everything about the self
must be questioned. Freedom through creation must be maintained, and
72Haar, N ietzsche and M etaphysics 17.
73Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3.
74"The term ' Versuchet', which occasionally appears in Nietzsche's texts, has the double
meaning of'experimenter' and 'tempter.' Every creator is at once someone who tempts
others and who experim ents on (tem pts) him selfand others in order to create something
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this means that there can be no conclusion to the experimental interpretation
of the self. The Nietzschean ethical imperative may mirror the Delphic
"become who you are," but it goes much further. It is also necessary to
"overcome what you have become," again and again.
Now that there is no goal for all, "an experimental morality is called
for. setting one's self a goal." What is meant is "a substitute for
morality through the will to our goal and consequently to the means
to this goal." It is the substance of the future that is to become free:
"They will call you the destroyers of morality, but you are really only
the finders of yourselves."75
This is no hit-or-miss experimentation. Self-overcoming is not a
project to be taken lightly or handled carelessly. Nietzsche emphasizes that
it is the epistemological necessity of the will to overcome itself, even calling
likening it to the destiny of individual existence. "Truly, I have gone my
way through a hundred souls and through a hundred cradles and birthpangs. I have taken many departures, I know the heart-breaking last hours.
But my creative will, my destiny, wants it so."76 This experimentation is a
direct reflection of Nietzsche's view of both the individual and die universe.
Deleuze notes: "We affirm chance and the necessity of chance; becoming

that does noty e t exist a set of forces capable of acting upon and m odifying that which
exists." Klossowski, N ietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 127.
75Jaspers, Nietzsche, 158.
76 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL2.
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and the being of becoming; multiplicity and the unity of multiplicity---Difference reflects itself and repeats or reproduces itself."77
Nietzsche does not deny that aesthetic ethics are certainly fraught
with difficulty. The affirmation of chance and flux has profound
psychological impact The lack of stability is disconcerting, even though it
represents the ultimate expression of freedom in the Nietzschean sense.78
There is no form to which to aspire, although Nietzsche strives to include
even the most mundane elements in the process of aesthetic self
overcoming. If aesthetic ethics are to be successful, even those elements of
the self which were endemic or artificial must be re-willed into existence,
creating the image of an internal harmony. As Klossowski argues,
"Zarathustra's remedy is to re-will die non-willed, inasmuch as he desires to
assume the accomplished fact himself, thereby rendering it unaccomplished
by re-willing it innumerable times.”79 As Nietzsche writes, "truly, like the
sun do I love life and all deep seas. And this /call knowledge: all that is

77 Deleuze, N ietzsche and Philosophy, 197.
78"In this world rid of God and of moral idols, man is now alone and without a master. No
one has been less inclined that Nietzsche (and in this way he distinguishes himself from the
romantics) to let it be believed that such freedom would be easy. This complete liberation
put him among the ranks of those of whom he himself said that they suffered a new form of
anguish and a new form of happiness." Albert Camus, The Rebel: A n Essay on Man in
R evolt 70.
79Klossowski, N ietzsche and the Vicious Circle 67.
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deep shall rise up—to my height!"80 Integrating the elements of the self is
the only goal in Nietzschean aesthetic ethics:
Ah, you men, I see an image sleeping in the stone, the image of my
visions! Ah, that it must sleep in the hardest, ugliest stone! Now my
hammer rages fiercely against its prison. Fragments fly from the
stone: what is it to me? I will complete it for a shadow came to me—
the most silent the lightest of all dungs came at once to me! The
beauty of the Obermensch came to me as a shadow. Ah, my brothers!
What are the gods to me now!81
Deleuze and Guattari argue: "Creations are like mutant abstract lines
that have detached themselves from the task of representing a world,
precisely because they assemble a new type of reality that history can only
recontain or relocate in punctual systems."82 The implication of this
argument is that autocreation is a fragile process that can be derailed by any
number of factors. It can therefore not occur within a social context "But
by my love and hope I entreat you: do not reject the hero in your soul! Keep
holy your highest hope!"83 Nietzsche therefore argues that it is necessary to
reject those institutions and forms that are not created. For Nietzsche, such
forms as the state and society are not valid because they are not aesthetic;
they have not been created by the individual. Mass culture is inherited by

80Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:15.
81 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:2.
82Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 296.
83Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
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others and thus is not dynamic and tends toward stagnation. Indeed, the
state and the weakened man it produces saps the strength of the individual:
Nothing is beautiful, except man alone: all aesthetics rests upon this
naivete, which is its 61 s t truth. Let us immediately add the second:
nothing is ugly except the degenerating man—and with this the
realm of aesthetic judgement is circumscribed. Physiologically,
everything ugly weakens and saddens man. It reminds him of decay,
danger, impotence; it actually deprives him of strength.84
Nietzsche's aesthetic ethics is designed to return to the care for the
self that has become neglected in modem society. Rather than offering a
concrete model for self-overcoming, Nietzsche delineates the conditions
under which this process may become possible. Through the
reinterpretation of the self under the auspices of the will-to-power,
Nietzsche opens up the possibility of the transmuted self.

8«Nietzsche, The Twilight o fthe Idols, 9£0.
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C h a p te r vn
M etam o rp h o se: t h e T ra n sm u te d S e lf

This dissertation has argued thus far against a concretization of
Nietzsche's philosophy and political thought Nevertheless, Nietzsche
certainly envisions some kind of personal transformation as the goal of his
philosophy of self-overcoming. This is the meaning of the symbol of the
Obermensch. However, it is necessary to examine the Obermensch as a
psychological mode rather than as the traditional notion of an ideal type.
The Obermensch represents an attitude towards life as encompassed in the
overcoming of nausea and the acceptance of the task of self-overcoming;
innately opposed to the idea of patterning one's life after a set of
commandments.1 As such, Nietzsche's task of personal creation cannot be
delineated in terms of essential traits or specific manifestations, in keeping
with the argument thus far. Nietzsche's philosophy of the self is therefore
inconsistent and nebulous by design. To paraphrase The Birth o f Tragedy,
Nietzsche is "superficial out of his profundity." The individual must seek
transmutation on his own, not as the follower of another.
Nietzsche's invitation to this task is found in the pivotal section of
Zarathustra "The Vision and the Riddle." The vision is an invitation to
embrace the void left after the overcoming of nausea. "I saw a young
1"Full life-expression is a matter of physiological and spiritual endowment." Babich,
N ietzsche's Philosophy o fScience, 771.
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shepherd. . . and a heavy, black snake was hanging out of his mouth. Had I
ever seen so much disgust and pallid horror on a face?. . . Then a voice
cried from me: 'Bite! Bite!"'2 The snake is representative of existential
nausea, and the shepherd must embrace this horror, let it become part of
him, if he is to survive. Once the horror of existence is confronted and
nausea overcome, the individual is no longer properly human, but a
transmuted self. The riddle is therefore the emergence of a transmuted,
creative self from the realization of nihilism:
Who is the man into whose throat all that is heaviest, blackest will
thus crawl? The shepherd, however, bit as my cry had advised him .
.. he spat far away the snake's head—and sprang up. No longer a
shepherd, no longer a man—a transformed being, surrounded with
light, laughing. . . . My longing for this laughter consumes me: oh
how do I endure still to live! And how could I endue to die now!3
One must embrace the void (i.e., snake), consume it take it into one's
own being; and only then become transformed above the loathsomeness of
life. This represents no less than the recreation of the self arising from a
fundamental change in perspective and the destruction of previous external
modes of interpreting both the self and the world. Self-overcoming
therefore leads to the imperative of self-creation. "There are many souls one
will never uncover, unless one invents diem first"4

2Nietzsche, Zarathustra, HL2.Z
3 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:23.
4 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
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Nietzsche's recognition of the self as an ever-changing flux of forces
in need of self-overcoming, however, represents only the beginning of
Nietzsche's theory of selfhood.5 The transmuted self, symbolized by the
Obennensch, is its culmination. Because Nietzsche consciously avoids
attaching specifics to the transmuted self, it is necessary to resort to
inference and symbolic interpretation to divine the meaning behind the
transmuted self. Deleuze argues that the transmuted self is a synthesis of
the active and reactive, the unity of actor and medium, a self-replicating
creative power relation.
Reactive forces break their alliance with the w ill to nothingness.; the
w ill to nothingness, in turn, breaks its alliance with reactive forces. It
inspires in man a new inclination: for destroying himself, but
destroying himself actively
Zarathustra wants to say: I love die
one who makes use of nihilism as the ratio cognoscenti of the will to
power, but who finds in the will to power a ration essendiin which
man is overcome and therefore nihilism is defeated.. . . Active
destruction means: the point, the moment of transmutation in the will
to nothingness. Destruction becomes active at die moment when,
with the alliance between reactive forces and the will to nothingness
is broken, the will to nothingness is converted and crosses over to the

5"One common and general feature shared by both Nietzsche and Buddhism is the
centrality of man in a godless cosmos, in the sense that both look to man, and not any
external power, being, or numious source, for their respective solutions to what they
perceive as the problem(s) of existence.. . . Both see men as an ever-changing flux of forces
possessing what may generally be called physical and psychological aspects. And within
this flux there is no autonomous or unchanging subject corresponding to such terms as
'self, 'ego', or 'soul.' Both also emphasize the hierarchy that exists or can exist between
individuals and within the individual's own nature.. . . Another feature shared by both. . .
is that their respective goals are to be achieved through a process of'self-overcoming',
(SeJbsttlberwindungin Nietzsche's case, dtta-bhavana in Buddhism's), and that this self
overcoming is understood as the spiritual expression of a more basic and natural force (will
to power in Nietzsche's case, tanha in Buddism's)." Morrison, N ietzsche and Buddhism,
63.
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side of affirmation, it is related to a p o wer o f affirming which
destroys the reactive forces themselves. Destruction becomes active
to the extent that the negative is transmuted and converted into
affirmative power the "eternal joy of becoming" which is avowed in
an instant, die "joy of annihilation", the "affirmation of annihilation
and destruction." . . . This is the "decisive point" of Dionysian
philosophy: the point at which negation expresses an affirmation of
life, destroys reactive forces and restores the rights of activity.6
In this sense, the self becomes the site of both action and reaction, as
it is in the process of creating and destroying itself. It is also possible to
argue that the transmuted self represents a transcendence of the dichotomy
of active and reactive. Babich argues, "the emphasis upon the 'post-human'
. . . in Nietzsche succeeds in a critical reading of the nature of the human as
such, shifting its position to the sliding or precessionally decentered subject
of interpretive style."7 The individual can be neither a subject nor object of
action; it is no less than the site for the interpretation of phenomenon. The
distinction between external and internal experience ceases to have
meaning. Furthermore, the differentiation between action and reaction
cannot be made; they are both manifestations of the will-to-power,
perceived differently. Thus, Nietzsche's vision of the integrated self has a
gestaJt-Uke form. Schutte notes: "As soon as the individual form is given
preference over the totality, the intent of Nietzsche's teachings is lost"8

6 Deleuze, N ietzsche and Philosophy, 174-175.
7 Babich, N ietzsche's Philosophy o fScience, 21.
8Ofelia Schutte, Beyond N ihilism : N ietzsche w ithoutM asks, 34.
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It is misleading to seek to determine whether or not the transmuted
self represents the transcendence of action and reaction or a synthesis of the
two. Nietzsche presents the transmuted self as something to be
experienced, not analyzed. As such, this interpretation seeks to identify the
symbols Nietzsche chooses to communicate the internal experiences of the
transmuted self and explore their implications for the politics of the self. In
terms of the transmutation itself, it will be argued that Nietzsche poses this
as a problem of separating creative action from the necessity of reaction,
leading to an ethos of eternal creation: the next permutation of the eternal
recurrence as will-to-power.
L
Nietzsche uses the symbol of metamorphosis prominently in his
theory of transmutation. Indeed, one of the most important sections of
Zarathustra details the "three metamorphoses of the spirit" Nietzsche uses
the symbols of the camel, the lion, and the child to detail the personality
types found on the path to transmutation. This section is essentially a
microcosm of Nietzsche's political argument in Zarathustra, and further
serves to underscore the thesis of this dissertation.
The first type, the camel, represents the socially-created individual
Nietzsche criticizes in the first part of Zarathustra. The camel is essentially a
beast of burden, taking on inherited guilt and institutional structures that
are not its own. The greatest problem with this type of individual is the lack
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of creativity arising from the needless repression of the self. "There are
many heavy things for the spirit, for the strong, weight-bearing spirit in
which dwell respect and awe: its strength longs for the heavy, for the
heaviest"9 The camel takes on many disparate elements from the social
realm, ignoring the exigencies of the self in order to please others or simply
out of laziness.
Nietzsche condemns this tendency in strong terms, extending it to the
Ultimate Man. Nietzsche argues that the personality of the camel is an
affront to human dignity and the self-worth of the individual. "What is this
heaviest thing, you heroes

Is it not this: to debase yourself in order to

injure your pride? To let your folly shine out in order to mock your
wisdom?"10 As seen earlier, Nietzsche calls for the individual to escape
society in order to seek self-overcoming. "But in the loneliest desert the
second metamorphosis occurs: the spirit here becomes a lion; it wants to
capture freedom and be lord in its own desert"11
The lion is independent and largely free of societal influence. As
such, the lion represents the individual searching for identity and selfovercoming, as typified in die Higher Men. However, die lion is a pride
animal, not fully self-sufficient and still open to the influence of others, as
9 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, hi.
10Nietzsche, Zarathustra, hi.
11Nietzsche, Zarathustra, hi.
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elaborated in Nietzsche's critique of the community. The lion represents
self-overcoming, but is not able to make the transition to self-creation. "To
create new values—even the lion is incapable of that but to create itself
freedom for new creation—that the might of the lion can do. To create
freedom for itself and a sacred No even to duty. . . the lion is needed."12
The metamorphosis into the lion therefore creates the necessary substrate
for the possibility of transmutation. However, the lion is incapable of self
creation, as evidenced by the failure of the Higher Men.
The last metamorphosis is that of the child, innocent enough to begin
the process of self-creation without lapsing into repression. The child is no
less than the transmuted self as expressed in the symbol of the Obermensch.
But tell me, brothers, what can the child do that even the lion cannot?
Why must the preying lion still become a child? The child is
innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a selfpropelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes. Yes, a sacred Yes is
needed, brothers, for the sport of creation: the spirit now wills its own
will, the spirit sundered from the world now wins its own world.13
The symbol of the child underscores the interpretive aspect of
transmutation. Nietzsche is not naive enough to assert that the self can
actually be recreated from scratch. Rather, the significance of transmutation
is that the individual can reinterpret both the self and the world from a
perspective that is not colored by inherited institutions or repressive

12Nietzsche, Zarathustra, hi.
13Nietzsche, Zarathustra, hi.
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normalizing mechanisms. However, even this more modest goal is
troublesome. As Nietzsche emphasizes consistently, most of the means of
human expression are in some sense repressive, including language and
conventional philosophical discourse. More fundamentally, modes of
thought such as reason and abstract conceptualizing are bound by factors
that are socially-constructed and overly reductionistic. In this sense,
Nietzsche seems to offer a false hope, if not a delusion, as his goal for
human existence. If the individual's mode of interpretation is almost
completely determined by socially-bounded symbols and methodology,
self-overcoming would represent the total destruction of all previous
experiences and their replacement by an undetermined, perhaps
indeterminable, interpretive scheme arising totally from the individual's
consciousness.
This criticism is not without merit However, it retains its validity
only if Nietzsche's critiques are taken to the extreme and his positive theory
is taken too concretely. The most important implication of the symbolic
progression of the three metamorphoses is that Nietzsche actually presents
them as a progression. The individual must actually proceed through each
of these manifestations in order to reach die goal of transmutation, which is
the integration of the self-actuated elements of the consciousness under the
auspices of the will-to-power. It is not necessary to forget previous
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experience or even to abandon socially-created symbols and discourse, but
to recognize them for what they are and to give the individual's own
reinterpretation precedence over inherited power structures.
This point is underscored by Nietzsche's insistence on the integrity of
the self as a discrete unit capable of presenting a valid interpretation of both
itself and its world. In addition, Nietzsche emphasis upon the integration of
the parts of the self into a plural entity explicitly recognizes that all parts of
the consciousness, including those that may be influenced by social and
experiential patterns, must be retained and validated as essential to
individual existence. The camel is not annihilated or even repressed, but is
sublimated into the integrated consciousness along with the independence
of the lion and the creativity of the child. All of these elements, coexisting
and competing, insure that the individual neither stagnates nor consumes
itself in the morass of nihilistic helplessness. Nietzsche positive theory is
not couched in negative terms, but rather in language of integration,
typified by the symbol of noontide.

n.
One of the most important symbols in Zarathustra is that of the
"noon" or "noontide." Nietzsche elaborates on this symbol in The Twilight
o f the Idols, identifying die positive purpose of Zarathustra with the symbol
of noon. In this work, Nietzsche identifies the symbol of noon closely with
an altered perception of reality and with the integration of the self:
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The true world—we have abolished. What world has remained? The
apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also
abolished the apparent one. (Noon; moment of the briefest shadow;
end of the longest error; high point of humanity; IN dPIT
Zarathustra).14
For Nietzsche the symbol of noon represents die individual
integrated consciousness, with no "shadows." By adopting the symbol of
the shadow, Nietzsche implies that the subconscious elements of the
consciousness are never destroyed, but are rather drawn up into the
consciousness through existential awareness. 15 In this sense, the
unconscious elements are integrated into the consciousness through die
process of overcoming and the confrontation with repressed knowledge.
This mirrors the synthesis of the Apollonian and Dionysian psychological
types that Nietzsche praised in ancient tragedy. The healthy mode of
existence that Nietzsche envisions must take into account all aspects of
human existence as manifestations of the will-to-power and therefore valid
expressions of life. Morrison notes, "the real batde for power is within the
individual. As Nietzsche says man is a war, which is a 'war within oneself,
and the basic weapons in this war are "self-control [and] self-outwitting/"16

14 Nietzsche, Twilight o fthe Id o ls\
15Nietzsche's symbolic language in this regard is strikingly similar to Jung's analysis of the
subconscious. Jung was certainly familiar with Nietzsche's argument in Zarathustra, but it
is impossible to determine if he adopted this language from Nietzsche.
16Morrison, N ietzsche and Buddhism, 171.
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The transmuted self represents the outcome of this battle; it is the
awakening of awareness.
In the course of his masterful analysis, Jaspers identifies three types
of "awareness of being" Nietzsche proposes, each of which "can be made
manifest only through indirect language, through image and simile." These
are "(1) contem plative vision, (2) m ystical oneness with being and (3)
Dionysian intoxication" Although Jaspers does not delineate examples
within Zarathustra where each of these states appears, it is possible to
identify examples within the text In the contemplative vision "the truthful
man experiences what he himself is and what being is as 'the great
enlightenment about existence.'" Jaspers argues that mystical oneness with
being is expressed most vividly in Zarathustra, with the symbol of noon.
With this image, "the world's perfection stands revealed. The yes, which
has absorbed all that is, is experienced." Dionysian intoxication is a multi
layered and more complex stage of experiencing being. Dionysian
intoxication involves the affirmation of existence with all of its vicissitudes,
through which the individual becomes "die transmuter of existence when he
learns to transmute himself."17
The transmuted self embodies all three of these modes, but
Zarathustra emphasizes integration and wholeness above all others. The

17Jaspers, N ietzsche, 354-347.
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integration of the self through the awareness of its multiplicity is
paradoxical, but consistent with Nietzsche's theory of freedom. Camus
states, "there is freedom at midday when the wheel of the world stops
spinning and man consents to things as they are. But what is becomes what
will be, and the ceaseless change of things must be accepted."18 Noontide
represents the recognition of the only stability inherent in the human
constitution: change. The transmutation of the self is indeed a
transformation, but one of perspective rather than concrete. This
perspective acknowledges that the primacy of the self and of its variegated
nature:
But now the day, the transformation, the sword of judgement, the
great noontide comes to them all: then many things shall be revealed!
And he who declared the Ego healthy and holy and selfishness
glorious—truly, he, a prophet, declares too what he knows: “Behold,
it comes, it is near, the great noontide?*19
The recognition of the individual self as project further emphasizes
the lack of an endpoint for transmutation. Self-overcoming must continue
irrespective of the extent of transmutation. "Man is a bridge and not a goal;
counting himself happy for its noontides and evenings, as a way to new
dawns."20 The symbol of noon, a moment which recurs daily, is emblematic

18 Albert Camus, The Rebel:An Essay on Man in Revolt, 78.
19Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:10.
20Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:123.
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of the continuing nature of Nietzsche's theory of selfhood. The symbol of
noon also connotes optimism for the possibility of transmutation:
And this is the great noontide: it is when man stands at the middle of
his course between animal and Obermensch and celebrates his
journey to the evening and his highest hope: for it is the journey to a
new morning. Then man, going under, will bless himself; for he will
be going over to the Obermensch and the sun of knowledge will
stand at noontide. "A llgods are dead: now we want the Obermensch
toJivd'—let this be our last will one day at the great noontide!21
The symbol of noon is also related to the symbols of the eagle and the
snake. It is telling that these symbols first occur in the narrative
simultaneously, in section ten of the prologue. Furthermore, the animals
only reappear in the narrative when Zarathustra is alone, when he finally
abandons the "other." The voice of the animals represents instinct and selfknowledge, not the herd or collective mentality. Nietzsche emphasizes this
point as both animals are solitary creatures. This is related to the symbol of
noon as the animals are representative of parts of Zarathustra's own
consciousness that are ignored or repressed when Zarathustra is within die
confines of society. When the consciousness is exposed in solitude, these
elements are free to manifest themselves:
Zarathustra said this to his heart as the sun stood at noon: then he
looked inquiringly into the sky—for he heard above him die sharp
cry of a bird. And behold! An eagle was sweeping through the air in
wide circles, and from it was hanging a serpent; not like prey but like
a friend: for it was coiled around an eagle's neck.22
21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:22.3.
22Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §10.
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Zarathustra encounters the voice of the animals, which represents his
own internal dialogue. This encounter takes place at noon, representing die
integration of the self. This integration is the beginning of transmutation, a
task as formidable as self-overcoming. "The proudest animal under the sun
and the wisest animal under the sun—they have come scouting

I found

it more dangerous among men than among animals; Zarathustra is
following dangerous paths."23 When taken together, the symbols of noon
and the animals represent a fundamental point of Nietzsche's theory of die
transmuted self. The symbol of noon, in connection with that of the
animals, emphasizes that the individual must cultivate awareness of the
internal movements within die self. "My animals are awake, for I am
awake. My eagle is awake and, like me, does honor to the sun. With eagle's
claws it reaches out for the new light"24 The price of personal
transmutation is perpetual self-overcoming and vigilance.
The symbol of noon is therefore both one of integration and die
affirmation of plurality. This apparent contradiction is at the very heart of
Nietzsche's positive thought Deleuze notes:
The sense of Nietzsche's philosophy is that multiplicity, becoming
and chance are objects of pure affirmation. The affirmation of
multiplicity is die highest speculative proposition, just as die joy of
23Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §10.
24 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:2Q. The animals axe therefore part of Zarathustra's
consciousness.
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diversity is the practical proposition. The player only loses because
he does not affirm strongly enough, because he introduces the
negative into chance and opposition into becoming and multiplicity.25
The symbols of die transmuted self: the metamorphoses of the spirit,
noontide, and the animals are all representative of this imperative. The
transmuted self is not a completed project Indeed, the last paragraph of
Zarathustra unites all of these symbols in the assertion that Zarathustra's
work has only now begun, that of the transmutation:
My suffering and my pity—what of them! For do I aspire after
happiness? I aspire after my world Very well, my lion has come, my
children are near, Zarathustra has become ripe, my hour has come!
This is m y morning, m y day begins: rise up now, rise up, great
noontideI Thus spoke Zarathustra and left his cave, glowing and
strong, like a morning sun emerging from behind dark mountains.26
Nietzsche, therefore, finishes his narrative by emphasizing that the
integration of the self is a project that is never to be completed, and cannot
therefore be explained. However, the mechanisms mediating the disparate
elements of the consciousness receive a great deal of attention in
Zarathustra, and must therefore be examined to gain any degree of
understanding of the transmuted self.

25Deleuze, N ietzsche and Philosophy, 197.
26Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:20. This is the last paragraph of the book—but where is
Zarathustra going? Back to man? No, now that the great noontide has come and his
consciousness is integrated, he can leave the solitude of his cave and venture forth into the
world.
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m.
Much of Nietzsche's thought proceeds from an analysis of die
dynamics of the human psyche, indeed it is ultimately from Nietzsche's
psychological observations that his other philosophical and political
doctrines flow. These psychological explorations are driven by frustration
engendered by the lack of self-knowledge by modem individuals.
Nietzsche laments in the Genealogy o f Morality, "we are unknown to
ourselves, we knowers, we ourselves, to ourselves, and there is a good
reason for this. We have never looked for ourselves—so how are we ever
supposed to find ourselves?"27
In keeping, much of Nietzsche's thought is concerned with the
analysis of the self. Indeed, one of the fundamental elements of Nietzsche's
critique of modernity is the role of die human self as presented in the idea of
the "subject" The idea of the subject that has free will and the ability to act
is essential to the modem project It is only through the distinction between
the subject and the object that it is possible to attach value judgments to
actions, depending upon the intentions behind those actions.
Nietzsche tells us that this idea of die subject can not be seen as given,
but is rather the product of an extensive historical development28 Thus, the

27Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o fM orality, ed. Keith AnseU-Pearson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3.
28Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o fM orality, 12-13.
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modern project is built upon an untenable ontological foundation, implicitly
relying upon the concept of a fundamental human nature. Instead,
Nietzsche emphasizes that the universe is not ordered, and that it is only
through the interposition of the will that any semblance of order becomes
apparent29 Therefore, if one is to look for foundations one must seek to
create them out of the concrete self.
Nietzsche insists that the self is composed of many parts, not one
essential spirit or nature. Nietzsche wants philosophy to abandon die idea
of the soul as found in Christian theology and even in Enlightenment
thought30 In the Christian philosophical tradition and Cartesian dualism,
the soul is seen as separate from the body in a fundamental sense. The body
and the spirit are composed of different elements, and exist on separate
planes. The implication of these schemes is that the soul or spirit is superior
to the body, and the entire material plane is, at least to some degree,
contemptible.
At no time does Nietzsche entertain the notion that there may be a
soul that exists outside the body. "But die awakened, the enlightened man

29"As an alternative to the logical method the Dionysian state of consciousness offers forms
of communication such as song and dance. Nietzsche's Zarathustra teaches one not to
believe in a god that does not dance. The godliness of which Nietzsche speaks is that of the
creative process of hfe, which is never self-contained. The rhythms and movement of song
and dance, like those of life, elude classification
The subject-object distinction that rules
discursive thought is suspended as the dynamic unity of life is perceived." Ofelia Schutte,
Beyond Nihilism : N ietzsche w ithoutM asks, 26-27.
30Nietzsche, Beyond Good and E vil trans. Walter Kaufmaim (New York: Vintage, 1989), 54.
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says: I am body entirely, and nothing beside; and soul is only a word for
something in the body."31 Nietzsche urges us to "give the finishing stroke to
that other and more calamitous atomism which Christianity has taught best
and longest, the soul atomism ."32 Nietzsche contends that it is necessary to
have a new conception of the self, one that does not see the soul as
composed of some external "substance." The spirit, the consciousness, is
therefore a historical development, and its contents are likewise products of
this development
Our mind flies upward: thus it is an image of our bodies, an image of
an advance and elevation. The names of the virtues are such images
of advances and elevations. Thus the body goes through history,
evolving and battling. And the spirit—what is it to the body? The
herald, companion, and echo of its battles and victories.33
Nietzsche takes great pains to demonstrate that the self is created and
bound by external factors, but ones that are concrete and experiential. As
Schacht states: "in short human consciousness for Nietzsche requires to be
understood as a phenomenon intimately connected with our underlying
human nature and constitution and our entanglement in a web of social
relations."34 Nietzsche's genealogical investigations were designed to

31 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:4.
32 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §12
33 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:221.
34 Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, (London: Routkdge, 1983), 315.
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demonstrate exactly this point "Consciousness is capable of attaining at
most a limited degree of self-autonomy in relation to them."35
Rather than postulating the existence of a soul or endlessly
contemplating the eternal nature of man, one should instead examine the
many competing parts of the concrete consciousness. The soul in
Nietzschean terms is the "sum of the inner movements" within the
individual psyche.36 The psyche is composed of competing drives and
inclinations, each of which seeks predominance. This is analogous to Plato's
metaphor of the soul as a dwelling, as Parkes notes:
Nietzsche now introduces an image of the psyche as a boarding
house. As new experiences enter the domicile of the soul
([Seelenwohnung), those unable to find anything related to them are
obliged to 'reside there alone, often to the displeasure of the older
residents with whom they often run into conflict' But if the
newcomer is fortunate, it will not be long before 'new guests stream
in from all sides into the open house, and the one who was just then
standing alone finds many and noble relatives. 37
Unlike Plato, however, Nietzsche does not argue that the elements of
the consciousness should be ordered according to an arbitrary principle
such as reason.
What the sense feels, what the spirit knows, never has an end in itself.
But sense and spirit would persuade you that they are the end of all

35Schacht, Nietzsche, 315.
36Nietzsche, D aybreak Thoughts on the Prejudices o fM orality, trans. RJ. Hollingdale
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), §311.
37Graham Parkes, Composing the Souk Reaches o fN ietzsche's Psychology, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press: 1994), 43.
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things: that is how vain they are. Instruments and toys are sense and
spirit behind them still lies the self.. . . Always the self listens and
seeks: it compares, overpowers, conquers, destroys. It controls, and it
is in control of die ego too. Behind your thoughts and feelings, my
brother, there stands a mighty ruler, an unknown sage—whose name
is self, hi your body he dwells; he is your body.38
It is in the tension between competing psychological elements that
human existence occurs. 'The I is no longer something stable and fixed, but
rather labile and dynamic: 'a moving midpoint'"39 Nietzsche does not
accept that the self is or must be a stable spirit or essence. Instead, it is
possible for the self to be eternally changing, as Nietzsche discusses in die
ideal type of the Dionysian man. "By virtue of die power of Dionysus one
can resolve oneself into a plurality of persons and play, thanks to the patron
deity of masks, a variety of parts in die drama of life."40 Nietzsche argues
not only that the consciousness is composed of multiple competing parts,
but that the very notion of consciousness is a manifestation of the tension
between these parts. "The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with
one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a herdsman. Your littie
intelligence. . . is also an instrument of your body, a littie instrument and
toy of your great intelligence."41 Nietzsche argues that this tension is what

38Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:1.
39Parkes, Composing the Soul 74.
40Parkes, Composing the Soul 276.
41 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:4.
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is properly termed the "self," not a stable identity or perceiving subject42 In
this sense, the self is radically de-centered and perpetually unstable:
Sense and spirit are instruments and toys: behind them still lies the
Self. The Self sees with the eyes of die sense, it listens too with the
ears of the spirit The Self is always listening and seeking: it
compares, subdues, conquers, destroys. It rules and is also the Ego's
ruler. Behind your thoughts and feelings, brother, stands a mighty
commander, an unknown sage—he is called Self. He lives in your
body, he is your body.43
The manner in which individuals are able to organize their internal
chaos into a manageable and creative conversation is the hallmark of self
creation. 44 This endeavor may be dangerous to both the individual and to
society.45 In Zarathustra Nietzsche employs an interesting analogy

42"Nietzsche calls the ‘under-willd o r' under-soul^ the different protagonists of this
internal struggle (which is only a feeble debate, involving 'the one who ordere,' 'the one
who obeys/ 'the one feeling satisfaction') in the midst of the willing subject These are, in
fact the parts of the unconscious of the body, an 'edifice of multiple souls.' Why does he
talk about 'souls'? The usurpation or reversal, which attributes the 'noble' name 'soul' to
what tradition considers inferior, is aimed at designating the true 'acting principles/ the
impulses, the instincts." Haar, N ietzsche and M etaphysics, 94.
43 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:4.
44 "Yet the sub-ego plurality is not reducible simply to the forces of the bodily unconscious,
any more than it can be assimilated to the diversity of feelings and ideas. The logical
identity of the ego or the moral identity of the person takes hold at the expense of the
presence of multiple 'persons/ i.e., roles that follow each other or coexist in the apparatus of
the individual psyche. Nietzsche does not tire of stressing that the 'person' is nothing but
some special underscoring, a product of circumstances, within the multiple 'persons,' i-e.,
characters or personalities that we carry inside us in a state of greater or lesser virtuality.
Most often a person, Le., a dramatic character, a more or less 'arbitrary' mask, sticks to us,
occupying the center stage of consciousness alone at the expense of those masks that we
carry'inside the body.'" Haar, N ietzsche and M etaphysics, 94-95.
45"Nietzsche's well-known separation of men into higher and lower orders is not so much
an evaluation of their soul's composition as of the different manner in which these
materials are organized and exploited." Thiele, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o fthe
Soul, 67.
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highlighting the peril of this undertaking: ''What is great in man is that he is
a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture
and a going under" 46
envy and mistrust and calumny among your virtues is necessary.
Behold how each of your virtues desires the highest place: it wants
your entire spirit; that your spirit may be its herald, it wants your
entire strength in anger, hate, and love. Every virtue is jealous of the
others, and jealousy is a terrible thing. Even virtues can be destroyed
through jealousy. He whom the flames of jealousy surround at last
turns his poisoned sting against himself, like the scorpion.47
The mechanisms by which the tensions between competing
psychological states are mediated receive a great deal of attention from
Nietzsche. Traditional philosophy cites reason as the faculty capable of
bringing the drives under control and ordering the consciousness.
Nietzsche does not disparage human reason, but he insists that it is not
capable of the type of universal explanatory power that Enlightenment
thinkers believe. Nietzsche insists that reason is simply another form of
interpretation, although its operation is somehow endemic to the human
mind. "Rational thought is interpretation according to a scheme that we
cannot throw off."48 Reason, however, is intrinsically incapable of ordering
the passions, as reason and the passions are not entirely separate. Reason is

46Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Prologue §4.
47Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 15.
48Nietzsche, The W ill to Power, trans. Walter Kaufinann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York:
Vintage, 1968), § 522
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influenced by the passions, and die passions contain a "quantum of
reason."49 Reason may be a special form of intellectual operation, but it is
not to be accorded a privileged place in Nietzschean psychology:
They are always looking back to the dark ages: then, indeed, illusion
and faith were a different matter; raving of the reason was likeness to
God, and doubt was sin.. . . That is why they hearken to preachers of
death and themselves preach afterworlds.50
In no case would Nietzsche accept any type of noetic reason existing
on a different plane than that of human existence. Offering such a claim is
sheer fantasy and is certainly harmful. In a section of Twilight o f the Idols
entitled "'Reason' in Philosophy" Nietzsche writes:
The reasons for which this world has been characterized as
"apparent^ are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other
kind of reality is absolutely indemonstrable. . . to invent fables about
a world "other" than this one has no meaning at all, unless an instinct
of slander, detraction, and suspicion against life has gained the upper
hand in us: in that case, we avenge ourselves against life with a
phantasmagoria of "another," a "better" life.51
The insistence upon an exterior order is thus representative of a
deeply set antipathy towards the Lebensw elt52 Rather than confronting life

49 Nietzsche, W ill to Power, § 387.
s° Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
51 Nietzsche, Tw ilight o fthe Idols, tnuis. Walter Kaufmarm, in The Portable N ietzsche (New
York: Penguin, 1954), 484.
52"Our inability to see ourselves, along with those propensities to self-evaluation that
parade as self-knowledge, causes us to live in constant self-deception. What we really are is
concealed from us in a number of ways: (a) The framework within which we view
ourselves is determined by language ...(b ) Unconsciously we seek out the principles
which conform to our temperaments: 'Our thought and judgement are subsequently taken
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as it presents itself, these philosophers are incapable of dealing with the
vicissitudes of life and must construct a higher reality towards which they
can pine. It is "the instinct of life-weariness, and not that of life, which has
created the 'other world.'"53 Neither human nor abstract divine reason can
be the ordering mechanism for the human consciousness. It is necessary to
seek a more fundamental ordering mechanism than reason, and one that is
located within the concrete consciousness.
As an alternative, Nietzsche suggests that the only possibility of
bringing the drives under control is through the will, specifically the will-topower. This process of subordinating the drives to the will may be referred
to as sublimation. Rather than suppressing a drive or fulfilling it directly, it
is possible to channel it into creative spiritual activity, creating an "organic
harmony."54
Yes, this Ego, with its contradiction and confusion, speaks most
honestly of its being—this creating, willing, evaluating Ego, which is
the measure and value of filings. And this most honest being, file
Ego—it speaks of the body, and insists upon the body, even when it
fables and fabricates and flutters with broken wings. Ever more

to be causes of our nature/ We interpret ourselves intellectualistically. (c) Success leads to
falsification.. .. (d) The image o fourpastmust be agreeable to us. 'One forgets much of his
past and deliberately excludes it from his memory.. . . We are always actively engaged in
this kind of self-deception.' (e) We are contaminated by the views which others take o fus:
'What we know of ourselves is not decisive for our happiness
At times we are
suddenly overwhelmed by what others know of us (or think they know of us), and we
realize that their opinions can overpower our own.'" Jaspers, N ietzsche, 133.
53Nietzsche, W ill to Power, § 586C
54Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 227.
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honestly it learns to speak, the Ego: and the more it learns, the more it
finds titles and honors for the body and die earth.55
Nietzsche conceived the will to power as the essential drive in
humanity.56 hi his notes, Nietzsche states "this world is the w ill to pow er—
and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and
nothing besides!"57 The will to power is manifested individually; it is
neither a social creation nor is it expressed socially. The will to power acts
primarily as a guide to the individual:
A will to the thinkability of all being: this I call your will. All being
you want to make thinkable: for you doubt with well-founded
suspicion, whether it is thinkable. Yet it shall yield and bend for you.
.. . Smooth it shall become and serve the spirit as its mirror and
reflection. That is your entire will. . . a will to power.58
The individual who has been able to achieve self-mastery over his
drives through the use of the will is truly a "free spirit" 59 This spirit does
not need external signifiers to provide a reason to live or to order his
consciousness; that would be herd morality. Rather, it is possible for the

55 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
56 "Nietzsche was a dialecticalm onist His basic force, the will to power, is not only the
Dionysian passionate striving, akin to Schopenhauer's irrational will, but is also Apollonian
and possesses as inherent capacity to give itself form. The victory of the Dionysian is thus
not complete, and the will to power is a synthesis of Nietzsche's earlier two dualistic
principles." Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 235-236.
57Nietzsche, W ill to Power, § 1067.
58 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
59"The framework within which Nietzsche's psychological understanding occurs is
composed of (1) the fundam entalrelation ofman to him selfw hen he sees and evaluates
himself, deceives himself about himself and proceeds to mould himself; and (2) The
operation and transformation o fdrives." Jaspers, N ietzsche, 132.
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free spirit to order his consciousness free of any such considerations.
Therefore, freedom for Nietzsche is to be "understood as facility in selfdirection."60
One could conceive of such a delight and power of selfdetermination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit could take
leave of all faith and every wish for certainly, being practiced in
maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and possibilities and
dancing even near abysses. Such a spirit would be the free spirit par
excellence.61
The free spirit is thus able to organize his inner chaos, but Nietzsche
never asserts that the plural nature of the soul itself is something to be
overcome. "Pluralism within the soul is to be maintained/'62 The pluralism
is the fundamental nature of the human psyche, and it is through conflict
between different elements that creativity is possible. "The finest
discoveries concerning culture are made by the individual man within
himself when he finds two heterogeneous powers ruling there."63
Nevertheless, Nietzsche understands that there must be a type of mental
parsimony.
One of the most integral characteristics of the mediating process
within the psyche is forgetfulness. Nietzsche does not mean mere

60Nietzsche, W ill to Power, 705.
61 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, tnuis. Walter Kaufmaim (New York; Vintage, 1974), 347.
62Thiele, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o fthe Soul, 67.
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thoughtlessness or some form of dementia. For Nietzsche, forgetfulness is
necessary for health; it is a type of mental hygiene. Forgetfulness allows for
peace, no happiness would be possible without it64 Nietzsche's concept of
forgetfulness is similar in application to Freud's concept of the unconscious
mind, which also results in a type of mental economy operating to preserve
sanity. Nietzsche expresses a similar sentiment in his earlier work:
The Greeks gradually learned to organize the chaos by following the
Delphic teaching and thinking back to themselves, that is, to their real
needs, and letting their pseudo-needs die out Thus they again took
possession of themselves; . . . This is a parable for each of us: he must
organize the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs.65
The task of making man into this reliable creature, "answerable for
his own future!' has been accomplished through the customs of society.66
The "conscience" of man is socially constructed and designed to preserve
the prevailing social order; it does not emanate from some divine source
outside of convention.67 The repression of the self by society ultimately
leads to a form of self-loathing, "bad conscience." "All instincts which are
not discharged outwardly turn inwards- this is what I call the
internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be
63 Nietzsche, Human A ll too Human: A Book fo r Free Spirits, trans. RJ. Hollingdale
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), §276.
64 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o fM orality, 38.
45 Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life", in U ntim ely
M editations, trans. RJ. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 123.
66 Nietzsche, Genealogy o fM orality, 39.
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called his 'soul.'"68 Bad conscience, inextricably tied to religion, serves as a
stumbling block to individual progress:"[I]ndeed, the possibility cannot be
rejected out of hand that the complete and definitive victory of atheism
might release humanity from this whole feeling of being indebted---Atheism and a sort of second innocence belong together."69
Nietzsche determines that the triumph of "slave morality" in the
modem age has left society incapable of responding to the challenge of
nihilism engendered by the collapse of die modem worldview, primarily
because the individual is caught up in the personal torments of "bad
conscience," rendering him incapable of realizing his true potential. For
Nietzsche, modem society is missing the ability to produce a culture based
upon positive, aesthetic values rather than the repression of natural, healthy
drives.70 The internal regime of competing drives forms the stage for the
politics of self-exploration and self-creation. As Thiele notes, "the
individual is a law unto himself, unpredictable and unmanageable."71
The transmuted self as Nietzsche envisions it is therefore the
affirmation of internal multiplicity. The theory of the multiple self is a

67 Nietzsche, Genealogy o fM orality, 41-42.
68 Nietzsche, Genealogy o fM orality, 61.
69Nietzsche, Genealogy o fM orality, 67.
70Nietzsche, Genealogy o fM orality, 22-23, see also "The Greek State."
71 Thiele, Friedrich N ietzsche and the Politics o fthe Soul 38-
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straightforward extension of Nietzsche's affection for the mask, but is more
nuanced. By denying the stability of the self, Nietzsche undercuts the
philosophical anthropology underlying modem models of selfhood and
philosophical discourse. Nietzsche presents die self as essentially a
conversation. The ideal of the transmuted self is the recognition of this fact
and the addition of a level of intentionality to this fundamental process.
Haar argues:
[T]he point of view of internal plurality is not only that of a
succession, but also that of a "social" coexistence o f persons. "The
free man i s . . . a society of individuals." "The individual is a
society." In fact we maintain with ourselves and within ourselves
social relations as complex and numerous as those we maintain
within the individuals around us.72
By affirming internal life as an interpretive dialogue, Nietzsche
validates the competing sections of the self which have been recognized
since Plato while avoiding the type of rank-ordering philosophy has
afforded to one part or the other. Rather than the creation of an entirely
new self or the destruction of previous identity, the transmuted self is
essentially the reinterpretation of the self along the lines of multiplicity. As
Jaspers notes, "man, though blind to himself and captivated by his own selfdeceptions, still manages—in spite of the self-evaluations by which he

72Haar, N ietzsche and M etaphysics, 97.
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lives—to m ould his own nature. To mould himself would appear to be the
highest possibility open to man."73
IV.
Nietzsche's emphasis on the self as a project represents a return, at
least in spirit, to the ancient care of the self. Unlike the ancients, however,
Nietzsche presents no goal or standards by which to measure the worth of
the individual or a ranking for the constituents of the soul. This is in
keeping with his view of existence as an interpretive endeavor, rife with flux
and perpetually changing configurations of the will-to-power. Nietzsche's
call to the transvaluation of values proves to be the reinterpretation of the
need for valuation as an internal constellation of forces rather than as a
means of measuring external phenomena. Transmutation represents
revaluation as self-interpretation and self-valuation, a process without an
endpoint or precedence. The analysis of Zarathustra, however, identifies
three key strategies associated with transmutation: constant
experimentation, transgression against norms, and the embracing of
creativity as a way of life.
Because of the difficulty of identifying normalizing mechanisms, it is
necessary to transgress social norms constantly and experimentally. The
revaluation of die self requires consistent, affirmative action to avoid

73Jaspers, N ietzsche, 134.
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stagnation. "Are you the victor, the self-conqueror, the ruler of your senses.
. . . Or do the animal and necessity speak from your desire? Or isolation?
Or disharmony within yourself?"74 This further emphasizes the
indeterminate nature of Nietzsche's theory of transmutation. Constant
experimentation is required because of the lack of any meaningful order to
revaluation. That which is revalued must be consistently revalued to avoid
dogmatization or complacency. As Schutte notes, "from the Dionysian
standpoint the self is always in process. It speaks for the dynamic unity of
the body, not for something that controls the body or lodges in a different
sphere from the body and the earth."75
Nietzsche argues that the only possible definition of virtue can
therefore be that of the purity of self-created value. "Your virtue is your
dearest self.. . . That your virtue is your Self and not something alien, a
skin, a covering: that is the truth from the bottom of your souls, you
virtuous!"76 The great tragedy of mankind, as well as a great pity, is that the
vast majority of individuals never even try to achieve this type of virtue.77

74 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:20.
75 Ofelia Schutte, Beyond N ihilism : N ietzsche w ithoutMasks, 34.
76 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL5.
77 "It follows from the above that the self for which we consciously live is by no means our
actual self: the vast majority live their whole lives 'only for the phantom of an ego.'...
Consequently all of them together reside in a cloud of impersonal opinions and arbitrary or,
one might say, fictitious, evaluations. This cloud of opinions comes very close to having a
life of its own, independent of the people that it envelops: from it derives the enormous
effect of universal judgements about 'm an'". Jaspers, Nietzsche, 133-134.
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This is in fact Zarathustra's greatest fear, that pity over mankind will drag
him into despair and ruin his attempt at transmutation. It is better for
Zarathustra to succeed alone than for everyone to fail.
The body purifies itself through knowledge; experimenting with
knowledge it elevated itself; to the discerning man all instincts are
holy; the soul of the elevated man grows joyful. Physician, heal
thyself: thus you will heal your patient as well. Let his best remedy
be to see with his own eyes him who makes himself well.78
It is also for this reason that Nietzsche does not attempt to present a
political theory to reform the state and social structures. No matter how
well constructed, collective systems have failed their members. Nietzsche
therefore capitalizes on the failure of collective institutions. The individual,
through resistance to normalizing mechanisms, can gain the experiences
necessary to begin self-creation. In order for the individual to revalue, there
must be values to reinterpret
All names of good and evil are images: they do not speak out they
only hint He is a fool who seeks knowledge from them. Whenever
your spirit wants to speak in images, pay heed; for that is when your
virtue has its origin and its beginning. Then the body is elevated and
risen up; it enraptures the spirit with its joy, that it may become
creator and evaluator and lover and benefactor of all things.79
Society is therefore good for something, and indeed necessary, as an
object of resistance. By resisting the seriousness of society and its
imperatives, the individual realizes how hollow these inherited structures

78 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, I£22.
79 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, T;22.1.
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actually are. "And when I beheld my devil, I found him serious, thorough,
profound, solemn: it was the Spirit of Gravity—through him all tilings are
ruined. One does not kill by anger but by laughter."80
By embracing creativity as a way of life, the individual has come full
circle. Beginning initially as a socially-created being, the individual has
become a fully self-aware being capable of self-interpretation and
continuous self-overcoming. "I have learned to walk: since then I have run.
I have learned to fly: since then I do not have to be pushed in order to move.
Now I am nimble, now I fly, now I see myself under myself, now a god
dances within me."81 This is the transmuted self, and its exigencies are
incommunicable. Nietzsche presents the transmuted self in veiled terms
because it cannot be explained, it is too bound up in internal experience and
hermeneutics to even try:
This tree stands here alone on the mountainside; it has grown up
high above man and animal. And if it wished to speak, it would find
no one who understood it so high it has grown. Now it waits and
waits—yet what is it waiting for? It lives too near the seat of the
clouds: is it waiting, perhaps, for the first lightning?82
The transmuted self is therefore a concept that cannot be explained,
only experienced. Nietzsche's theory of the transmuted self is anything but

80 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
81 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
82Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:8.
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nihilistic, but it is solipsistic. "There are a thousand paths that have never
yet been tread, a thousand forms of health and hidden islands of life. Man
and man's earth are still unexhausted and undiscovered."83 Nietzsche
therefore, does not present a political theory in any conventional sense. He
does, however, present a theory of politics grounded in the sanctity of the
individual self and the innate dignity of the individual spirit

83Nietzsche, Zarathustra, h22Z
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C h a p te r vm
Z a r a t h u s t r a a s A n ti-P ro p h e t

Nietzsche's presents a remarkably insightful analysis of the conflict
between the self and society. Rather than the extremes of solipsism or
statism attributed to him in some of the prominent interpretations,
Nietzsche presents a radically different view of political life in Zarathustra.
The modes of political existence analyzed by Nietzsche, the state and the
community, produce tensions within the individual that must be resolved.
Nietzsche's theory of the transmuted self presents a response to the void
that is healthier than the internalized guilt he so vehemently criticizes. In
Zarathustra, Nietzsche presents the possibility of a new type of human
existence that can transcend the morass of modem society and the grim fate
of the last man to aspire to a new level of political life. Rather than a
disconnected, ambiguous collection of political aphorisms, Nietzsche's
Zarathustrian political theory is one of hope in die face of die horror of
absurdity.
Nietzsche deconstructs human collective existence from die most
broadly aggregated, the state, to the most basic, die interpersonal friendship,
in order to reveal its pernicious effects upon the individual. Nietzsche
concludes that all forms of human relationships invariably give rise to
repressive power relations that threaten die natural expression of die
individual self and frustrate the emergence of die creative personality. In
256
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the course of the narrative, Nietzsche shifts his analysis toward the
manifestations of the will-to-power within the consciousness of the
individual.
Nietzsche concludes that each individual is a collection of competing
drives and impulses, which are perceived and interpreted by the will. In
this sense, "reality" is an interpretive construct arising from each
individual's confrontation with the world, each necessarily different
Accordingly, any attempt to concretize this hermeneutic scheme either in
analytic philosophical systems or political dogmatism is a falsification of
authentic experience, which can only be gained through individual
confrontation with the held of objects and the other. Genuine philosophical
insight cannot be communicated through symbolically-deficient language; it
can only be hinted at The philosophical use of such language is
exceptionally dangerous, as it leads to intellectual laziness and the
perpetuation of philosophical error. Nietzsche, attempting to overcome
these hazards, seeks a less repressive approach to the communication of
philosophy.
Nietzsche argues that each attempts to construct an interpretation of
reality in accord with their own internal configuration of the will-to-power.
Individuals with repressed drives or internalized social ideologies interpret
die world in unhealthy ways, undermining their won potential and
condemning them to mediocrity. Through self-overcoming, the individual
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recreates the world in a healthier mode, corresponding to a more open
internal configuration of the will-to-power. Reality is therefore always a
projection of the internal, as all tilings are ultimately interpreted according
to the internal constellation of forces within the individual. The will-topower, as conceived by Nietzsche, is therefore the will-to-create, both
ourselves and the world.
Zarathustra is thus Nietzsche's attempt to convey his interpretation
of the will-to-power by invoking within the reader a semblance of his own
internal experience. The narrative symbols in Zarathustra represent the
forces that can provoke a change in the internal configuration of the will-topower radical enough to cause a total reevaluation of the Um welt The most
profound of these experiences is existential nausea, which strips away the
false comfort underlying traditional interpretations.
After nausea is confronted, individuals are forced to radically modify
their interpretive scheme, forcing an individually-actuated hermeneutics to
come to the fore. As such, the interpretive frame arising from the
individual's internal configuration of the will-to-power is necessarily
reconfigured, parallel with the change in these constellations. This change
in interpretive scheme is transmutation. The self is not therefore "re
created" in a concrete sense, but rather the perspective by which the
individual interprets reality and the self is radically altered. This change in
perspective is the outcome of self-overcoming, and the realignment
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produced is the transmuted self. Transmutation is the interpretation of the
elements of the consciousness under the auspices of internally-actuated willto-power; a process rather than an outcome. "This—is now my way: where
is yours? Thus I answered those who asked me 'the way/ For theway—
does not exist!"1
Importantly, no where in Zarathustra does Nietzsche articulate
anything which could be construed as a traditional political theory.
Nietzsche's contribution to political theory, apart from his formidable
critiques, must therefore lie in his highly individualistic theory of the self.
This chapter will examine whether it is possible to synthesize this material
into a political theory, or whether Nietzsche's philosophy is inimical to
political thought
As examined in the previous chapter, the section "The Three
Metamorphoses" represents the progression of the individual from herd
creature to the overcoming of humanity to the transmuted self. This is
properly termed a political theoiy, as it involves the relation between the
individual and the state, political socialization, and the question of justice.
However, Nietzsche political thought is unique in its lack of concern for the
state and collective institutions. They remain objects to be criticized or
perhaps rebelled against, but are not to be rehabilitated. Essentially,

1 Nietzsche, Zaratftustra, 111:11.
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concern with the reform of social institutions is placing the cart before the
horse; it makes no sense to rehabilitate the social realm when the individual
self is at risk. Nietzsche's condemnation of society is complete, and he sees
no use in attempting to rehabilitate it
Everything among them speaks, no one knows any longer how to
understand. Everything falls away into failure, nothing falls any
longer into deep wells. Everything among them speaks, nothing
prospers and comes to an end any longer.. . . And what yesterday
was still too hard for time itself and its teeth, today hangs chewed
and picked from the mouth of the men of today. Everything among
them speaks, everything is betrayed. And what was once called a
secret and a secrecy of profound souls, today belongs to the streettrumpeters and other butterflies.2
For Nietzsche, an essential step in self-overcoming is no less than die
alleviation of the human drive towards collectivization and thereby the
concretization of the manifestations of internal life, i.e. the will-to-power.3
Nietzsche's political thought is therefore radically individualistic, not only
because of the imperative to separate from social life but also in the
distinctive interpretive philosophy he espouses. As Nietzsche writes, "it is
the stillest words which bring the storm. Thoughts that come on doves' feet
guide the world."4

2Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IH9.
3 As Nietzsche argues: “Suffering bom solitude is also an objection—I have suffered only
from 'multitudes/" Ecce Homo, IL10.
4 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:22.
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It is therefore difficult for political theorists, accustomed to dunking
in state and collectively-bounded terms, to approach Nietzsche in the
manner he intends. It is for this reason that Nietzsche's political thought has
been essentially misunderstood by most political theorists as presenting an
aristocratic theory of domination by a cadre of Obermenschen.5 As argued
in the introduction, this interpretation of Nietzsche as an advocate of "great
politics" can only be advocated from an incomplete reading of Nietzsche
and through the deliberate disregard of his most profound philosophical
and psychological insights. The main political argument contained in
Zarathustra is that of a metamorphic journey towards individual creation
and away from the herd, not the return to society as a type-former or
demagogue.
The interpretation of Nietzsche as an aristocratic or statist thinker is
revealed as untenable through the careful reading of Zarathustra. This is
because the metamorphic structure of Zarathustra is the only work in
Nietzsche's mature philosophic corpus that brings together die disparate
strands of his political critique and positive theory and provides a
comprehensive political interpretation. From this analysis, the essential
thrust of Nietzsche's intentionally evasive political thought becomes

5 Indeed, one of the leading textbooks in political theory advocates this interpretation,
essentially by presenting Nietzsche's ideas out of context and drawing from the dubious
Machlass fragments. John H. Hallowell and Jene M. Porter, PoliticalPhilosophy: The Search
for H um anity and Order, (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice HaO, 1997), 620.
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evident Nietzsche envisions no less than a reinterpretation of the way
individuals live in the fullness of existence.
As mentioned earlier, Nietzsche's earliest works have often been
used to argue that Nietzsche envisioned a type of heroic community, like
Homeric society. Similarly, Nietzsche's later works have been used to
demonstrate that Nietzsche was the "ultimate nihilist" Both of these
interpretations are flawed. Nietzsche's political writings, as mediated
through Zarathustra, reveal a perpetual desire to criticize the status quo,
and seek continually to improve the self through resistance to mediocrity
and the institutions that perpetuate it As Jaspers notes:
Nietzsche follows neither course: he provides no constructive whole
like Hegel's and no practical political technique like Machiavelli's.
Instead, his thinking derives from an all-encompassing concern for
the being of man
He hopes to generate a movement that will
quicken the ultimate grounds of humanity's being, and he wishes
through his thinking to impel those who hear and understand him to
enter into this movement Still he does not limit or define die content
of this movement politically, ethnologically, or sociologically.6
Nietzsche's political thought is indeed radical, perhaps so radical that
political theorists overlook the more nuanced elements in their search for
Nietzsche's positive thought As Zarathustra laments, "but why do I speak
where no one has m y kind of ears? Here it is yet an hour too early for me.
Among these people lam my own frontrunner."7 Nietzschean political

6Jaspers, Nietzsche, 253.
7 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:5.3.
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thought simply does not provide the blueprint many writers seek to find.
Rather, Nietzsche urges individuals to contemplate their existence, become
aware of their potential, and act accordingly. This process cannot occur
within a rigid state framework, although such a situation may spur
individuals to act Likewise, a community structure can serve only a limited
role in the quest for self-authentication. The ultimate site for political action
must lie within the restless individual spirit Thus no political system,
however constructed, can ever capture the essence of political reality:
change. Nietzsche pushes us to accept this essential fact and to stop creating
unhealthy narratives that perpetuate the myth of a stable cosmos.
L
Zarathustra explores the space between the competing drives
inherent in the self: the urge for order and the desire for freedom. The
interpretations of Nietzsche that stress the desire for order and those that
stress his call for the release from bounds both are equally in error.
Nietzsche was neither an authoritarian nor an anarchist His political theory
does not fit into any categories of conventional political thought; Nietzsche
consciously avoids this type of concretization. Nietzsche's political thought
is attitudinal rather than institutional. This renders die interpretation of
Nietzsche's political thought exceptionally difficult, as it extends to elements
traditionally thought outside of political theory, such as psychology and
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ontology. This, however, is exactly what Nietzsche intends. As Jaspers
notes:
One cannot make a rational system of Nietzsche's politics without
falsifying his thought His voluntaristic thinking, whose direction is
determined vitally rather than conceptually, exhibits what is most
characteristic only when one seeks out die antithesis which it
contains.8
Therefore, it is impossible to speak of Nietzsche's political thought as
being in any sense bounded or well-defined. Nietzsche's politics is based
upon a reinterpretation of what it means to be political. For Nietzsche,
politics is an active stance toward the process of becoming-oneself.9 This
necessarily involves interaction with others and even social institutions, but
does not stop there. Nietzsche's critiques are grounded in contempt for
those who are unwilling to consider the proposition that the fullest
expression of politics may lead to the separation of the individual from die
collective rather than the continuing immersion of the individual into the
social matrix. The perfection of politics is not to be found in the re
articulation of die social, but in the continual reinterpretation of the self.

8Jaspers, Nietzsche, 253.
9 Nietzsche speaks to the inherent individuality of his project in a preliminary draft for
section III of Ecce Homo. "My writings are difficult; I hope this is not considered an
objection?. .. Silence is as much of an instinct with me as is garrulity with our dear
philosophers. I am brief, my readers themselves must become long and comprehensive in
order to bring it up together all that I have thought, and thought deep down.. . . Finally, I
speak only of what I have lived through not merely of what I have thought through the
opposition of thinking and life is lacking in my case. My 'theory' grows from my
'practice'—oh from a practice that is not by any means harmless or unproblematic'' Found
in The Basic W ritings o fNietzsche, 796.
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Politics, as originally conceived in the polls, recognized this proposition and
was structured accordingly.10
In this sense, Nietzsche apparently returns to a classical theory of
politics, but his analysis paradoxically serves to undercut one of the
fundamental presuppositions of classical political thought. Nietzsche
affirms he classical emphasis on the care for the self while denying the
validity of the polis. Whereas thinkers like Aristotle consistently argued
that humans can only be fully human within the polis, Nietzsche agues that
the opposite is the case. Within the confines of collective existence, humans
are not capable of reaching their full potential qua humans; the mechanisms
of conformity are simply too invasive. Nietzsche, however, does not reject
the notion of the polis out of hand, his flirtation with the possibility of the
community of the Higher Men is an experiment along the lines of the
ancient heroic community. Nevertheless, Nietzsche concludes that even the
least restrictive social situation will inevitable compromise the individual; it
cannot be otherwise.

13Patocka argues that the sixteenth century is the line of demarcation that leads to the
destruction of the care-for-self. "Care for the soul means that truth is something not given
once and for all, nor merely a matter of observing and acknowledging the observed, but
rather a lifelong inquiry, a self-controlling, self-unifying intellectual and vital practice.
Greek thought distilled the care for the soul in two forms: we care for the soul so that it
could undertake its spiritual journey through the w orld. . . or, conversely, we think and
leam to render our soul into that firm crystal of being. . . which represents one of the
possibilities of the being which bears within it the source of movement, of deciding its
being or nonbeing, that is, dissolution in the uncertainty of instinct and undarified
tradition." Jan Patocka, H ereticalEssays in the Philosophy o fH istory, trans. by Erazim
Kohak, ed. James Dodd (Chicago: Open Court; 1996); 82.
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This is especially true of contemporary ideas of politics. The modem
conception of politics, long removed from the intimacy of the polis, has
become another detached symbol, appealing to ideals that no longer exist
Therefore, Nietzsche is not as radical as he first appears when he calls for a
return to emphasis upon the individual. This theme has been repeated
throughout history in response to the problems inherent in increasing
collectivization. As Patocka argues, the individual self is always the victim
of the collectivization of goals and commitments:
From that time on another motif comes to the fore, opposing the
motif of the care of the soul and coming to dominate one area after
another, politics, economics, faith, and science, transforming them in
a new style. Not a care (or the soul, the care to be, but rather the care
to have, care for the external world and its conquest^ becomes the
dominant concern. 11
In its emphasis upon societal collective goals and identities, modem
politics has betrayed the classical foundations of politics and surrendered to
a more primitive type of human existence, analogous to tribal existence.
Whereas the ancients were preoccupied with defining a political space in
which individuals could reach their ultimate potential as individual human
beings, modem politics seeks to produce compliant members who do not
seek to express their individuality, or only do so in a tightly confined
manner, hi essence, the classical political emphasis was upon die

11 Patocka, HereticalEssays, 83. Modem politics therefore has little to do with the classical
conception of politics; they are antithetical.
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production of citizens, the modem emphasis is upon the production of
subjects. Nietzsche calls for neither. Both models of politics have been a
failure in that the inevitable product of collective existence is always
mediocrity.
Nietzsche is calling for a return to the ancient care-for-self that was
emphasized by classical philosophy,, albeit without the emphasis upon the
po lis This more than anything else represents Nietzsche's most radical
contribution to political theory. Nietzsche's political thought is therefore
not social, but it is not asocial either. The metamorphic structure of his
argument in Zarathustra depends upon an initial immersion within a social
matrix; this is the only condition which allows for the rise of nausea.
Without the social, therefore, Nietzsche's positive thought concerning the
self is impossible. Indeed, the self is transmuted, i.e. changed, through the
experience of existential horror; it must be changed from its initial state of
collective being. The social man is the larval stage of humanity; nausea is its
chrysalis; and the transmuted self is the goal. There can be no transmuted
self without the social; this is why the community of die Higher Men is not
tenable. It is not possible to skip over die stage of social creation of the self,
to do so precludes the experiences necessary for the fostering of nausea.
It is most accurate to term Nietzsche's political thought transsodal.
Nietzsche's politics thus remains necessarily ambiguous, but this return to
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ambiguity is only the surface expression of a deep commitment to
individual self-worth. Jaspers mirrors this point
. . . that which underlies and determines all judgements is provided
by an attitude directed upon die whole of being. It is no longer mere
politics but philosophy, on the basis of which, within the wealth of
possibilities but without rational principle, opposing and
contradictory ways can be tried solely under die guidance of the idea
of saving and advancing humanity's being.. . . In comparison with
the great traditional constructions of political science and philosophy
of history, Nietzsche's political thinking is bound to show an absence
of logical unity and of consistent, precise conceptual procedures. The
substance of his thinking shuns any attempt at unequivocal
expression, but still it generates a wholly uniform atmosphere. Such
thinking can sweep through one's soul like a storm; but it cannot be
formalized and conceptualized in a clear and conclusive manner.
Insofar as Nietzsche intends to produce this atmosphere, he avoids
anything that could resemble a doctrine.. . . His conceptuality is not
meant to express a truth that is assuming a fixed goal and final shape;
rather it appears to present itself as a means of unlimited flexibility in
the hands of a governing will to think that is not bounded by
anything. In this way its formulation attains a maximum of
suggestive power. Only by taking this pow er o f expression together
with the capacity for change can we lay hold of the import of such
thinking.12
Rather than opening a new political space for collectives, Nietzsche
instead calls for a reevaluation of traditional political categories with an eye
towards individual development He does not solve the problems of
collective existence, nor does he seek to try. Politics must remain a function
of the self, eternally changing and mysterious. As Jaspers notes:
Apart from Nietzsche, allpolitical thinkers regard politics as
precisely delimited. They usually take it to be bounded by God or
transcendence or refer it to a specific human actuality. Political
12Jaspers, Nietzsche, 252-253.
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thinking can for instance proceed (as in the case of Hegel) within die
scheme of existing and developing totalities; then it is a systematic
whole expressing die self-awareness of a factual reality
Or again,
it can develop (as in the case of Machiavelli) with a view to particular
realities and their significance for the autonomy of power. 13
Because of this, the elaboration of a Zarathustrian political theory
cannot take the form of a framework or even an ethical code; it is necessarily
too subjective. Rather, Nietzschean ethics is a protean exercise operating
within the context of the Nietzschean perspective of flux and eternal
Becoming:
Free from what? Zarathustra does not care about that! But your eye
should clearly tell me: free /or what? Can you furnish yourself with
your own good and evil and hang up your own will above yourself
as a law? Can you be the judge of yourself and avenger of your law?
It is terrible to be alone with the judge and avenger of one's own law.
It is to be like a star thrown forth into empty space and onto the icy
breath of solitude.14
Nietzsche therefore cannot create a framework for politics without
becoming hypocritical. Nietzsche's theory of power precludes the creation
of a non-repressive ethics. He consistendy argues that all ethical systems,
of whatever form, will eventually degenerate into dogma and repression.
As Nietzsche's ultimate concern is with the liberation of the individual from
external signifiers, Nietzschean politics must be necessity resist

13Jaspers, Nietzsche, 252.
14Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:17.
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concretization in any form.15 By positing his ethical imperative in an
aesthetic mode, Nietzsche seeks to insure that each transmutation is
fundamentally separate and unique, precluding concretization. As Deleuze
and Guattari argue:
The diagnosis of becomings in every passing present is what
Nietzsche assigned to the philosopher as physician, "physician of
civilization," or inventor of new immanent modes of existence.
Eternal philosophy, but also the history of philosophy, gives way to a
becoming-philosophical.16
The interpretation of Zarathustra presented in this dissertation makes
it possible to reconcile die disparate strands of Nietzsche's seemingly
scattered political references with his epistemological and ontological
precepts. In Zarathustra, he begins with a simple, yet devastating
assumption: God is no longer in the picture. Although this assertion is one
of the most powerful that can be offered, Nietzsche presents it in a
subordinate clause within his introductory section. The irrelevance of God
is not the ultimate conclusion of Nietzsche's philosophy; it is the beginning.
Nietzsche goes on to reject other traditional bases for order and ultimately

15"Independence is for the very few; it is a privilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it
even with the best right bat without inner constraint proves that he is probably not only
strong, but also daring to the point of recklessness. He enters into a labyrinth, he multiplies
a thousandfold the dangers which life brings with it in any case, not the least of which is
that no one can see how and where he loses is way, becomes lonely, and is tom piecemeal
by some minotaur of conscience. Supposing one like that comes to grief, this happens so for
from the comprehension of men that they neither feel it nor sympathize. And he cannot go
back any longer. Nor can he go back to the pity of men." Nietzsche, Beyond Good and
E vil %IS.
16Deleuze and Guattari, Whatis Fhilosophy?\\7t.
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meaning. He concludes that the state is a poor substitute for the unifying
effect of the belief in God. The community of like-minded individuals is
capable of more positive action, but is ultimately flawed as it will
degenerate into a type of herd mentality.
It is this total loss of order and meaning that sets the stage for
Nietzsche's positive theory. Nietzsche does not mourn the loss of meaning;
it was never really there to begin with. The nausea of the eternal return is
not only contempt for the return of the commonplace and the mediocre; it
represents something much more important Indeed, nausea, not the eternal
return, may well be the central metaphor in Zarathustra. It represents the
abject horror created by the realization that there is ultimately no meaning
to be found in the universe as a whole. The heavens are silent, and human
society seeks to quell the questioning spirit
The horror caused by this realization nearly destroys Zarathustra.
However, it is necessary for Zarathustra to stare into the void and
appreciate die full horror of the absurd universe before his task can begin in
earnest Zarathustra is a harsh document; it peels away the layers of belief
that we have constructed over the course of human history to reveal the
only true arche. nothingness. It is only when Zarathustra embraces the void
that he can go on living. Thus, the concept of eternal return is not important
p erse, it is rather the effect that it produces, existential nausea, which is
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important Eternal return teaches the individual that there is no higher
good, no ultimate meaning. The universe is absurd and will remain so.
The horror of existence ultimately destroys die static view of the self;
including the solace that comes from the belief in order, divine or human,
which allows people to live their lives in the ordinary world without
complaint The confrontation with finitude destroys the ability to live as
before and continued existence can only come with the price of great
internal suffering in the face of an absurd universe. Ultimately, the
individual life can have great meaning, but only within that individual self.
Once we abandon hope for another world, and reliance upon others, it is
possible to create ourselves in our own image. This is the ultimate political
meaning of Zarathustra. It condemns the individual to an uncertain
existence, consciously free from the systems and institutions of solace that
have built up in society to shield the individual from these harsh truths. As
Ldwith argues, "as an at-tempter, Nietzsche-Zarathustra is always in transit;
a 'wanderer' who attempts, and walks along, different paths in order to
come to the truth."17 This "truth" is the radical isolation of the individual in
the face of a meaningless universe. It is a condemnation of a type, but
Nietzsche argues that it opens up an entirely new space of personal
existence, an undiscovered country.

17Karl Ldwith, N ietzsche's Philosophy o f the EtemaJRecurrence o fthe Same, 1Z
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n.
Although Nietzsche couches Zarathustra's arguments in prophetic
language and metaphor, Zarathustra is far from being a conventional
prophet Importantly, Zarathustra urges those who have listened to his
message to abandon him and mistrust his message. "I now go away alone,
my disciples! You too now go away and be alone! So I will have it Truly, I
advise you: go away from me and guard yourselves against Zarathustra!
And better still: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he has deceived you."18
As argued earlier, this admonishment is meant as much to protect
Zarathustra from contamination as to preserve his disciples. However, the
figure of Zarathustra offers another object of resistance that can spur
personal growth in those who listen:
The man of knowledge must be able not only to love his enemies but
also to hate his friends. One repays a teacher badly if one remains
only a pupil. And why, then, should you not pluck at my laurels?
You respect me; but how if one day your respect should tumble?
Take care that a falling statue does not strike you dead!19
Zarathustra's failure to teach others is not a failure of his educational
method or because of his lack of desire: die subject simply cannot be
communicated, much less taught It is the mistake of the modem age, and
of ourselves, to assume otherwise. How can someone learn self-overcoming

18Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:22.3.
19Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:223. Jung quoted this passage to Freud when he decided to
transcend his theories with that of symbolic analysis.
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without first having self-knowledge? It is this frustration that is the origin
of Nietzsche's genealogical analyses, and is exhibited prominently in
Zarathustra. This is why Zarathustra constantly laments that "they do not
understand me: I am not the mouth for these ears."20 It is impossible to
expect individuals who have not yet experienced the horrors of nausea to
recognize the profound symbols in Zarathustra's teaching for what they are:
calls to transmutation. The idea of transmutation cannot occur to such a
mind; it hardly warrants consideration. "You had not yet sought yourselves
when you found me

Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and

only when you have all denied me will I return to you."21
Nevertheless, Zarathustra continues throughout the narrative to refer
to himself as a prophet "I spoke my teaching, I broke upon my teaching:
thus my eternal fate will have it—as prophet do I perish!"22 Nietzsche
intentionally casts Zarathustra as a prophet rather than a teacher. A prophet
can speak in symbolic language; it is natural for the role. Furthermore, the
prophet communicates knowledge that is gained in an unconventional
manner, in this instance through personal insight Jaspers argues:
What is Nietzsche's real intention in this conflict between prophetic
proclamation and rejection of blind followers, between pedagogue
and iconoclast and in all the interplay of statements that cancel each
20Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5.
21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:223.
22Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:132.
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other out while they yet strike at the heart of tilings? What will
replace the religious founder for him and what does he wish to be for
others?23
To answer Jaspers, Zarathustra does not wish to be anything for
others. This is precisely the goal of Zarathustra's rejection of his followers.
If anything, Zarathustra is prophesying to himself, uttering a riddle of what
he might become. "Zarathustra the prophet, Zarathustra the laughing
prophet. . . I myself have set this crown on my head!"24 Zarathustra serves
as an impetus to the individual, but not as a guide. The harsh critiques of
social existence advanced by Nietzsche can offer an impetus to the
individual, but they cannot take the place of the experiences themselves.
The individual must be ready to receive the prophesy in order for the
transmutation to make sense.
The figs are falling from the trees, they are fine and sweet; and as
they fall their red skins split I am a north wind to ripe figs. Thus,
like figs, do these teachings fall to you, my friends: now drink their
juice and eat their sweet flesh! It is autumn all around and clear sky
and afternoon. Behold what abundance is around us! And it is fine
to gaze out upon distant seas from the midst of superfluity. Once
you said "God" when you gazed upon distant seas; but now I have
taught you to say " Obermensch’P
In actuality, Zarathustra's role is unclear, even to himself. It is
impossible to characterize him as either a traditional prophet or teacher.

23Jaspers, Nietzsche.
24Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.18.
25Nietzsche, Zarathustra, C:2.
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Zarathustra is as much the subject of his prophesy as its conveyor, in
keeping with the conclusion that die narrative of Zarathustra is essentially a
vehicle for the communication of internal experiences:
A seer, a wilier, a creator, a future itself and a bridge to the future—
and alas, also like a cripple upon this bridge: Zarathustra is all this.
And even you have often asked yourselves: Who is Zarathustra to
us? What shall we call him? And, like me, you answer your own
questions with questions
I walk among men as fragments of the
future: of that future which I scan. And it is all my art and aim, to
compose into one and bring together what is fragment and riddle and
dreadful chance.26
Indeed, the most profound assertions Zarathustra makes arise horn
his inner experience, as revealed through his continuing reinterpretation.
"My past broke open its graves, many a pain buried alive awoke: they had
only been sleeping, concealed in winding sheets."27 By releasing this
repressed knowledge and reinterpreting the will-to-power, the individual
brings forth his own prophetic imagination. "Truly, my happiness and my
freedom come like a storm. . . yes, you too, my friends, will be terrified by
my wild wisdom; and perhaps you will flee from it together with my
enemies."28 Zarathustra's prophesy is therefore one of self-revelation.

26Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:20.
27Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:3.
a Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:1.
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Because of the essentially subjective nature of this endeavor,
Nietzsche warns of the tendency to create ideal types based upon one's self,
most prominently in The Twilight o f the Idols,
Let us finally consider how naive it is altogether to say: "Man ought
to be such and such!" Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of
types, the abundance of a lavish play and change of forms—and
some wretched loafer of a moralist comments: "No! Man ought to be
different!" He even knows what man should be like, this wretched
bigot and prig: he paints himself on the wall and comments, "Ecee
HomoZ'29
In Zarathustra, Nietzsche asserts that there is no ideal type of the
transmuted self; the symbol of the Obermensch is intentionally undefined.
Even the process of self-overcoming is different for each individual, much
more so the outcome of this journey. As McGowan notes:
In the chaotic world of atomistic impulses, precepts, and experiences,
all explanatory schemes must fail because random chaos is the only
reality, and all freedom must be impossible because there can be no
agent who directs or chooses die movements of will
As a result
like Nietzsche, postmodern theory often finds itself in die position of
affirming (and desiring) something that it also declares impossible to
attain.30
Nietzsche emphasizes that since self-overcoming is never complete, it
makes no sense to articulate a goal that can never be attained, setting up
another signifier for bad conscience. "There has never yet been an
Obermensch. I have seen them both naked, the greatest and die smallest
man. They are still all-too-similar to one another. Truly, I found even the
29Nietzsche, Twilight o fthe Idols, 5:6.
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greatest man—all-too-human!"31 The individual who is ready to receive
Zarathustra's prophesy does not need such a concrete expression of the
transmutation, it will intuitively make sense. "One has to speak with
thunder and heavenly fireworks to feeble and dormant senses. But the voice
of beauty speaks softly: it steals into only die most awakened souls."32

m.
Nietzsche is not able, or does not desire, to overcome the political
problems that plague modem existence. Essentially, the political argument
in Zarathustra dismisses all forms of collective life as lost, a waste of time if
not a danger for the individual. Nietzsche's positive thought while it does
not seek to destroy collective existence, relegates its role to that of producing
the misery necessary to spur individuals toward nausea. However,
Nietzsche also makes it absolutely clear that only a few will be able to
overcome societal pressures and begin the process of self-creation. As such,
Nietzsche's positive thought leaves political theorists at something of a loss.
Nietzsche does not deal with important political issues such as order
and justice. Indeed, he dismisses both of these as societal myths that have
evolved to perpetuate the status qua Nietzsche's reticence on these topics is
therefore somewhat understandable. He does not speak to die nature of
30 McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critics, 88.
31 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:4.
32Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL5.
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justice because his theory of interpretation denies stable meanings, and
because he does not wish to set up the basis for new dogmas. However, this
does not solve the serious problems involved in social action. Nietzsche
essentially refuses to speak to practical politics, and therefore does not give
any guidance for how people should live together within the Lebenswelt.
Nietzsche's silence is his prerogative, but it has contributed to his
marginalization within political theory.
Nietzsche's political analysis in Zarathustra, inasmuch as it is
transsocial, denigrates the social realm in a manner that could be construed
as dangerous. If the social is not valued, indeed viewed with contempt,
there is no incentive to insure that those who are not capable of self
overcoming are protected. Although Nietzsche does not argue that the
masses should be manipulated, he does not provide any guidance for how
the exceptional individual should interact with others. However,
Nietzsche's imperative to separate from others to avoid contamination,
which ultimately led Zarathustra to seek solitude again, certainly supports
the assertion that Nietzsche did not have a social role in mind for die
individual.
Zarathustra therefore sets the stage for individual creation of a new
political milieu. Nietzsche informs us that die this project needs to be
undertaken, but not does not elaborate how. This is frustrating and
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dangerous, but certainly consistent with Nietzsche's philosophy and with
postmodern thought in general.
Nietzsche's legacy to postmodernist theory, then, is his deeply
ambiguous atomism, which embodies a radical desire for freedom
(understood negatively) and provides a powerfully skeptical
ontology in his battle against the truth value of human
representational schemes, discourses of knowledge, and moral
systems. 33
For Nietzsche, the blind alleys along the way to self-overcoming are
as important as the successes. Indeed, those who walk a direct path are
probably not obeying their inner directives. "All good things approach their
goal crookedly

His step betrays whether a man is stepping along his

own path: so watch me walk! But he who approaches his goal, dances.."34
Nietzsche's Zarathustra resembles Tiresias the blind soothsayer. He
possesses knowledge, but does not dare elaborate it to those who are not
ready. Such disclosure would surely destroy both the speaker and the
hearer. For Nietzsche, reticence is a virtue; it is the hallmark of truth. The
speaker immediately sets himself up as an external signifier, the potential
oppressor of those who hear. Further, the speaker assumes a measure of
responsibility for those who listen:
Something said to me voicelessly. "You know, Zarathustra, but you
do not speak!" And I answered at last defiantly: "Yes, I know, but I
will not speak!" Then again something said to me voicelessly: "You
w ill not Zarathustra? Is this true? Do not hide yourself in your
33McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critics, 87.
34Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:13.17.
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defiance!" And I wept and trembled like a child and said: "Alas, I
want to, but how can I? Release this from me alone! It is beyond my
strength!"35
In this sense, Zarathustra is a riddle. Its ultimate meaning can only
be grasped through interpretation and personal insight Because of this, it is
Nietzsche's reluctance to be specific that gives his philosophy such power.
"Be like a wind when it rushes forth from its mountain caves: it will dance
to its own pipe, the seas tremble and leap under its footsteps."36
Concretization and the hubris this implies is Zarathustra's greatest enemy,
threatening to destroy what he has created:
Where I found again my old devil and arch-enemy, the Spirit of
Gravity, and all that he created: compulsion, dogma, need and
consequence and purpose and will and good and evil: For must there
not exist that which is danced upon, danced across?37
Not all of the socially-created elements can be overcome. Even if they
could, the self in constant flux and one therefore never know himself
completely. No matter how much we resist, it is inescapable that humans
are innately social; we are created through interactions with others and
cannot live on our own for a number of years. The project outlined in
Zarathustra therefore is incapable of completion; it is a continuing project

35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:22. This is the stillest hour. It highlights that Zarathustra
contains this knowledge all along but does not want to confront the truth. Zarathustra is
spoken to by "something"—it is his subconscious.
36Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:132).
37Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:122.
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without a definite outcome. This is not a flaw—it is the intentional
outgrowth of Nietzsche's epistemology. The tension with the social realm
serves as a constant impetus to resistance and therefore creation. "The air
thin and pure, danger near, and the spirit full of a joyful mischief: these
things suit one another."38 This also precludes concretization into a
teleological schematization. Nietzsche's project seeks to provide an
alternative to continual emergence in collective identity. The transmuted
self can see the social realm and the Ultimate Man for what they are, and
this contempt will serve to prevent backsliding into the morass of collective
mediocrity, even if the social can never be completely overcome:
What is the ape to men? A laughing-stock or a painful
embarrassment In the same way will man be to the Obermensch a
laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment You have made your
way from worm to man, and much in you is still worm. Once you
were apes, and even now man is more of an ape than any ape. But he
who is wisest among you, he also is only a discord and a hybrid of
plant and of ghost39
Nietzsche's analysis implies that resistance is a natural expression of
the will-to-power. However, modem society causes the individual to
internalize this innate conflict which is then expressed in bad conscience
and self-hatred. Nietzsche argues that it is necessary to add a level of
intentionality to resistance. This is not to say that there must be a goal to
resistance, only that the individual must resist For Nietzsche, resistance is
38Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
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not a moral statement, "the good and the just call me the destroyer of
morals: my story is immoral."40 Resistance is however an ethical statement,
albeit within the sphere of individual aesthetic ethics. In this sense,
continual resistance is consistent with die need for perpetual selfovercoming. Resistance should be welcomed and encouraged; it is the
hallmark of transmutation. "You tell me: 'Life is hard to bear/ But if it were
otherwise why should you have your pride in die morning and your
resignation in the evening?"41 Nietzsche's philosophical and political
thought is therefore based upon the continual opposition between
competing perspectives, both within and external to the self. "Whatever I
create and however much I love it—soon I have to oppose it and my love:
thus will my will have it"42 The imperative of the will-to-power is therefore
constant flux and continual tension. It makes no sense to speak of stable
political structures or fixed identities; these are oxymoronic.

39 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3.
40 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:19.
41 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7. "The modem hero, the modem individual who dares to heed
the call and seek the mansion of that presence with whom it is our whole destiny to be
atoned, cannot, indeed must not, wait for his community to cast off its slough of pride, fear,
rationalized avarice, and sanctified misunderstanding. 'Live/ Nietzsche says, 'as though
the day were here/ It is not society that is to guide and save the creative hero, but precisely
the reverse. And so every one of us shares the supreme ordeal—carries the cross of the
redeemer—not in the bright moments of his tribe's great victories, but in the silences of his
personal despair." Joseph Campbell, The Hero w ith a Thousand Faces (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1949), 391.
42Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL12.
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Nietzsche recognizes that the model of selfhood he proposes is
inimical to politics. By its very nature, the simple fact of living with others
necessarily involves the creation of a superstructure of debts, obligations,
and responsibilities. Besides becoming the basis of bad conscience, these
responsibilities limit the possibilities for self-creation necessary for
transmutation. "Great obligations do not make a man grateful, they make
him resentful; and if a small kindness is not forgotten it becomes a gnawing
worm."43 All individuals seek to express the will-to-power, but this
expression is inevitably frustrated by the limiting factors imposed by
collective existence. Because of this, collective existence in any form is
inimical to the fundamental nature of humanity: "Where I found a living
creature, there I found will-to-power; and even in the will of the servant I
found the will to be master."44 Because of this, Nietzsche refuses to
entertain the notion of a reformed political theory of either the state or the
community. Nietzsche's silence on this matter speaks volumes.
The implication of the interpretation advanced in this dissertation is
that Nietzsche's model of transmuted selfhood precludes all models of
collective action. Although Nietzsche offers hints that some types of
collective existence might be acceptable, like die Greeks or friendship, these
are never articulated as a concrete alternative. Furthermore, it is telling that
43Nietzsche, Zarathustra, U:3.
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Nietzsche never discusses, in any of his works, educating children. His
positive theory seems wholly devoted to the improvement of die already
mature individual. As such, Nietzsche's philosophy is one of redemption,
not utopianism. Nietzsche abandons die impulse inherent in political
theory to articulate a new political system to foster his goals. Rather, it is the
responsibility of the individual to recognize the pathological character of
modem society and attempt existential escape.
Zarathustra can therefore be read as a modem philosophical tragedy.
We know the problems of individual and collective existence, but can never
complete the process of transmutation or redeem social existence. We can
see the meaninglessness of existence as revealed in the void, but can never
fully overcome it or even seek consolation. Human knowledge is uncertain,
and given the symbolic deficiency of language, the most important insights
concerning reality cannot be communicated. As Nietzsche states: "The
world is deep*."*5 Interpretation can never cease; life is constant uncertainty
in the face of an absurd universe that can communicate no solace.
Humanity is in a sense cursed; it alone is capable of nausea but can never
alleviate it This is why individual existence is so precarious and prone to
self-deception. "Uncanny is human existence and still without meaning: a

**Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
45Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:195.
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buffoon can destroy it"46 If the individual is to survive as an individual, it
is necessary to become light in the face of the void, and to dance over its
precipice:
And me too, who love life, it seems that butterflies and soap bubbles,
and whatever is like them among men, know the most about
happiness. To see these light; foolish, dainty, affecting little souls
flutter about—that moves Zarathustra to tears and song. I could only
believe in a God who knew how to dance.47
This is the meaning behind Nietzsche's often misunderstood
imperative: "many die too late and some die too early. Still the doctrine
sounds strange: 'Die at the right time.'"48 Through the realization of
personal finitude, the individual is able to project himself against a concrete
endpoint, and thereby reinterpret his existence accordingly. Only then is it
possible to create a meaning for oneself in the face of the abyss of
meaninglessness.
What, then, does this interpretation of Zarathustra offer? Certainly
not a political theory, but a political project continual resistance and self
creation. Whenever and wherever the individual encounters seemingly
stable institutions and value judgements, they must be confronted and
resisted. "Good and evil, and rich and poor, and noble and mean, and all
the names of the virtues: they should be weapons and ringing symbols that
46 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §7.
47Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:7.
48Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:21.
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life must overcome itself again and again!"49 Nietzsche argues that eternal
self-overcoming is the secret of life. "And life itself told me this secret
'Behold, it said, 'I am that which m ust overcome itself again and again."’50
This is a process of continual self-overcoming, not a teleological exercise.
This eternal flux is inimical to social existence of any type, which requires
stability. As Jaspers concludes, "instead of developing an unambiguous
political theory, Nietzsche's thinking reveals the abyss of existence and the
ambiguity of all reality."51
Zarathustra can be read as offering hope in the face of increasingly
collectivized existence. In this sense, Zarathustra is indeed a subversive
document It denies the validity and efficacy of politics, and calls for
resistance to social norms and even to the idea of society. It further calls for
individuals to confront inner truths that are profoundly disturbing, not only
to personal mental health but to societal harmony. Is Zarathustra then the
harbinger of nihilism and anarchy? Nietzsche's critique of society and new
model of selfhood does not necessarily call for the destruction of society or
complete alienation from others. Rattier, Nietzsche calls for psychological
liberation from metaphysical systems of consolation and existential

49Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:7.
30 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
51Jaspers, N ietzsche, 277.
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alienation. As Ldwith states, "in the horizon of Nietzsche's 'atheism/ which
recognizes for the first time that the'death o f G od means for man'freedom
towards death/ Hegel and Feuerbach draw together as 'church fathers/
'half-priests/ and 'veil-makers'."52 Similarly, the "death of the state" opens
up a new space for personal existence free from ideology and nationalism.
Jaspers states:
Creation without transcendence, or self-being without God, must
lead to two conclusions that Nietzsche actually draws. When human
finiteness ceases to be evident as finiteness because it is no longer
enclosed by any infinity, i.e., when creative freedom faces
nothingness instead of transcendence (for that which has nothing
outside itself is everything, with die result that finiteness cannot be
taken seriously), then either (1) creation is absolutized as a temporal
actuality to which no valid standard applies, or (2) it is deified.
Neither of these related to transcendence; each is, instead, a way in
which confidence becomes evident at the boundary which is no
longer a boundary but a fulfillment53
Zarathustra can be read as a calling to a way of life that is cognizant
of the dangers of society and confident of individual self-worth. The
transmuted individual is unwilling to compromise personal growth for
safety or convenience. This is perhaps the ultimate individual expression of
the will-to-power, the will-to-self. It is paradoxical that one must be called
back to an awareness of the self, an awareness that should be die most
fundamental. As Klossowski argues, "on die one hand, forgetfulness and
unconsciousness axe necessary to life; on the other hand, there is a 'will to
52Ldwith, N ietzsche's Philosophy o fthe EternalRecurrence o f the Same, 38-39.
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unconsciousness' which, precisely because it is willed, implies the
consciousness of our conditioned state: an iiresoluble antimony."54
Nietzsche does not provide the resolution to this tension; perhaps it cannot
be resolved.
Nietzsche is therefore not the prophet of nihilism; he also does not
call for anarchy. He rather calls us to confront the uncomfortable truth that
the universe is meaningless, the universe is silent, the myths with which we
surround ourselves are unhealthy and insure mediocrity. As painful as it is,
we must embrace the void and realize our own personal nausea. When we
do this, it becomes evident that the only alternative is to create ourselves in
our own image. "To be sure, I am a forest and a night of dark trees: but he
who is not afraid of my darkness will find rosebushes too underneath my
cypresses."55 There is, however, little guidance available and no assurance
of success.

53Jaspers, Nietzsche, 160.
54Klossowski, N ietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 54.
35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL10.
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A ppen dix

A Response to H eidegger' s Q uestion : "W h o is N ietzsche ' s
Z arathustra ?"

Both Nietzsche and Heidegger have received a great deal of attention
in contemporary scholarship. Indeed, it has widely been recognized that
these two philosophers have made some of the greatest contributions to
"postmodern" philosophy and political thought However, despite the
voluminous amount of research and exhaustive interpretation of both of
these thinkers, there is a surprising lack of unanimity regarding the content
of their central philosophical tenets, much less the implications of their
thought for philosophy as a whole. The philosophies of both Nietzsche and
Heidegger remain heuristic nightmares, full of mutability and outright selfcontradiction.
Complicating this interpretive endeavor is the fact that Heidegger
was greatly influenced by Nietzsche; indeed a thoroughgoing examination
of Nietzsche is central to Heidegger's philosophical-ontological project The
culmination of this ongoing dialogue is Heidegger's voluminous fourvolume treatise on Nietzsche, which has arguably become the most
influential interpretation of Nietzsche's thought coloring many later
interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy.
However, Heidegger's analysis is open to criticism along many
angles, from charges of outright misinterpretation to his reliance on the
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highly problematic Nachlass fragments. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to examine Heidegger's entire interpretation of Nietzsche, especially
considering these potentially serious problems with the text Fortunately,
Heidegger produced a compact essay on Nietzsche's self-proclaimed
masterpiece, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Heidegger's essay, "Who is
Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" contains the essential philosophical points
Heidegger concludes from his Nietzsche project and therefore serves as a
microcosm of Heidegger's ruminations on Nietzsche. This essay will
therefore examine Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's magnum opus
to demonstrate the fundamental problems with Heidegger's reading of
Nietzsche.
L
With characteristic understatement, Heidegger begins his essay by
stating: "the question, it would seem, can be easily answered."1 However,
Heidegger demonstrates that the interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is
anything but easy. The narrative format of Zarathustra is a drastic
departure from conventional philosophical texts, and the use of symbol and
metaphor can lead to intense confusion and multiple interpretations.
Although Heidegger does not separate his essay into sections, it is possible

1Martin Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" in N ietzsche U: The Eternal
Recurrence o fthe Same, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Frandsco: Harper and Row, 1984),
211. All references are to this edition. This essay is also included in The N ew N ietzsche, ed.
David B. Allison, trans. Bemd Magnus (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985).
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to identify several heuristic stages Heidegger progresses through to reach
his ultimate conclusion: Nietzsche's thought as expressed in Zarathustra
represents the ultimate expression of metaphysical thinking.2
First, Heidegger grapples with what the actual figure o f Zarathustra
is supposed to represent Zarathustra goes down from his mountain to
teach the wisdom he has accumulated in solitude. He is therefore according
to Heidegger an advocate, ein Fiirsprecher? Heidegger argues that the
advocate does not only proclaim knowledge, he "interprets and explains
what he is talking about and what he is advocating/'4 Thus, Nietzsche's
character of Zarathustra must do more than simply present "truth," he must
integrate it into an interpretation of the fundamental order of the universe.
Heidegger identifies this fundamental order as the will-to-power.
It is therefore Heidegger's contention that Nietzsche's philosophy is
centered around the exploration of different manifestations of this unitary
concept: the will-to-power. "Zarathustra speaks on behalf of life, suffering,
and the circle, and that is what he speaks forth. These three, 'life, suffering,
circle,' belong together and are the selfsame."5 Indeed, for Heidegger the

2 As Heidegger argues: "every great thinker always thinks one jump more originally than
he directly speaks. Our interpretation must therefore try to say what is unsaid by him."
Martin Heidegger, N ietzsche 1: The W ill to Power as A rt trans. David Farrell Krell (San
Francisco: Harper, 1979),134.
3 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 211.
4 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 212.
5 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 212.
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entirety of Nietzsche's Zarathustra is devoted to an examination of the
different permutations of the will-to-power, as expressed in conflict and
recurrence. In this sense, Zarathustra is expressing a philosophy of
perpetual flux, yet rooted in the actions of the will:
Accordingly, Zarathustra introduces himself as an advocate of the
proposition that all being is will to power, a will that suffers in its
creating and colliding, and that wills itself precisely in this way in
eternal recurrence of the same. With the above assertion we have
brought the essence of Zarathustra to definition. . . 6
The "essence" of Zarathustra is therefore this advocacy of the will-topower as the fundamental essence of the universe. The two most familiar
elements of Zarathustra's teaching are the Obermensch (overman) and the
eternal recurrence of the same, both therefore manifestations of the will-topower.7 Heidegger examines what each of these doctrines represent, but is
more concerned with the relationship between the two. As Heidegger
argues: "to all appearances, he teaches two things: the eternal return of the
same and the overman. However, it is not immediately apparent whether
and in what way the things he teaches belong together."8
Indeed, these two concepts are problematic in themselves; the
connection between the two is even less forthcoming. Heidegger asserts:

6 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 213.
7 It is best to leave the term Obermensch untranslated, but since Krell renders it as
"overman" I have left it as such in citations from his translation of Heidegger.
8 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 213.
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"yet even if the connection were to be clarified it would remain questionable
whether we are hearing the advocate, whether we are learning from the
teacher

We must pay attention to the way he says it, on what occasions,

and with what intent"9 Thus, for Heidegger the manner in which
Zarathustra becomes aware of his destiny is as important as Zarathustra's
ultimate teachings.
Heidegger then moves to examining how Zarathustra becomes aware
of his destiny to advocate these concepts of the Obermensch and the eternal
recurrence. Heidegger focuses on a section in the third part of Zarathustra
entitled "The Convalescent" (Der Genesende). Zarathustra has become
comatose after his experience of the great nausea and the occurrence of his
"most abysmal thought"10 Heidegger argues that "'The Convalescent is
one who is getting ready to turn homeward, that is to toward what defines
him. The convalescent is under way to himself, so that he can say of himself
who he is."11
Thus, it is in this passive mode of convalescence that Zarathustra is
ready to learn of his destiny, what he must ultimately advocate. However,
Heidegger notes that Zarathustra does not learn of this destiny from within

9 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 213.
10Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, 111:13.
11Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 212.
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himself. Rather, it is revealed to him. "Zarathustra does not utter the
decisive phrase 'You are the teacher of the eternal return!' by himself to
himself. His animals tell him this."12 Indeed, "the animals seek to learn
Zarathustra's essence. He asks himself whether he is still—that is, whether
he is already—the one who he properly is."13 However, Heidegger has
already identified Zarathustra's essence as that of the advocate of the willto-power in its various forms. Therefore, Zarathustra must come to realize
this himself and act accordingly.
"The animals say: 'For your animals know well, O Zarathustra, who
you are and must become: behold, you are the teacher o f the eternal
return—that is now your destiny!' Thus it comes to light Zarathustra must
first become who he is."14 Zarathustra becomes this teacher through the
explication of the will-to-power as expressed in the concept of the
Obermensch and ultimately the eternal recurrence. Because of the
problematic nature of these concepts, it is necessary to analyze both of these
in detail to discern the connection between the two.
12Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 213. In N ietzsche II, Heidegger discusses
the symbolism of the animals in great detail:"___Zarathustra's two animals, eagle and
serpent, symbolize: first, in their circling and coiling—the a id e and ring of eternal return;
second—in their essential character as pride and discernment, respectively, these
constituting the basic stance of the teacher of the eternal return and his mode of knowledge;
third, as the animals of his loneliness, being supreme exactions on Zarathustra himself."
Heidegger, N ietzsche H 48.
13Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 214.
14Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 214. Heidegger quotes from "The
Convalescent".
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First, however, it is necessary to comment upon Heidegger's analysis
thus far. Heidegger's characterization of Zarathustra's task is problematic.
Heidegger casts Zarathustra as primarily an advocate of a specific
worldview, the primacy of the will-to-power. This characterization
overlooks Zarathustra's self-proclaimed task, self-overcoming, and to urge
action toward this ultimate goal. "Mankind is something that must be
overcome. What have you done to overcome him?"15
This task of self-overcoming is more concrete and experiential than
Heidegger assumes. Indeed, much of the Zarathustra narrative is devoted
to the task of overcoming various facets of modem humanity. These include
the repression inherent in mass society, the problems of friendship, and
finally the confrontation with personal finitude and the tangential nature of
the self.
The task of self-overcoming necessarily involves the concept of the
eternal return, but it is not limited to or even epitomized in the eternal
recurrence, as Heidegger seems to argue. Indeed, Heidegger conflates the
concept of the will-to-power, self-overcoming, and the idea of die
Obermensch in his insistence that Zarathustra's destiny is the teacher of the
eternal recurrence. Each of these concepts are distinct elements in the

is Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3.
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project of self-creation but are treated separately by Nietzsche. The relation
between these elements will be specifically discussed later in this paper.
Heidegger's insistence that Zarathustra only learns of his destiny as
the teacher of the eternal recurrence in the passive mode of convalescence is
even more problematic. Rather, Zarathustra learns only of his destiny
through concrete interaction in the world and eventually through self
contemplation; specifically not through a passive reception of knowledge.
Indeed, Zarathustra acknowledges this task as supremely difficult:
Alas, I have to climb my most difficult path! Alas, I have started
upon my loneliest wandering! But a man of my sort does not avoid
such an hour the hour that says to him: "Only now so you tread
your path of greatness!" Summit and abyss—they are now united in
one!"16
The convalescence is actually brought about through Zarathustra's
realization of die meaninglessness of existence, as symbolized in the great
nausea. The period of Zarathustra's convalescence is therefore his recovery
from his confrontation with this horror
"Ah! You are coming—I hear you! My abyss speaks, I have turned
my ultimate depth into the light! Ah! Come here! Give me your
hand . . . nausea, nausea, nausea—woe is me!" Hardly had
Zarathustra spoken these words, however, when he fell down like a
dead man and remained like a dead man for a long time.17

16Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 111:1.
17Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 01:13.1-2
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Indeed, Zarathustra's worst horror arises from his realization that the
imperative of the eternal return renders him, exceptional though he may be,
as ontologically equal to the most crude specimen of humanity.
I had seen them both naked, the greatest man and the smallest man:
all too similar to one another, even the greatest all too human! The
greatest too small!—that was my disgust at man! And eternal
recurrence even for the smallest! That was my disgust at all
existence! Alas! Nausea! Nausea! Nausea!18
Zarathustra is only able to overcome this nausea by separating
himself from others, and creating himself as worthy of recurrence.
How did I free myself from nausea? Who rejuvenated my eyes?
How did I fly to the height where die rabble no longer sit at the well?
Did my nausea itself create wings and water-divining powers for me?
Truly, I had to fly to the most extreme height to find again the
fountain of delight!19
Is it therefore accurate to characterize Zarathustra as an "advocate"
or a "teacher"? All his attempts at communicating his knowledge ultimately
fail. He abandons his students when he realizes that they are only forming
new power relationships and making him an object of bad conscience.20
Indeed, Zarathustra abandons completely the possibility of teaching anyone

18Nietzsche, Zarathustra, HI:13.2. Hollingdale renders this as "disgust"
19 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:6.
Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:22. "But that night he went away alone and forsook his
friends." This is the end of Part II, and of Zarathustra's dealings with others. He must
return to his solitude, and his internal conversation, in order to fully comprehend the
enormity of his repressed knowledge of the void.
20
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his fundamental concepts, including the eternal recurrence, much less the
project of self-overcoming:
I need pure, smooth mirrors for my teaching; upon your surface even
my own reflection is distorted. Many a burden, many a memory
weighs down your shoulders; many an evil dwarf crouches in your
comers. And there is hidden mob in you, too. And although you are
of a higher type, much in you is crooked and malformed. There is no
smith in the world who could hammer you straight and into shape
for me.21
Zarathustra rather recognizes his project of self-overcoming as an
essentially solipsistic enterprise, incommunicable and indefinable. He
recognizes his attempts at teaching to have been a waste of time, detracting
from his most pressing task. It is only when he returns to his solitude that
he can begin the project of self-creation in earnest:
It is returning, at last it is coming home to me—my own Self and
those parts of it that have long been abroad and scattered among all
things and accidents. And I know one thing more: I stand now
before my last summit and before the deed that has been deferred the
longest22
Rather than being an advocate for the eternal recurrence, Zarathustra
is an advocate of the self-contemplation in a foundationless context He
does not as much advocate the will-to-power and the eternal recurrence as
recognize their utility in his project Zarathustra defines himself primarily
as the conqueror of the great nausea, preparing a way for the creation of his

21 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:11.
22Nietzsche, Zarathustra, HI:1. Zarathustra has returned to solitude, and can then recover
his self and begin the new quest
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own self: "This is the man without nausea, this is Zarathustra himself, the
overcomer of the great nausea"23
IL
Heidegger analyses in detail the enigmatic concept of the
Obermensch. Heidegger must argue that there is an "essence" of man to be
found in Nietzsche's thought to sustain his contention that Nietzsche's
philosophy is metaphysical. Heidegger argues that Nietzsche identifies the
essence of contemporary humanity as incapable of correctly relating to
"Being," i.e. the will-to-power. Indeed, humanity in its present form is
radically estranged from its own essence—a type of ontological
inauthenticity similar to Heidegger's analysis in Sein u n dZ eit Heidegger
asserts that the Obermensch is more than a new expression of the heroic
personality or even an existential attitude, it is a new permutation of
ontological relation:
With the name overman Nietzsche is by no means designating a
merely superdimensional human being of the kind that has prevailed
hitherto. Nor is he referring to a species of man that will cast off all
that is humane, making naked willfulness its law and titanic rage its
rule.24
Heidegger asserts that Nietzsche realizes that humanity is no longer
in proper relation to the "being of Beings", again understood as the will-topower. This ontological estrangement is the cause of modem Dekadenz.
23Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IV:8.
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The Obermensch is therefore the reawakening of the innate constitution of
human ontology, which has become repressed (forgotten) through centuries
of doctrinal and philosophical error
. . . the overman—taking the word quite literally—is that human
being that goes beyond prior humanity solely in order to conduct
such humanity for the first tim e to its essence, an essence that is still
unattained, and to place humanity firm ly within that essence.25
For Heidegger, Nietzsche understands this ontological problem as a
value judgement "The question asks: Is man, in his essence as man
heretofore, prepared to assume dominion over the earth?"26 Nietzsche of
course answers in the negative. The question, then, is how to rectify this
ontological alienation. The answer, and the problem, is to be found in
transcendence. Heidegger asks of Nietzsche:
Must not prior man be conducted beyond himself, over his prior self,
in order to meet this challenge? If so, the 'over-man/ correctly
thought cannot be the product of an unbridled and degenerate
fantasy that is plunging headlong into the world.27
In other words, there must therefore be a method to the madness.
The ontological substrate, the will-to-power, is indefinite and indefinable. If
there is to be a relation between the essence of humanity and pure existence
as such( Being), then it must proceed, Le. be revealed, from existence itself.
24 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215.
25 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215. Italics mine.
26Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215.
27Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 215-216.
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Man's existence is already compromised by a faulty relation to its own
being; it cannot expect to proceed towards an authentic relation to Being, the
will-to-power.
Heidegger thus asserts that Nietzsche expects Being to reveal itself to
the individual as the will-to-power. If Heidegger is correct, then Nietzsche
is indeed a metaphysician. Transcendent reality, even in the guise of the
indefinable will-to-power, is a component of metaphysical things. One
cannot have metaphysics without the "meta'—the transcendent Indeed, the
use of symbols to identify the indefinable is perhaps even more than
metaphysical, it smacks of theology. Heidegger implies that Nietzsche's
Zarathustra is a messianic figure, showing the way for ontological salvation:
The overman proceeds beyond prior and contemporary humanity;
thus he is a transition, a bridge. In order for us learners to be able to
follow the teacher who teaches the overman, we must—keeping now
to the imagery—get onto the bridge. We are thinking the crucial
aspects of the transition when we heed these three dungs: First, that
from which the one who is in transition departs. Second, the
transition itself. Third, that toward which the one in transition is
heading.28
Heidegger asserts that the one who is in transition is the inauthentic
self, the estranged individual. The transition is the revealing of Being. The
one in transition is therefore heading towards an authentic relation to the
Being of beings. The aim of this transition, in Nietzsche's terms, is

28 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 217.
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existential justification. Only the ontologically authentic individual is
justified in assuming dominion over world (existence).29 This is no mere
call for dominance of others or material reality, it is a call to ontological
integration. Zarathustra is therefore the advocate for the possibility of
authentic relation to Being. "Whither the one in transition goes, there his
longing is at home. The one in transition and even the one who points out
the way to him, the teacher, i s . . . on the way home to the essence that is
most proper to him, He is the convalescent"30
Nietzsche therefore diagnoses the fundamental problem of
modernity much as Heidegger does himself: the inauthentic relation to
Being. How then can Heidegger accuse Nietzsche of being the culmination
of metaphysics? Ultimately, Heidegger implies that Nietzsche's
understanding of ontological alienation remains too deeply rooted in the
philosophic tradition to make the leap ahead into clear understanding.
Nietzsche has begun to grasp the truth, but it remains largely in the
shadows, primarily because of his problematic and erroneous conception of
time.

29"What is being contested is decided in advance: power itself, which requires no aims. It
is aim-less, just as the whole of beings is value-less. Such aimlessness pertains to the
metaphysical essence of power. If one can speak of aim here at all, then the "aim" is the
aimlessness of man's absolute dominance over the earth. The man of such dominance is the
Over-man." Heidegger, N ietzsche IV: N ihilism , ed. David F. Krell; trans. Frank A. Capuzzi
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1962), 82.
30Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 217.
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Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's Obermensch and the willto-power is far from clear. Even in Zarathustra, Nietzsche speaks sparingly
of the Obermensch, and even then in allegorical terms. However, what does
the Obermensch represent, if not the embodiment of the will-to-power?
Essentially, the Obermensch represents the human being who has been able
to conquer the transcendental nonsense that has been inculcated into
modem man. It is in this sense that die Obermensch is the meaning of the
earth, as it is solely based in the material and experiential Lebenswelt.
The Obermensch is the meaning of die earth. Let your will say: the
Obermensch shall be the meaning of the earth! I entreat you,
brothers, remain true to the earth, and do not believe those who
speak to you of otherworldly hopes! They are poisoners, whether
they realize it or not31
Accordingly, the Obermensch represents one who is strong enough to
endure the great nausea without capitulating to the desire for
transcendental solace. Indeed, the Obermensch actually desires the moment
of the great nausea, as it is the only method open to the promise of self
creation:
In truth, man is a polluted river. One must be a sea to receive this
polluted river and not become defiled. Behold, I teach you the
Obermensch he is this sea, in him your great contempt can go under.
What is the greatest thing you can experience? It is the hour of the

31 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3. Here we are dealing with a conception of the
"earth" similar to the phenomenological conception of the "world." As such, the individual
ObennenscHs Umweltwould constitute the meaning of the earth rather than the social
matrix and pre-constructed meaning of das M art
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great contempt The hour in which even your happiness becomes
loathsome, and your reason and virtue as well. 32
This is not to say that the Obermensch is some sort of fixed goal or
predetermined set of psychological traits. "Man is a rope, fastened between
animal and Obermensch—a rope over an abyss.. .What is great in man is
that he is a bridge and not a goal."33 The Obermensch is therefore not a
separate species or supernatural being. The Obermensch represents an
attitude towards existence, one that is able to endure the horror
meaninglessness of existence and continue to create.
Zarathustra does not see the Obermensch as some ontological
category or even as the embodiment of the will-to-power. In Nietzsche's
philosophy, all beings and objects are manifestations of the will-to-power,
"where I found a living creature, there I found will to power."34 Nietzsche's
concept of the Obermensch is much more concrete than Heidegger
interprets it Zarathustra argues that the Obermensch lies with toe
individual self, waiting to be created:
Ah, you men, I see an image sleeping in the stone, toe image of my
visions! Ah, that it must sleep in the hardest ugliest stone! Now my
hammer rages fiercely against its prison. Fragments fly from toe
stone: what is it to me? I will complete it for a shadow came to me—
toe most silent the lightest of all things came at once to me! The
32Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §3. This is the calling for the great nausea and thus the
separation from the herd.
33 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §4.
34 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:12.
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beauty of die Obermensch came to me as a shadow. Ah, my brothers!
What are the gods to me now!35
For Nietzsche, therefore, the concept of the Obermensch is actually
anti-metaphysical. It is concrete, arising from die experiences of the
individual, and actively opposed to the transcendence inherent in
metaphysical thinking. Heidegger fundamentally misinterprets this concept
by concentrating on an ontology that is simply not present in Nietzsche's
thought, as will be further demonstrated.

m.
Heidegger attempts to bolster his metaphysical interpretation by
linking Nietzsche's conception of time as expressed in the eternal recurrence
to the temporality of traditional metaphysics. Indeed, the Heidegger argues
that the very manner in which Nietzsche has Zarathustra realize his
philosophical insights is the epitome of metaphysical thinking:
In die section 'On die Great Longing' Zarathustra speaks to his soul.
According to Plato's teaching—a teaching that became definitive for
Western metaphysics—the essence of thinking resides in the soul's
solitary conversation with itself. The essence of thinking i s . . . the
telling-self-gathering which die soul itself undergoes on the way to
itself, within the scope of whatever it is looking at36

35 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, II:Z
36 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 218. Heidegger cites Plato, Theaetetus
189e; and The Sophist 263e. In Nietzsche's defense: "Is there anything worse, said
Nietzsche, than to find oneself facing a German when one was expecting a Greek?"
Deleuze and Guattari, W hatis Philosophy? 109.
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It is through this self-conversation that the essential nature of time is
revealed to Zarathustra. "In converse with his soul Zarathustra thinks his
'most abysmal thought"'37 This thought is the fundamental unity of the
three ekstases of time: past, present and future, in the "Moment"38 The
Moment is the conflation of time into an enduring yet constantly recurring
point of temporal existence. Therefore, the Moment is a seeming
contradiction: a moment of recurrence that is also a point of eternal
endurance. Taken metaphysically, this problematic assertion takes on an
almost mystic character
All three phases of time merge in a single identity, as the same in one
single present, a perpetual "now." Metaphysics calls the constant
now "eternity." Nietzsche too thinks the three phases of time in
terms of eternity as the constant now. Yet for him the constancy
consists not in stasis but in eternal recurrence of the same.39
However, Nietzsche could argue that his conception of time is not as
much of a concrete temporal theory as it is a therapeutic tool for redeeming
mankind from the fundamental cause of its estrangement revenge.
Heidegger acknowledges this possibility: "Nietzsche's thought thinks in the
direction of redemption from the spirit of revenge. His thinking would

37Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 218.
38"In the end, Zarathustra hears which eternity it is that his animals are proclaiming to him,
the eternity of the Moment that embraces everything in itself at once: the downgoing."
Heidegger, N ietzsche H 59.
39Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 218.
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minister to a spirit which, as freedom from vengefulness, goes before all
mere fraternizing—but also before all vestiges of the sheer w ill to punish."40
If the moment is to be worthy of recurrence, it must be free from
revenge. Since revenge has dominated humanity's thought until now, this
is not a simple task. It requires the overcoming of the inauthentic nature of
man.41 This overcoming is complicated by Nietzsche's particular conception
of revenge. "If Nietzsche understands revenge as the spirit that defines and
sets the tone for man's relationship with Being, then he is from die outset
thinking revenge metaphysically."42
According to Heidegger, this metaphysical revenge is not grounded
in any reaction to concrete conditions or social relationships, it flows horn a
much deeper source. Heidegger argues that such an expansive concept of
revenge is also fundamentally metaphysical:
What is revenge? We can now provisionally say that revenge is
persecution that defies and degrades. And such persecution is
supposed to have sustained and permeated all prior reflection, all
representation of beings? If the designated metaphysical scope may
in fact be attributed to the spirit of revenge, that scope must
somehow become visible in terms of the very constitution of
metaphysics.43
40 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 219.
"That is what is peculiar to, and hardest to bear in, the doctrine of eternal return—to wit,
that eternity is in the Moment, that the Moment is not the fleeting 'now,' not an instant of
time whizzing by as a spectator, but the collision of future and past. Here the Moment
comes to itself. It determines how everything recurs." Heidegger, N ietzsche II, 57.

41

42Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 221.
43Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 222.
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Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's revenge as that of resentment
towards time: "Nietzsche has Zarathustra say: 'This, yes, this alone is
revenge itself: the will's ill will toward time and its 'it was'."44 This is in
turn ill will towards human finitude and therefore death. Heidegger
implies that this spirit of revenge is contempt towards all that which is finite
and ephemeral, which is necessarily therefore everything human:
Revenge is the will's ill will toward time and that means toward
passing away, transiency. Transiency is that against which the will
can take no further steps, that against which its willing constantly
collides. Time and its "It was" is the obstacle that the will cannot
budge. Time, as passing away, is repulsive; the will suffers on
account of it Suffering in this way, the will itself becomes chronically
ill over such passing away; the illness then wills its own passing, and
in so doing will everything in the world be worthy of passing away.
Ill will towards time degrades all that passes away.45
If man is to be redeemed from this ill will, it is necessary to overcome
this contempt for finitude. "Redemption releases the ill will from its 'no'
and frees it for a 'yes.' What does the 'yes' affirm? Precisely what the ill
will of a vengeful spirit renounced: time, transiency."46 It is necessary to
fully accept the truth of finitude, despite the psychological pain that will
surely result

44 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 223.
45Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 224-225. Heidegger is missing the point—
the individual must acknowledge and accept finitude in order to progress beyond the need
for metaphysical consolation.
46 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 226.
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The mechanism by which this overcoming of resentment against time
is to be accomplished is the realization of the eternal return of the same.
"Redemption from revenge is transition from ill will towards time to die
will that represents being in the eternal recurrence of the same. Here die
will becomes the advocate of the drcle."47
Heidegger identifies several problems with Nietzsche's advocacy of
the eternal recurrence which fundamentally link it with metaphysics. First,
Nietzsche's use of w ill in this context strikes Heidegger as overtly
transcendental:
Nietzsche says that revenge is the will's ill will. But w ill signifies the
Being of beings as a whole, and not simply human willing. By virtue
of the characterization of revenge as 'the will's ill w ill/ the defiant
persecution of revenge persists primarily in relationship to the Being
of beings.48
It follows that since the revenge that must be overcome is
ontological—transcendental; the will that responds must be the quasi-mystic
"will" that Nietzsche supposedly inherits from Schopenhauer and Hegel.49

47 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 226. "As for Nietzsche, he does not want to
instill perfect comprehension by means of the few, cryptic things he says about his doctrine
of eternal return. Rather, he wants to pave the way for the transformation of that
fundamental attunement by which alone his doctrine can be comprehensible and effective.
What he hopes for his contemporaries is that they become fathers and forefathers of those
who surely must come." Heideggpr, N ietzsche H, 17.
48 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 223. For Nietzsche there is no willing
besides human willing! Heidegger fundamentally misses Nietzsche's point about the
essential concreteness of the politics of ressentim ent, which is a self-replicating system of
mutually-supportive societal mechanisms.
49 Heidegger ignores the feet that Nietzsche explicitly refutes Schopenhauer's pessimistic
philosophy o f will and the Hegelian dialectic.
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Heidegger bolsters this supposed parallel by emphasizing the temporal
understanding of metaphysics that is joined to this particular ontological
connotation of will. "Passing away and transiency must recur in that
coming as the same. And such recurrence itself is perdurant only if it is
eternal. According to the doctrine of metaphysics, die predicate 'eternity'
belongs to the Being of beings."50
The eternal recurrence is thus doubly metaphysical, both in terms of
the will driving it to a particular configuration and the confluence of
metaphysical temporality sustaining die recurrence. Again, Heidegger
portrays Zarathustra as messianic in tone by advocating this particular
ontological scheme: "Only when the Being of beings represents itself to man
as eternal recurrence of the same can man cross over the bridge and,
redeemed from the spirit of revenge, be the one in transition, the
overman."51
It is through the joining of the "will" expressed in the Obennensch
and the perpetual becoming of the eternal recurrence that Platonic
metaphysics is fulfilled.52

50Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 226.
51 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 226.
52"'Recurrence' thinks the peraumentizing of what becomes, thinks it to the point where
the becoming o i what becomes is secured in the duration o fits becoming. The'eternal'
thinks the permanentizing of such constancy in the direction of its ending back into itself
and forward towards itself." Heidegger, N ietzsche W 164*165.
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As the teacher of eternal recurrence and die overman, Zarathustra
does not teach two different things. What he teaches coheres in itself,
since one demands die other as its response. Such correspondence—
in the way it essentially unfolds and die way it withdraws—is
precisely what the figure of Zarathustra conceals in itself, conceals yet
at the same time displays, thus allowing the correspondence to
provoke our thought Yet the teacher knows that what he is teaching
remains a vision and a riddle. He perseveres in such reflective
knowledge.53
Again, Heidegger portrays Zarathustra as a teacher of mystical
knowledge that can only be apprehended in part, and then only through the
revelation of Being through the confluence of "will" and "recurrence."
Indeed, the circular and interdependent structure underlying Nietzsche's
philosophy points to its innate connection to traditional metaphysics:
These doctrines are conjoined in a circle. In its circling, the teaching
corresponds to that which is—to the circle which as eternal
recurrence of die same makes out the Being of beings, that is, what is
permanent in Becoming.54
Nietzsche is thus able to obtain a partial insight into the fundamental
problems of ontology. However, his underlying connection to the
temporality of metaphysics ultimately causes the failure of his project
Within the infinite temporal horizon of metaphysical thinking, it is
impossible to obtain freedom from revenge:
What is left to say, if not this: Zarathustra's doctrine does not bring
redemption from revenge? We do say i t . . . But we say it in order to

53Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 226-227.
54Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 228.
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turn our attention to the fact that—and die extent to which—
Nietzsche's thought is too animated by die spirit of prior reflection.55
Heidegger thus concludes that Nietzsche remains mired in the
metaphysical abyss that he claims to be reacting against That this failure to
break free of metaphysics occurs in Nietzsche's most radically different
work, employing a narrative framework in explicit rejection of traditional
philosophical forms, is doubly damning. If Nietzsche is indeed unable to
break free of metaphysical thinking, which he categorically rejects,
Heidegger is able to then support his position as the first post
metaphysician. However, this conclusion is based upon a very narrow
reading of Nietzsche bordering on misinterpretation, as will be
demonstrated below.
However, Heidegger's entire analysis of the implications of the
eternal recurrence is only tenable if one takes for granted that Nietzsche
actually intended the eternal recurrence to be taken seriously as a
cosmological doctrine. "Ill will" towards time is a characteristic of a specific
mode of human existence: mass society. In Nietzsche's analysis, revenge
towards time is the epitome of ressentim ent. The individual, enmeshed in
historical and social circumstances, may well resent his place in this order.56

55Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 229.
56This argument is extensively explored in The Genealogy o fM orality. In addition,
Nietzsche warns against the "tyranny of history" in his early essay "The Uses and Abuses
of History."
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Repressive morality has cultivated this existential self-hatred while
depriving the individual of the means to liberate himself:
To be sure, there are sour apples whose fate is to wait until the last
day of autumn: and they become at the same time ripe, yellow, and
shriveled
Many a man never becomes, sweet, he rots even in the
summer. It is cowardice that keeps him fastened to his branch.57
This pathetic creature is identified by Nietzsche as die Ultimate Man.
"The time of the most contemptible man is coming, die man who can no
longer despise himself. Behold! I shall show you the U ltim ate Man."** The
Ultimate Man is the individual manifestation of mass society, unable to even
conceive of himself as an individual outside of his societal context This
individual is a socially-created historical being, truly suffering from the
tyranny of history and revenge against time.
Willing liberates: but what is it that fastens in fetters even the
liberator? "It was": that is what the will's teeth-gnashing and most
lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been
done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past The will cannot
will backwards; that it cannot break time and time's desire—that is
the will's most lonely affliction.59
How, then, does Nietzsche propose to free is from this revenge?
Heidegger argues that Nietzsche cannot because of his flawed temporality.
Perhaps the answer lies in Nietzsche's intention—he does not argue that it is

57 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:21.
58Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Prologue §5. D erLetzteM enschis often translated as the "Last
Man."
59 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 11:20.
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necessary to completely overcome the revenge against time. Indeed, die
definition of the Ultimate Man cited above is one that can no longer despise
oneself, i.e. capitulation to revenge against time. It is the desire to make
oneself worthy of recurring eternally that drives the project of self-creation
in Zarathustra. This is epitomized in one of the most misquoted passages
from Zarathustra: "Many die too late and some die too early. Still the
doctrine sounds strange: 'Die and the right time.'"60
The attitude of the eternal recurrence is not a capitulation to the need
for consolation in the face of death. Rather, it is a method of coping with the
contingency of existence and the realization of finitude. As such, the
concept of the eternal recurrence represents a much more drastic departure
from metaphysical temporality than Heidegger is willing to admit Indeed,
the eternal recurrence is a call for the individual to use time as a foil—
revenge cannot be overcome, but it can be turned to one's advantage. "O my
soul, I taught you the great contempt that comes not as the gnawing of a
worm, the great loving contempt which loves most where it despises
most"61 Thus contempt brought about by ill will against time can lead to
the great nausea and the possibility of self-creation.

60Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:21.
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IV.
As argued above, Heidegger's interpretation ultimately rests upon
construing Nietzsche's ontology as metaphysical Primarily, Heidegger
attempts to demonstrate that Nietzsche's conception of revenge is
essentially ontological, rather than concrete or even existential However,
Heidegger's discussion of the relation of beings to Being is especially
problematic considering Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics.
The most fundamental problem with Heidegger's interpretation is his
reading of Nietzsche's "ontology of man." In Heidegger's analysis of
Zarathustra this takes the form of Heidegger's characterization of human
will. Heidegger identifies Nietzsche's concept of the will-to-power with
transcendental ontology. "Here the word w illing names the Being of beings
as a whole. Such Being is will. . . Nietzsche is thinking the selfsame thing
when he acknowledges the primal Being of beings as power."62
Heidegger's interpretation of the will-to-power as the primal Being of
beings extends beyond the subjective will.63 Heidegger completes an
analysis of Nietzsche's concept of the will-to-power connecting the

61 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IILT4.
62 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 223.
63"Nietzsche interprets the Being of Beings as will to power. Art he considers the supreme
configuration of will to power. The proper essence of art is exemplified in the grand style.
But the latter, because of its own essential unity, points to an original concrescive unity of
the active and reactive, of Being and Becoming." Heidegger. N ietzsche 1,135-136.
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individual will to the "will" that Heidegger contends lurks behind the
phenomenal world. In this manner, human will is actually a component of
die substrate of primal existence:
In modem metaphysics, there for die first time appears expressly and
explicitly, the Being of beings appears as will. Man is man insofar as
he comports himself to beings by way of thought In this way he is
held in Being. Man's thinking must also correspond in its essence to
that toward which it comports itself, to w it the Being of beings as
will.64
Thus, Heidegger connects the will-to-power to his own ontology at
the expense of Nietzsche's philosophy. According to Heidegger,
Nietzsche's concept of will is flawed as it does not explicidy accept a
connection to the "Being of beings" of which it is a part In this sense,
Nietzsche's thinking is im plicitly metaphysical—it may deny an ontological
connection between beings but it nevertheless relies upon this mistaken
distinction in order to support its own ontology:
Metaphysical thinking rests on die distinction between what truly is
and what measured against this, constitutes all that is not truly in
being. However, what is decisive for die essence of metaphysics is by
no means the fact that the designated distinction is formulated as the
opposition to the suprasensuous to the sensuous realm, but die fact
that this distinction—in the sense of a yawning gulf between the
realms—remains primary and all-sustaining.65
hi order to sustain this interpretation, Heidegger must bolster his
contention that there is in fact an "essence" of human existence and that it is

64Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 223.
65 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 230.
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indeed connected to a larger ontological context This is no small feat as
Heidegger himself acknowledges: "On what basis do Being and die essence
of human being belong together? How do they cohere/ if Being is no
fabrication of human beings and humanity no mere special case among
beings?"66
Can the coherence of Being and the essence of human being be
discussed at all, as long as our thinking remains mired in the
previous conception of man? According to it man is animal
rationale, the rational animal. Is it coincidence, or a bit of lyrical
ornamentation, that die two animals, eagle and serpent accompany
Zarathustra; that theyXsXL him who he must become, in order to he
the one that he is?67
It is in the discussion of the symbol of die animals that Heidegger
reveals that he has fundamentally misread Zarathustra and is therefore
largely incorrect in his interpretation of Nietzsche. Much of Heidegger's
analysis of Nietzsche has centered upon the symbols of the animals, who
within the narrative of Zarathustra reveal most of the innate truths about
existence to Zarathustra. Heidegger interprets this as the revelation of Being
to Zarathustra, as these pronouncements come from a source outside of
Zarathustra's concrete experience or philosophical interrogation. Again, the
connection between die two doctrines is critical:

66 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 231. Here Heidegger has exposed a
central assumption that is the weakness of his philosophy and interpretation of Nietzsche.
According to Nietzsche, the idea of essence and Being are assumptions that have arisen
from the need of logical discourse.
67Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 231.
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The riddle of who Zarathustra is, as teacher of eternal return and
overman, is envisaged by us in the spectacle of the two animals. In
this spectacle we can grasp more directly and more readily what our
presentation tried to exhibit as the matter most worthy of question,
namely, the relation of Being to that living being, man.68
According to Heidegger, the two animals represent different facets of
Zarathustra's teaching and in turn different facets of existence. Because the
two animals are always presented together in the narrative, Heidegger is
able to argue that they represent two indivisible aspects of the same
teaching. What, however, do these symbols mean? These symbols are
essentially indefinable by conventional philosophical terms, they are poetic
symbols representing the creative energy of Zarathustra.69 Nevertheless,
Heidegger argues the symbol of the animals point to constituent elements of
Zarathustra's ontology.
Heidegger identifies the symbol of the eagle as analogous to the
concept of the Obermensch. The eagle, which Zarathustra hails as
representative of pride, represents the spirit of the person who stands
against the tide of fate to shape his own destiny.70 The analysis of the

68Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 232.
69"Zarathustra's animals are all the more implacable inasmuch as we hear them—not
expressing certain propositions or rules or admonitions-but saying from out of their
essential natures what is essential, and saying it with growing lucidity through the palpable
presence of sensuous imagery. Sense-images speak only to those who possess the
constructive energy to give them shape, so that they make sense. As soon as the poetic
force—that is, the higher constructive energy—wanes, the emblems turn mute. They
petrify, become sheer 'facade' and 'ornament'". Heidegger, N ietzsche II, 48.
70"The eagle is the proudest animal. Pride is the fully developed resolution of one who
maintains himself at the level of his own essential rank, a rank to which his task appoints
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symbol of the serpent reveals an identification with the concept of die
eternal recurrence.71 Zarathustra identifies the serpent with wisdom,
implying that wisdom borne of experience leads to the realization of the
eternal recurrence. These two symbols therefore signify two essential traits:
pride and wisdom.
According to Heidegger, die symbol of the eagle further represents
the "human essence" while the symbol of the serpent represents the
ontological substrate:
Essential to the figure of Zarathustra remains the fact that the teacher
teaches something twofold which coheres in itself: eternal return and
overman
"Eternal return of the same" is the name for the Being
of beings. "Overman" is the name for the human essence that
corresponds to such being.72
Thus, the two symbols, and the two doctrines that correspond to
them, are actually representative of the authentic ontological condition.
Why, then, does Heidegger critique Nietzsche's philosophy as

him. Pride is the assurance of one who no longer confuses himself with anyone else. Pride
is poised above, is defined by heights and elevation; yet it is essentially different from
arrogance and superciliousness. The latter remain in need of a relationship with what is
beneath them; they have to set themselves in relief against it and this they remain
necessarily dependant upon it For they possess nothing that would inherently enable them
to imagine themselves in elevation." Heidegger, N ietzsche D, 46.
71 "The serpent is the most discerning animal. Discernment suggests the mastery of actual
knowledge concerning the sundry ways in which knowing announces itself, holds itself in
reserve, asserts itself and yet remains flexible, avoiding its own pitfalls. Proper to such
discernment are the power to metamorphose and to disguise oneself—a power that cannot
be reduced to vulgar falsehood—and the mastery of masks. Discernment does not betray
itself. It haunts the background while playing in the foreground; it wields power over the
play of Being and semblance." Heidegger, N ietzsche D, 47.
72 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 231.
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metaphysical? Beyond die objections to Nietzsche's temporality analyzed
above, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche fails to recognize the extent of the
ontological link between the two concepts of the Obermensch and die
eternal recurrence.
Heidegger's interpretation of the symbol of the animals is central to
his entire analysis, but it is based upon a questionable presupposition.
Heidegger's interpretation of the animals has them speaking to Zarathustra
as outside influences, presumably the revealing of Being. However, it is
more in keeping to argue that the symbol of the animals represent
constituent elements of Zarathustra's own consciousness. The animals only
appear to Zarathustra when he is in solitude or in his cave. They coax him
to the realization of things he already knows, but has been drowned out by
his interactions with others. Heidegger does not speak to this possibility, no
matter how strongly it is implied by the text
Heidegger further argues that the principal reason Nietzsche foils to
fully comprehend the innate link between these concepts is that both of the
animal symbols correspond to the Dionysian mode of existence rather than
the more analytical and rational mode of die Apollonian. This reliance on
solely poetic symbols is symptomatic of die metaphysics inherent in
Nietzsche's philosophy. According to Heidegger, this is no mere accident
That Nietzsche interpreted and experienced his most abysmal
thought in terms of the Dionysian only speaks for die fact that he still
thought it metaphysically, and had to think it so lely in this way. Yet
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it says nothing against the fact that this most abysmal thought
conceals something unthought, something which at the same time
remains a sealed door to metaphysical thinking.73
Here is the paradigmatic occurrence of Heidegger's analysis of the
"unthought" The unthought Heidegger finds lurking behind Nietzsche's
philosophy is the metaphysical belief in transcendence, however specially
denied by Nietzsche. In this instance, the transcendent element in
Nietzsche's thought is exacerbated by his failure to recognize the essential
unity of the will-to-power and the ontological relationships Heidegger
identifies.
It is in this light that Heidegger constantly criticizes Nietzsche's
conception of the will-to-power is existential rather than ontological.74 It is
this fundamental criticism, which includes the problems of temporality, that
forms the root of Heidegger's critique. Paradoxically, Heidegger criticizes
Nietzsche for failing to realize the essential character of the will-to-power as
an ontological doctrine; while at the same time elaborating an ontological

73 Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" 233. Italics mine. It is difficult to
characterize Nietzsche's treatment of these, as use of these ideal types changes. The
Dionysian and the Apollonian are ideal types, both are valid strategies for becoming.
74"Will to power is the essence of power itself.. .. Will does not hover beyond power; it is
rather the empowering command within the essence of power to exercise power. The
metaphysical determination of Being as will to power remains unthought in its decisive
im port... to think Being, the beingness of beings, as will to power means to conceive of
Being as the unleashing if power to its essence; the unleashing transpires in such a way that
unconditionally empowering power posits the exclusive preeminence of beings over
Being." Heidegger, Nietzsche III: The W ill to Power as Knowledge and as M etaphysics,
trans. Joan Stambaugh, David F. KnD, and Frank Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper and Row,
1987), 164.
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theory strikingly similar to Nietzsche's existential analysis. Both are
fundamentally concerned with rescuing die individual from repressive
societal mechanisms, through the realization and confrontation with the
fundamental truth of finitude.
Heidegger argues that in failing to recognize that there is an actual
"essence" of human existence, Nietzsche has opened die door to that which
he decries most Nietzsche's deficient existential conception of the Being of
beings as the will-to-power actually leads to nihilism, die "forgetting of
Being."75 For Nietzsche, this is a pleasant prospect Heidegger's ontological
scheme, which leads to the concept of "destiny" and V olksgeist, is nothing
more than a repackaging of the mystic transcendence found in religious and
metaphysical modes.
Indeed, the abandonment of ontology is exactly what Nietzsche
prescribes for philosophy. Ontological schemes of the type Heidegger
advances lead to a static perception of reality. Nietzsche's conception of the
universe as the manifestation of the will-to-power is designed to overcome
the being/Being relationship inherent in traditional philosophy, including
Heidegger. The ontology espoused by Heidegger leads to the further
entrenchment of the Descartean subject/object distinction, specifically
rejected by the presuppositions of phenomenological thought.
75"The essence of nihilism proper is Being itself in default of its unconcealment, which is as
its own 'It', and which determines its 'is' in staying away." Heidegger, N ietzsche IV, 7\h.
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It is in this spirit that Heidegger is the type of philosopher that
Nietzsche is reacting against Heidegger chastises Nietzsche for failing to
overcome metaphysics while at the same time setting up a quasi-mystical
ontology to replace the metaphysical myths of transcendence. Heidegger
thus falls into the trap of previous philosophers: they become dogmatists.
"You have served the people and the people's superstitions, all you famous
philosophers!—you have not served truth!"76
Nietzsche has no lack of venom for career philosophers such as
Heidegger. According to Nietzsche, such philosophers will always be
compromised by the need of their work to conform to accepted standards.
"The genuine man, the free spirits, have always dwelt in the desert; as the
lords of the desert; but in the towns dwell the well-fed famous
philosophers—the draught animals. For they always, as asses, pull-the
people's cart!"77 This leads to the failure to address the really hard
questions of philosophy, especially the type that leads to the collapse of
accepted worldviews. Rather than grappling with the meaninglessness of
existence, philosophy turns towards the endless repackaging of the same
concepts and doctrines. "To all of these lauded wise men of the academic

76 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 0:8.
77Nietzsche, Zarathustra, IL8.
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chairs, wisdom meant sleep without dreams: they knew no better meaning
of life"78
Nietzsche therefore argues that philosophical knowledge is
exceptionally difficult to come by, especially ontological knowledge. This
difficulty has led to the creation of disingenuous shortcuts common to
metaphysical philosophy:
It was suffering and impotence—that created all afterworlds; and that
brief madness of happiness that only the greatest sufferer
experiences. Weariness, which wants to reach the Ultimate with a
single leap, with a death-leap, a poor ignorant weariness, which no
longer desires even to desire: that created all gods and afterworlds.79
For Nietzsche, metaphysics is therefore a symptom of philosophical
Dekadenz. Seeking a fundamental ontology is not problematic perse, but
Heidegger tends to objectify ontological terms in a manner that comes very
close to metaphysical transcendence. Nietzsche argues that there is no
existence beyond that of human experience, and therefore it is necessary to
interpret ontology as essentially a human construct "But that 'other world',
that inhuman, dehumanized world which is a heavenly Nothing, is well
hidden from men; and the belly of being does not speak to man, except as
man."80

78 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:2.
79 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
80Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
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Much as Heidegger argues at the beginning of Being and Time, it is
necessary to interrogate human existence in order to gain understanding of
the nature of Being. This is, of course, a difficult task: "Truly, all being is
hard to demonstrate; it is hard to make it speak. Yet tell me, brothers, is not
the most wonderful of all things most clearly demonstrated?"81 The
narrative of Zarathustra is partially aimed at the interrogation of this Being,
with the conclusion that all existence is concrete and centered within the
human consciousness.
Nietzsche completes this interrogation, with the following results:
Yes, this Ego, with its contradiction and confusion, speaks most
honestly of its being—this creating, willing, evaluating Ego, which is
the measure and value of tilings. And this most honest being, the
Ego—it speaks of the body, and insists upon the body, even when it
fables and fabricates and flutters with broken wings. Ever more
honestly it learns to speak, the Ego: and the more it learns, the more it
finds titles and honors for the body and the earth.82
Therefore, when the self is interrogated, it reveals its immanent
constitution, the concrete, physical Being of consciousness. This Being is not
revealed to the Ego, the Ego seeks this knowledge within itself. By
constructing his argument on the passive reception of this knowledge
through the revelation of Being, Heidegger has set up his fundamental
ontology as a meta-object separate from the human consciousness, and
therefore produces a metaphysical construct
n Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 1:3.
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Heidegger can only sustain his critique of Nietzsche as a
metaphysician by concretizing Nietzsche's rhetorical concepts to die point of
exaggeration. Rather than as an interpretive scheme, Heidegger asserts that
the will-to-power represents die "Being of beings." Rather than as an
instructive concept, Heidegger argues that the Obennensch represents the
"essence of man." Finally, Heidegger represents the eternal recurrence as
die revelation of the Being of beings to the individual. The
misunderstanding of these concepts renders Heidegger's interpretation of
Nietzsche's philosophy untenable.
The answer to Heidegger's question, "Who is Nietzsche's
Zarathustra," has indeed proven difficult to answer. He is not, however,
merely the teacher of regurgitated metaphysics. Zarathustra's teaching is
instead a profoundly anti-metaphysical philosophy of immanent action
within the lebensw elt, with no hope of help from Beyond.

82Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 13.
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